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Abstract
There are many important dimensions of epistemic evaluation, one of which is justification. We don’t just evaluate
beliefs for truth, reliability, accuracy, and knowledge, but also for justification. However, in the epistemological literature,
there is much disagreement about the nature of justification and how it should be understood. One of the controversies
that has separated the contemporary epistemological discourse into two opposing camps has to do with the internalism-
externalism distinction. Whereas internalists defend certain core assumptions about justification from the pre-Gettier
tradition, externalists generally think that the traditional conception is untenable and should be replaced.
In this compilation thesis, I argue for, defend, and develop a particular brand of internalism, both in general and with
respect to specific sources of justification. In papers 1 and 2, I defend a couple of well-known arguments for mentalism
and accessibilism. Moreover, I also point out how prominent versions of these theses are vulnerable to serious problems
(e.g., about over-intellectualization and vicious regresses). Part of my goal in the first couple of papers is to figure out what
commitments the internalist should take on in order to avoid the externalist's objections, while at the same time receiving
support from considerations that have motivated internalism in the past. In papers 3 and 4, I start from the assumption that
mentalism is true and attempt to answer the following questions: 1) which non-factive mental states can play a justification-
conferring role with respect to empirical belief? And 2) why does this set of states play the epistemic role it does? In
response to question 1, I argue that all and only one's beliefs and perceptual experiences have justificatory relevance. In
response to question 2, I argue that one's beliefs and perceptual experiences are one's strongly representational states, and
that strongly representational states necessarily provide support to certain empirical propositions. Having done so, I then
defend mentalism about scientific evidence from a couple of prominent objections in the recent literature. Lastly, in papers
5 and 6, I argue for a particular brand of internalism about testimonial and memorial justification and show how that
position has a dialectical advantage over its main competitors.
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1. From Knowledge to Justification 
What is knowledge?
1
 This age-old problem was for a long time thought to be solved. First, 
whenever you know that such-and-such is the case, then such-and-such must of course be the 
case. In other words, whatever is known must be true. Second, whenever you know that such-
and-such is the case, you must believe that such-and-such is the case. In other words, you 
cannot know something without actually believing it. Third, whenever you know that such-
and-such is the case, then you must also be justified in believing that such-and-such is the 
case; lucky guesses do not qualify as knowledge. So, in other words, whatever is known must 
also be justifiably believed.
2
 These three ingredients were for the longest time thought to give 
us the essence of knowledge: they are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for 
knowledge. Indeed, philosophers as diverse as Plato (Theaetetus, 201; Meno, 98), Alfred Ayer 
(1956, 34), and Roderick Chisholm (1957, 16) all agreed that the following analysis of 
knowledge was correct: 
The JTB analysis: S knows that p if and only if (i) p is true; (ii) S believes that p; and 
(iii) S is justified in believing that p.  
However, philosophical problems have a tendency to reappear or reassert themselves, 
and the problem of knowledge is no exception. In 1963 Edmund Gettier published a three 
page article (really, it was only two and a half pages) which exposed a fatal flaw in the JTB 
analysis: it is possible to have a justified true belief that fails to qualify as knowledge. For 
                                                          
1
 Here, I’m only concerned with propositional knowledge, not practical or objectual knowledge. 
2
 The kind of justification that is necessary for knowledge is, more specifically, epistemic justification; i.e., 
justification that somehow speaks in favor of the truth of the thing believed. Proponents of pragmatic 
encroachment will disagree with the claim that knowledge only requires justification of the epistemic kind 
insofar as they think that there are pragmatic conditions on knowledge, and that those conditions may have 
something to do with whether one has knowledge-level justification. This is, however, an issue that I will 
sidestep in the dissertation. For detailed discussions of pragmatic encroachment, see Fantl & McGrath (2002); 
Stanley (2005); and Schaffer (2006). 
12 
 
example, you may be justified in believing that p, competently deduce q from p, and, as a 
result, justifiably believe that q as a conclusion of the deduction (where p is false and q is 
true). Since you have a justified true belief that q is the case, that belief should qualify as 
knowledge according to the JTB analysis. However, since q was deduced from a false 
proposition, that may disqualify your belief in it from counting as knowledge. In order to 
make the counterexample more lucid, consider the following scenario: 
Bob’s wife just got diagnosed with cancer. While driving her home from the doctor’s 
office, Bob forms the belief that one person in the car has cancer. However, as fate 
would have it, the diagnosis is wrong: Bob’s wife doesn’t have cancer. Moreover, 
unfortunately, and without knowing so himself, Bob actually has cancer. So there is 
after all one person in the car who does have cancer. 
In the scenario, Bob has a justified true belief that one person in the car has cancer, but it fails 
to constitute knowledge.  
After Gettier had provided counterexamples to the JTB analysis of knowledge, many 
epistemologists tried offering an amended analysis that would prove immune to 
counterexample.
3
 One prominent strategy was to figure out what the fourth “no-Gettier” 
condition that would turn justified true belief into knowledge was. Perhaps knowledge should 
be analyzed as JTB + something else.
4
 Another strategy was to somehow strengthen the 
justification condition so that the JTB analysis would give the right verdict about Gettier-
cases.
5
 And a third strategy was to eliminate the justification condition altogether
6
 and, in 
certain cases, to replace it with something else, like reliable doxastic dispositions
7
 or proper 
causal etiology.
8
 However, the problem of knowledge has proved to be resilient.
9
 Indeed, 
now, more than fifty years after the publication of Gettier’s paper, there is still little 
agreement among epistemologists about what the proper analysis of knowledge looks like, or 
even whether knowledge can be analyzed into constituent parts. 
                                                          
3
 See Shope (1983). 
4
 See, e.g., Lehrer & Paxson (1969); Nozick (1981); and Sosa (1999). 
5
 See, e.g., Chisholm (1989, ch. 6). 
6
 See, .e.g., Sartwell (1991; 1992).  
7
 See, e.g., Dretske (1989). 
8
 See, e.g., Goldman (1967; 1976). 
9
 As a result of its resilience, a recent strategy has been to argue that knowledge cannot be analyzed into 
necessary and sufficient conditions, or at the very least to argue that JTB-inspired analyses invariably will fail. 
See, e.g., Zagzebski (1994); and Williamson (2000). 
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Following the publication of Gettier’s seminal article was not only a heightened focus 
on knowledge, but also on the three elements comprising the traditional JTB analysis. And, 
after a while, justification came to supersede knowledge as the main object of epistemological 
study, surrounded by its own puzzles and problems.
10
 However, the reason for this was only 
partly due to the impact of Gettier’s article. Another major contributing factor had to do with 
the resilience of skeptical problems and the apparent inability of our reflections on knowledge 
to provide satisfying solutions to (or dissolutions of) them.
11
 In a nutshell, the problem is that 
when we’re pressed by the skeptic to provide grounds for thinking that our everyday beliefs 
actually have a lot going for them, epistemically speaking, our knowledge attributions often, 
if not always, appear to be unjustified. After all, do we really know the things we usually take 
ourselves to know, or might we somehow simply be deceived into thinking that we do? There 
appears to be several ways in which we actually might be deceived at this very moment such 
that it undermines our knowledge.
12
 Does this mean that the skeptic has won and that our 
beliefs don’t have anything going for them? Not necessarily. Whereas our knowledge 
attributions may seem vulnerable to a host of skeptical problems,
13
 our justification 
attributions don’t. This is arguably the most important insight provided by René Descartes’ 
Evil Demon thought experiment.  
In the First Meditation, Descartes noted that a malevolent demon could be deceiving 
us about the external world by somehow making our perceptual experiences systematically 
unreliable, and, moreover, that this kind of deception appears to undermine our knowledge of 
                                                          
10
 Although, as we will see, there is a recent trend among proponents of the so-called “knowledge-first” program 
to place knowledge at the heart of epistemological analysis and research. See, e.g., Williamson (2000). In my 
thesis, I will discuss and criticize certain core aspects of this species of externalism (see paper 4). 
11
 For a comprehensive study of the history and development of skepticism as a philosophy, see Popkin (2003). 
12
 Consider the following Brain in a Vat (BIV)-Based Skeptical Argument: 
1. I don't know that I'm not a BIV. 
2. If I know that I have two hands, then I know that I am not a BIV. 
3. Therefore, I don't know that I have two hands.  
The first premise is motivated by reflection on the BIV scenario, and the second premise is motivated by the 
plausible Closure Principle, according to which you know whatever you competently deduce from your 
knowledge. Moreover, the argument seems to undermine much of what we usually take ourselves to know since 
it doesn't lose any of its strength if we replace the proposition that “I have two hands” from the second premise 
and the conclusion with any similar empirical proposition that we usually take ourselves to know. 
13
 Many strategies have of course been devised for responding to the skeptic. One of them, popularized by G. E. 
Moore (1939), is to argue that the first premise of the BIV-Based Skeptical Argument is false. The argument can 
be presented as a modus ponens as follows: 
1. I know that I have two hands. 
2. If I know that I have two hands, then I know that I am not a BIV. 
3. Therefore, I know that I am not a BIV. 
The second premise is motivated as before, by the Closure Principle above, whereas the first is motivated by the 
idea that one's perceptual experience is able to justify beliefs with the same (or sufficiently similar) propositional 
content. For more on skeptical arguments and Moore-inspired responses, see Pryor (2000); and Pritchard (2012). 
14 
 
the world.
14
 After all, if my actual perceptual experiences are subjectively identical to those 
that I would have if I were deceived by such a demon, then it appears that I can’t know 
anything about how the world really is on the basis of them.
15
 However, even though 
Descartes’ demon may undermine my knowledge of the world, it doesn’t appear to undermine 
the justification I have for my beliefs about it.
16
 Indeed, this fundamental intuition is the basis 
of Keith Lehrer and Steward Cohen’s (1983) New Evil Demon Problem for reliabilism. 
According to reliabilism, a belief is justified (if and) only if it is the result of a reliable 
doxastic disposition. However, reliabilism seems to be false since a Cartesian demon could 
make our beliefs about the world unreliable without undermining their justificatory status. For 
the purposes of my dissertation, this is a very important argument which I will revisit later in 
the introduction and also in much greater detail in several of the papers to come.
17
 
So, because of the various problems facing our reflections on knowledge, justification 
has in many ways become a central notion of contemporary epistemology. And that, 
moreover, is not a cop out. Regardless of whether or not our beliefs qualify as knowledge, we 
care deeply about their rational standing; i.e., whether, and to what degree, they are justified.
 
18, 19
 In the next section, I will therefore take a closer look at two of the debates that are 
responsible for shaping the contemporary epistemological discourse on the nature of 
justification.  
 
                                                          
14
 This is how he presents the thought experiment: “I shall suppose, therefore, that there is, not a true God, who 
is the sovereign source of truth, but some evil demon, no less cunning and deceiving than powerful, who has 
used all his artifice to deceive me. I will suppose that the heavens, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and 
all external things that we see, are only illusions and deceptions which he uses to take me in. I will consider 
myself as having no hands, eyes, flesh, blood or senses, but as believing wrongly that I have all these things.” 
(Descartes, 1641/1968, 100.) 
15
 The demon scenario, which functions as a possible explanation for the perceptual evidence we have, threatens 
to undermine our knowledge of the world, according to Descartes, since knowledge requires immunity from 
doubt and the scenario has the function of making us doubt the things we usually take ourselves to know. 
Moreover, it also threatens our knowledge even if we don’t endorse a certainty or immunity from doubt 
condition on knowledge. Indeed, it does so by pointing out that our evidence is compatible with both the 
skeptical hypothesis and the “common sense” hypotheses that we usually take ourselves to know, and this might 
make us sufficiently doubtful of the veracity of the common sense hypotheses that we no longer can be said to 
know that they are true. 
16
 For a disagreeing perspective, see Unger (1975, ch. 5), who argues, in a manner that anticipates some of the 
central points made by Williamson (2000) over two decades later, that Descartes' demon even undermines the 
justification we have for our beliefs about the world. 
17
 See especially papers 1 and 3. 
18
 Some philosophers, like Cohen (1984), think that a justified belief is the same thing as a rational belief, 
whereas others, like Lyons (2016), think that rationality and justification are different epistemic properties. 
19
 Some philosophers, like Sutton (2007, 7) and Williamson (forthcoming, 24), will disagree insofar as they 
defend the identification of justification with knowledge. 
15 
 
2. The Nature of Justification 
In the previous section we saw how it was that justification came to the fore in the 
epistemological discourse. In this section, we will take a closer look at the internalism-
externalism debate and the foundationalism-coherentism debate, both of which are 
responsible for drawing some of the most important battle lines in the literature on 
justification. Let’s begin with the internalism-externalism debate. 
 
2.1 Internalism vs. Externalism 
Philosophers often draw a distinction between two different kinds of justification.
20
 First, you 
can have justification to believe a certain proposition, regardless of whether or not you 
actually believe it. For example, after watching the weather forecast you can have justification 
to believe that it will rain tomorrow, but without having to form that belief. Second, you can 
also have justifiably held beliefs (or other doxastic attitudes). For example, if you believe the 
proposition above—that it will rain tomorrow—in a way that is properly based on that which 
gives you justification to believe it, then your belief is justifiably held. There are many ways 
in which this distinction has been characterized. Following Roderick Firth (1978), we can say 
that the first kind of justification is justification in the propositional sense, whereas the second 
kind of justification is justification in the doxastic sense.
21
 Thus, propositional justification is 
a property of propositions (for an epistemic agent), whereas doxastic justification is a property 
of doxastic attitudes (had by an epistemic agent).  
Now, epistemic internalism should most plausibly be construed as a theory about 
propositional justification.
22
 It is a theory about the propositions one has justification to 
believe/withhold/disbelieve, or, in other words, about the doxastic attitudes one has 
justification to hold (regardless of whether or not one actually holds them). (Henceforth, I’ll 
therefore use “justification” as short for “propositional justification”.) More specifically, in 
order to be an internalist one has to endorse either of two theses. The first thesis goes by the 
name mentalism (or non-factive mentalism), and it claims that facts about justification 
supervene upon one’s non-factive mental states, where a mental state is non-factive just in 
                                                          
20
 Some even operate with three kinds of justification. See, e.g., Littlejohn (2012, 5). 
21
 For other ways of characterizing the same distinction, see Goldman (1979); Conee & Feldman (1985); Pryor 
(2005); and Smithies (forthcoming). Wedgwood (2017, 139-141) traces the distinction back to Aristotle. 
22
 There are of course those who construe it as a theory about doxastic justification (see, e.g., Conee & Feldman, 
2001; and McCain, 2016). However, there are important reasons as to why that is problematic, some of which I 
will discuss later in the dissertation. 
16 
 
case it doesn’t necessarily have true propositional content.23, 24 Thus, according to mentalism, 
there can be no change in the facts about which doxastic attitudes one now has justification 
(to a certain degree) to hold without a change in one’s non-factive mental states.25  
The second thesis goes by the name accessibilism or access internalism, and it claims 
that there is an internalist accessibility condition on justification. More specifically, it says 
that facts about justification always are a priori accessible, where a priori is used in the 
traditional sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of the sense 
modalities.
26, 27
 Internalists are thus committed to accepting either mentalism or accessibilism 
(or both, of course).  
Many arguments have been offered for internalism. One of the most prominent 
arguments for mentalism starts by describing a deception scenario in which a subject 
somehow is being deceived into having a large number of false perceptual beliefs. However, 
the internalist notes, despite having beliefs that are false and unreliably formed, they 
nevertheless appear to be just as justified as they would have been if the subject were in a 
corresponding good scenario (without any deception going on). And, the internalist argues, 
the best explanation for why that is so is that mentalism is true. After all, there must be 
something which the subjects in the good and bad scenarios have in common that explains 
                                                          
23
 Proponents of mentalism include Pollock & Cruz (1999); Conee & Feldman (2001); Wedgwood (2002); 
Smithies (2012a); and McCain (2016). 
24
 Some proponents of mentalism, like Pollock & Cruz (1999) and Conee & Feldman (2001), formulate it as the 
view that facts about justification supervene upon one's mental states—not one's non-factive mental states. This, 
however, opens up for the possibility that mentalism, thus construed, might be an externalist view, since one's 
knowledge might be thought of as part of one's mental states. That being said, Conee and Feldman (2008) clarify 
that they think the supervenience base of justification is exhausted by one's non-factive mental states, or, more 
specifically, one's experiences. Moreover, since one's knowledge usually wasn't thought of as part of one's 
mental states until after the publication of Williamson's (2000) Knowledge and Its Limits (Cf. Williamson, 
1995), Pollock & Cruz's mentalism should most naturally be interpreted as an internalist position. 
25
 Supervenience is a reflexive, transitive and non-symmetric relation. The reason I formulate internalism (or 
mentalism, more specifically) in terms of supervenience, instead of focusing on relations like grounding or 
realization, which have become increasingly popular in contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mind, is 
that it avoids many of the problems in the epistemological context which it incurs when it is used in metaphysics 
or philosophy of mind. For example, many philosophers think that the supervenience of the mental upon the 
physical is necessary but not sufficient for physicalism to be true. For more about relations of metaphysical 
dependence in the philosophy of mind, see Tiehen (forthcoming). 
26
 Proponents of accessibilism include BonJour (1985); Moser (1985); Chisholm (1989); Fumerton (1995); Audi 
(1998); Steup (1999); and Smithies (2012b). 
27
 Thus, according to my usage of the notion, the modes of a priori accessibility include not only reflection and 
reasoning, but also introspection and other cognitive mechanisms with an experiential aspect. For more on the 
distinction between narrow and broad notions of the a priori, see Casullo (2003, ch. 2).  
Moreover, whereas the notion of a priori accessibility or knowability is able to capture the access 
internalist position, it plausibly fails in the case of physicalism. The problem, however, is opposite to that of 
supervenience: the a priori entailment of all truths from all actual physical truths appears to be sufficient but not 
necessary for physicalism to be true. Again, for more on this issue, see Tiehen (forthcoming). 
17 
 
why they appear to be equally justified in having the same beliefs
28—the most plausible 
candidate being their non-factive mental states. Indeed, mentalism implies that our intuitive 
judgments about the deception scenario—i.e., that the subject’s beliefs are just as justified as 
they would have been in the corresponding good scenario—are true.29 
In response, externalists have argued in either of two ways: (i) they have argued that 
we
30
 don’t have intuitions to the effect that the subject in the deception scenario has 
justification for his beliefs; (ii) they have argued that although we do have the intuitions 
which the internalist reports, mentalism doesn’t provide the best explanation for why that is 
so.
31
 In the first paper of my thesis I respond to both kinds of argument.
32
 Moreover, my 
strategy for doing so is outlined in the dissertation synopsis later in the introduction. 
A somewhat similar internalist argument, but this time for accessibilism, starts by 
describing a scenario in which a subject forms a belief using an unfamiliar faculty—i.e., a 
faculty for belief production which a subject has, but without any awareness of the fact that he 
has it or of why beliefs produced by that faculty should be true. But, as the internalist notes, 
although the belief is true and reliably produced (as the scenario stipulates), it doesn't appear 
to be justified. Moreover, the best explanation for why that is so seems to be that there is an 
accessibility condition on justification that the subject fails to satisfy: a subject can only have 
justification for a certain belief if it isn’t an accident from his first person perspective why that 
belief should be true. After all, without being in a position to tell what one’s beliefs rationally 
have going for them, they appear to be no more justified than hunches or guesses. Indeed, 
                                                          
28
 Although I occasionally write as if the topic of my discussions and arguments is what has been called personal 
justification (rather than propositional justification)—i.e., the justification someone has for 
believing/withholding/disbelieving certain propositions—this is simply for the sake of convenience since it isn't 
always possible (at least not easily so) to differentiate the different types of justification in one's writings. 
Moreover, although my discussions and arguments focus on propositional justification, I don't commit myself to 
any particular position when it comes to the issue of how propositional justification relates to personal 
justification. For more detailed and disagreeing discussions about whether and how personal justification relates 
to propositional justification, see Kvanvig & Menzel (1990), Engel (1992), and Littlejohn (2009). 
29
 The kind of deception scenario under consideration was first described by Lehrer & Cohen (1983) as a 
counterexample to simple process reliabilism, whereas the internalist argument was (for the most part) developed 
Wedgwood (2002). For an overview and evaluation of many of the reliabilist responses that have been offered, 
see Littlejohn (2012, introduction). 
30
 Who the “we” in this claim are isn't exactly clear. Turri (2015a; 2015b) has offered empirical evidence that 
most non-philosophers don’t have internalist intuitions in response to the scenario. However, it might still be the 
case that most philosophers do and that their intuitions should be given more weight. This issue will be further 
discussed in the dissertation's first paper. 
31
 Littlejohn (2009) offers the first kind of response, whereas Williamson (2007; forthcoming) offers the second. 
32
 A similar response to the latter kind of argument is offered by Pryor (2001) and discussed in greater detail by 
Greco (forthcoming). 
18 
 
accessibilism implies that our intuitive judgments about the scenario under consideration are 
true.
33
 
In response, externalists have once again argued in either of two ways: (i) they have 
argued that we don’t have intuitions to the effect that the subject in the unfamiliar faculty 
scenario doesn’t have justification for his belief; (ii) they have argued that although we do 
have the intuitions which the internalist reports, accessibilism doesn’t provide the best 
explanation for why that is so.
34
 In the second paper of my thesis I respond to both kinds of 
argument. Moreover, my strategy for doing so is outlined in the dissertation synopsis later in 
the introduction. 
Although these are the two most prominent internalist arguments, many others have 
been offered. Conee and Feldman (2004) argue from intuitions elicited by other, more 
mundane scenarios; Ginet (1975), Feldman (1988), Steup (1988; 1999), and Pollock and Cruz 
(1999) all argue from (what Goldman (1999) calls) a “guidance-deontological” conception of 
justification; and Smithies (2012b) argues from the paradoxicality of Moorean conjunctions, 
from scenarios involving subjects with blindsight (2014), and from the nature of higher-order 
reflection (2015). 
An important source of motivation for internalism is so-called “internalist intuitions” 
about various scenarios. Indeed, internalists often argue for their positions by inferring 
plausible explanations from the intuitions elicited by different scenarios or thought 
experiments. Moreover, in my dissertation, I will often follow suit by making use of this 
common internalist strategy. However, some philosophers may find this an objectionable 
strategy insofar as they think that our intuitions aren’t really reliable with respect to the 
subject matter at hand, or that it only leads to intuition mongering between proponents of 
different positions. In response to these worries, I briefly want to mention three reasons why I 
don’t think that they undermine my argumentative strategy. First, as I argue in section 4 of the 
second paper, the claim that internalist intuitions aren’t reliable is often unmotivated, and in 
the absence of any such motivation, they do provide us with good (albeit defeasible) reason to 
believe that their contents are true.
35
 Second, although many of the arguments I make do rely 
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 This kind of argument was first presented by BonJour (1980; 1985) and later taken up by Lehrer (1990). 
34
 Bernecker (2008) and Lyons (2009) offer the first kind of response, whereas Bergmann (2006), Beyer & 
Greco (2008), Lyons (2009), Comesaña (2010), Graham (2014a; 2014b), and Ghijsen (2016) offer the second 
kind of response. 
35
 Not only do one's intuitions provide evidence for certain propositions, but other people's intuitions can also 
provide the basis for testimonial evidence for certain propositions. If, for example, you're told by someone 
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on internalist intuitions about various cases, not all of them do. Moreover, just because many 
of the core arguments rely on such intuitions, it doesn’t follow that they are unsound. After 
all, there is a growing literature supporting the idea that intuitions are evidentially 
significant,
36
 and I will be working under the assumption that that idea is true. Third, as 
philosophers making arguments, I take it that we are bound to rely on intuition—for better or 
worse. Indeed, I doubt that there exists a single argument (philosophical or other) that doesn’t 
rely on intuition either when it comes to the justification of its premises or the justification of 
its background assumptions. So given that we are bound to rely on intuition, and also that 
intuitions are evidentially significant, it seems that intuitions are more likely to help progress 
the internalism-externalism debate, rather than deter it.
37
 
However, although I take intuitions to be evidentially significant, they only provide 
defeasible justification that can be overridden by other theoretical considerations. Indeed, 
following John Rawls' (1971) method of reflective equilibrium, I believe, on the one hand, 
that philosophical theory building should be guided by intuition, and, on the other, that 
intuitions should be evaluated with respect to other theoretical considerations about the 
properties with which the intuitions are concerned. For internalism to be a plausible theory of 
justification, the intuitions on which it relies should harmonize with other theoretical 
properties that we generally believe justification to have. That being said, externalists can 
always try to defeat the evidential force of internalist intuitions. However, in order to do so, 
they have to provide reasons for doubting the reliability of said intuitions—simply pointing to 
the intuitive nature of the internalist position isn’t enough.38 
Internalism is the traditional view, more or less assumed and unargued for up to the 
middle of the twentieth century, whereas externalism is the new kid on the block, trying to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
trustworthy that the vast majority of mathematicians have strong intuitions that Goldbach's conjecture is true, 
then I take it that the testimony does provide at least some evidence for said conjecture. However, it is of course 
important that the testifier—i.e., the person responsible for informing you about the mathematicians intuitions—
is trustworthy, or at least that one has reason to think that he is trustworthy; otherwise one would be gullible if 
one were to trust him. For more about testimonial evidence and gullibility, see Fricker (1994). 
36
 See, e.g., Chudnoff (2013); Bengson (2015); Koksvik (2017); and Ramsey (2019). 
37
 More detailed reflections along these lines are offered in sections 6 and 7 of paper 4. 
38
 Peter Pagin, Staffan Carlshamre, and Duncan Pritchard have raised the following concern about internalist 
intuitions: how do we know that the intuitions which internalists base their position on are about justification in 
particular, rather than some other epistemic property? In response, I would like to point out that there are two 
reasons why I think that internalist intuitions actually are about justification. First, based on my own 
introspection, I clearly do have (or at least seem to have) intuitions about justification when I reflect on various 
scenarios, such as the New Evil Demon scenario. Second, given that the relevant discussions in the literature 
have developed as if most other philosophers also have intuitions about justification—after all, people regularly 
say of the individuals who inhabit various hypothetical scenarios that they seem to (not) have justification for 
their beliefs—I think it is safe to assume (barring defeaters) that philosophers generally do have intuitions about 
justification.  
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upset the established order.
39
 Having considered the case for internalism, it is time to take a 
closer look at the opposing position. Epistemic externalism is simply defined as the denial of 
both the mentalist and the accessibilist thesis above. Whereas the internalist thinks that facts 
about justification in some special sense are internal (either because they are a priori 
accessible or because they have their basis in one’s non-factive mental states), the externalist 
denies that this is the case. That being said, externalism comes in different varieties. For 
present purposes, externalist views can be separated into two more or less distinct groups.
40
  
First, there are those who make specific claims either about what one’s justifying 
evidence or reasons for belief are, or about the nature of the relation of justificatory/evidential 
support. For example, proponents of the popular knowledge-first program claim that your 
evidence or reasons for belief simply are the propositions you know.
41
 This idea is captured 
by Timothy Williamson’s famous E = K thesis, which says: 
E = K: “knowledge, and only knowledge, constitutes evidence” (Williamson, 2000, 
185). 
 And also by what we may call the R = K thesis: 
R = K: “p is available to you as a reason if and only if you know p.” (Williamson, 
2007, 120.) 
Another externalist view is that of William Alston (1989), who claims that there must 
be a reliable connection between one’s justifying evidence or reasons and the doxastic 
attitudes they support. Moreover, he maintains that the reliability which pertains to the 
relation of evidential support should be understood in terms of objective probability or 
chance. However, it should be noted that even though Alston argues that the relation of 
evidential support should be understood in terms of probabilification (in the objective sense), 
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 And, it should be added, externalism has been very successful in doing so. In a survey by Bourget & Chalmers 
(2014) asking philosophers about their views on 30 central philosophical issues, 42.7% responded that they 
accept or lean toward externalism, whereas 26.4% responded that they accept of lean toward internalism. 
Moreover, 30.8% answered “other,” which probably has a lot to do with disagreements or lack of clarity about 
how the distinction should be drawn. 
40
 However, they will not necessarily be exhaustive insofar as there may be externalist views that don’t neatly fit 
into either group. Nevertheless, they do capture the most prominent externalist positions in the literature. 
41
 Proponents of the knowledge first program are among those who advocate for what has been called a “factive 
turn” in epistemology. Those who work under that banner usually claim that evidence is factive either in the 
sense that it is truth-entailing or in the sense that it includes (or consists of) facts about the external world. 
Mitova (2018, 1), for example, summarizes the position by saying that “when you believe something for a good 
reason, your belief is in a position to enjoy all the cardinal epistemic blessings: it can be rational, justified, 
warranted, responsible, constitute knowledge, you name it.” 
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he also thinks that there is an accessibility condition on one’s reasons/evidence. As he sees it, 
a belief B is (doxastically)
42
 justified just in case it is based on an adequate ground, where the 
ground is a priori accessible,
43
 and the fact that it is adequate means that it reliably indicates 
that B is true. Thus, since he thinks that there is an accessibility condition on one’s 
reasons/evidence, but no such condition on the relation of evidential support, he calls his 
position internalist externalism.
44
 However, since Alston is committed to denying both 
mentalism and accessibilism, insofar as the adequacy or reliability of one’s grounds isn’t a 
priori accessible and facts about justification fail to supervene upon one’s non-factive mental 
states, his position should be considered externalist.
45
 
Second, there are externalists who make specific claims about the processes that lead 
to justified belief. For example, Alvin Goldman (1979) claims that a belief B is justified just 
in case the subject has a reliable belief-forming process for forming B available; i.e., a process 
for belief-production which produces a sufficiently high proportion of true beliefs in scenarios 
similar to the actual one.
46
 Although Goldman’s externalism resembles that of Alston insofar 
they both think that reliability in some sense is a necessary condition for justification, their 
positions differ to the extent that the kind of reliability which Goldman focuses on attaches to 
belief-forming processes or doxastic dispositions, whereas the reliability which Alston 
focuses on attaches to the support relations that hold between evidence/reasons and the 
doxastic attitudes they justify. 
Another externalist view is proper functionalism, which claims that having cognitive 
faculties for belief production that function properly is a necessary condition for justification. 
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 Although some of the externalist positions I consider are formulated with respect to doxastic justification, they 
should still be considered externalist positions with respect to propositional justification. The reason is simply 
that the externalist conditions they focus on attach to propositional justification, and not whether one’s beliefs 
satisfy the basing requirement (which internalists usually agree is a causal or counterfactual, and hence external 
matter). 
43
 “Justification is a directly cognitively accessible item that will contribute to making true belief into knowledge. 
. . I will, obviously, not accommodate those theorists who deny that a justifier must be internal in this way." 
(Alston, 1989, 5-6.) Cf. Alston (1989, 239): "[T]he fate of prima facie justification is determined by what is in 
the subject's perspective on the world, rather than by the way the world is.” 
44
 A similar view is endorsed by Glüer & Wikforss (2018); although they do not claim that the ground must be a 
priori accessible, only that it must be a mental state. 
45
 A somewhat related position is epistemological disjunctivism, which claims (at least in paradigmatic cases of 
perceptual knowledge) that one’s reasons for belief are both a priori accessible and factive (or truth-entailing). 
For example, Duncan Pritchard (2012, 13) argues that we often have justifying reasons for belief which are 
reflectively accessible in the sense that “the subject can come to know through reflection alone that she is in 
possession of this rational support”, and that the reasons support doxastic attitudes with the same (or relevantly 
similar) propositional content by entailing that they are true.  
46
 It is hard to overstate the impact which Goldman’s reliabilism has had on contemporary epistemology; some 
have even said that it has undergone a “reliabilist revolution” (Williams, 2016, 3). For similar reliabilist 
positions, see, e.g., Greco (1999); Comesaña (2002); and Lyons (2013).   
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For example, Michael Bergmann (2006) argues that if a certain belief is (doxastically) 
justified, then it must have been produced by a properly functioning cognitive faculty. If, 
however, the faculty in question isn’t functioning in according with its “design plan”, then the 
beliefs it produces will somehow be defect and cannot be justified.
47, 48
 
 Many arguments have been offered for externalism in general, or one of the specific 
varieties just mentioned in particular. Arguably, one of the biggest motivations for 
externalism is that it is able to accommodate the compelling idea that justification is truth-
conducive.
49
 An argument from the truth-conduciveness of justification for externalism has 
recently been formulated by Clayton Littlejohn as follows: 
1. The conditions that justify belief have to be sufficiently indicative of the truth or 
make it sufficiently likely that the belief is true. 
2. Internal conditions alone cannot make it sufficiently likely that your belief is true 
or provide adequate indication that your belief is true. 
3. (Therefore) Justification is an externalist notion. (Littlejohn, 2012, 26.) 
In response, internalists will be quick to point out that even though we all would like 
justification to be truth-conducive, reflection on certain deception scenarios seems to suggest 
otherwise.
50
 Indeed, later on I will stress the point, which I believe some internalists have 
shied away from focusing on, that accepting internalist intuitions about Cartesian deception 
scenarios, which say that the deceived subject’s beliefs are just as justified as they would have 
been if they were true, commits the internalist to the view that evidential or justificatory 
support is a necessary, rather than contingent, relation. However, making such a commitment 
will, at least according to some externalists, be problematic for a couple of reasons: first, 
some externalists are likely to find this response problematic insofar as they think that 
denying the truth-conduciveness of justification also strips it of any epistemic value;
51,
 
52
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 Following Plantinga (1993, 22-24), Bergmann (2006) conceptualizes design plans as sets of circumstance–
response pairs. For an alternative understanding of proper function, according to which the proper functioning of 
a cognitive faculty has to do with how it performed when it produced the beneficial effects that caused its 
continuing existence, see Graham (2014a). 
48
 All of the externalist positions just mentioned will be discussed and criticized later; Williamson's in papers 1 
and 4, Alston's in paper 3, Goldman's in papers 1, 2, 3 and 6, and Bergmann's in paper 2. 
49
 Recently, Silins (forthcoming) has argued that the internalism-externalism distinction itself should be defined 
in terms of truth-conduciveness. 
50
 See, e.g., Cohen (1984). 
51
 Interestingly enough, one of the clearest expressions of this worry is given by the internalist BonJour, who 
remarks: “If epistemic justification were not conducive to truth in this way, if finding epistemically justified 
belief did not substantially increase the likelihood of finding true ones, then epistemic justification would be 
irrelevant to our main cognitive goal and of dubious worth. It is only if we have some reason for thinking that 
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second, by denying the truth-conduciveness of justification in favor of the view that 
justification is a necessary relation between one’s evidence and the beliefs it supports, 
internalists owe us an account of how the relation should be understood. By pointing to 
certain problems which threaten the existing accounts in the literature, externalists can make 
the claim that the prospects for any such account will be dim, and hence that the response to 
Littlejohn’s argument that we’re currently considering appears to be in trouble. I discuss this 
issue in more detail in the last section of paper 3.  
Another argument for externalism turns on the issue of how to best explain what 
distinguishes justified beliefs from unjustified ones. Alvin Goldman (1979), for example, 
argues that reliabilism provides a plausible and unifying explanation of the issue, and, 
moreover, that internalism cannot, or at the very least has not provided any similarly plausible 
explanation. As he sees it, reliability is the distinguishing mark of justification—not 
propositions or facts that are indubitable or self-evident, as internalists sometimes suggest.
53
 
In response, internalists have made a couple of points. First, reliabilism appears to be 
inadequate and therefore cannot provide a plausible explanation of what distinguishes 
justified beliefs from unjustified ones. For example, there appears to be counterexamples to 
both the necessity claim and the sufficiency claim which Goldman’s (1979) reliabilism is 
committed to.
54
 Second, internalists can attempt (indeed, they have attempted) to show that 
they do have the resources to offer a plausible and unifying explanation of the issue.
55
 For 
example, they can argue that you have (prima facie) justification for believing that p if it 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
epistemic justification constitutes a path to the truth that we as cognitive beings have any motive for preferring 
epistemically justified beliefs to epistemically unjustified ones.” (BonJour, 1985, 8.) 
52
 In order to alleviate the internalist's worries, Madison (2017) has argued that justification does have (intrinsic) 
epistemic value even if it isn't truth-conducive. 
53
 “Consider some faulty process of belief-formation, i.e., processes whose belief-outputs would be classed as 
unjustified. Here are some examples: confused reasoning, wishful thinking, reliance on emotional attachment, 
mere hunch or guesswork, and hasty generalizations. What do these faulty processes have in common? They 
share the feature of unreliability. They tend to produce error a large proportion of the time. By contrast, which 
species of belief-forming (or belief-sustaining) processes are intuitively justification-conferring? They include 
standard perceptual processes, remembering, good reasoning, and introspection. What these processes seem to 
have in common is reliability: the beliefs they produce are generally reliable.” (Goldman, 1979, 10.) 
54
 Lehrer & Cohen (1983) provide a counterexample to the necessity claim, and BonJour (1985) provides a 
counterexample to the sufficiency claim. Goldman (1986; 1988; 1993) responds. 
55
 In paper 3, I offer such an explanation when it comes to empirical justification in particular. 
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seems to you that p, along the lines of Michael Huemer’s (2007) Phenomenal Conservatism.56, 
57
 
Moreover, in addition to the arguments just mentioned, externalists have offered many 
besides. Goldman (1986), Alston (1989), and Feldman (2005) argue from over-
intellectualization; Alston (1989) argues from epistemic poverty; Senor (1993), Goldman 
(1999), Greco (2005), and Williamson (2007) argue from stored beliefs; Williamson (2000) 
and Kelly (2008) argue from the nature of scientific evidence; and Williamson (2007) argues 
from intuitions supporting externalism in the philosophy of mind.
58
  
 
2.2 Foundationalism vs. Coherentism 
Next, let’s look at the other defining debate: the foundationalism-coherentism debate. This 
debate is about how our beliefs get justified in the first place. We all agree that we have a 
great many justified beliefs. How are they justified? Plausibly by other justified beliefs. If the 
reason you believe that you’re healthy is that you also believe that your trustworthy doctor 
told you so, but your doctor has communicated to you that he bases all his diagnoses on what 
his terra cards tell him, then you shouldn’t believe that you’re healthy. And for the very same 
reason, in order for any belief B1 to be justified by another belief B2, B2 must itself be 
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 Huemer doesn’t just intend his principle of phenomenal conservatism to be a principle of foundational or non-
inferential justification, he intends it to be the principle of such justification (2001, 99-100f.). This means that 
seemings are both necessary and sufficient for foundational justification on his view.  
57
 Cf. Wedgwood (2002). 
58
 Whether or not externalism in the philosophy of mind supports externalism in epistemology by (i) entailing 
epistemic externalism and (ii) receiving intuitive support from reflection on various scenarios is a contested 
issue. To evaluate this kind of argument, it is important to note that externalism in the philosophy of mind can 
mean either content externalism, which says that some mental states have contents that are individuated in virtue 
of relations to the external environment, or vehicle externalism, which says that some mental states (as vehicles 
of content) are individuated in virtue of relations to the external environment. In the literature, three arguments 
have been offered for the view that content externalism entails epistemic externalism: BonJour's (1992) 
Accessibility Argument, Boghossian's (1989) Self-Knowledge Argument, and Chase's (2001) Process Argument. 
However, all of the arguments rely on contentious premises and therefore remain unconvincing. When it comes 
to the view that vehicle externalism entails epistemic externalism, fewer arguments have been offered in the 
literature. However, a couple of recent arguments by Carter et al. (2014) and Smithies (2018) plausibly suggest 
that accessibilism, together with certain plausible background assumptions, is incompatible with vehicle 
externalism. A reasonable, albeit somewhat tentative conclusion to draw from these discussions is that although 
epistemic internalists will have a hard time squaring their position with vehicle externalism, they should be able 
to endorse externalism about content without inconsistency—at the very least, doing so seems to be “a live 
option”, as Carter et al. (2014) put it in their review of the current literature about these issues. 
That being said, it would be somewhat odd to characterize a mentalist who thinks that non-factive 
mental states with externally individuated content can play a role in conferring justification upon one’s doxastic 
attitudes as an internalist, since this in effect would mean that the supervenience base of justification in some 
sense includes things that are external to the subject’s mind. 
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justified. So far, so good. But what about B2; what is it that justifies that belief? Well, 
plausibly another justified belief B3. This leads to the following principle: 
1. A belief can only be justified by another justified belief. 
The principle seems plausible enough, but it quickly leads to trouble. The trouble, 
more specifically, is that if B1 is justified, then there must be another justified belief B2 
supporting it, and if B2 is justified, then there must be another justified belief B3 supporting 
it, and if B3 is justified, then there must be another justified belief B4 supporting it, and so on 
ad infinitum. However, since it is highly doubtful that we have such an infinite stock beliefs, 
accepting the principle forces us to conclude that we don’t have any justified beliefs: 
skepticism ensues.
59
 This is known as the epistemic regress problem, and the 
foundationalism-coherentism debate is about how it should be solved.
60
  
Two unpopular and, as most epistemologists see it, implausible responses to the 
problem are (1) to accept skepticism about justification, and (2) to endorse infinitism. 
According to skepticism about justification, the fact that the principle mentioned above might 
lead to skepticism is actually something positive since skepticism is true: we don’t have any 
justified beliefs. The problem with skepticism about justification, however, is that it is 
extremely implausible. We certainly seem to have justified beliefs, and denying that this is so 
is so implausible that it might actually be impossible to rationally and consistently believe it. 
For if one really were to believe that no beliefs are justified, then that belief (in skepticism 
about justification) must itself either be justified or not. If it isn’t justified, then one doesn’t 
have sufficient reason for holding it. But if it is justified, then skepticism about justification 
must be wrong; there is after all at least one justified belief—namely, one’s belief in 
justification-skepticism. 
According to infinitism, the principle above is unproblematic because justificatory 
chains can have infinite length. Thus, the infinitist thinks that we do have many justified 
beliefs, that the principle above correctly explains why that is the case, and that our justified 
beliefs are supported by infinite chains of other justified beliefs (B2, B3, B4, etc.). However, 
the problem with infinitism is that it appears to lead to skepticism, as we saw above. The 
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 Note that the kind of skepticism that follows is much stronger than the kind of skepticism discussed in the 
previous section, since it is about justification rather than knowledge. 
60
 This and similar kinds of regress problem are sometimes traced back to Aristotle (Posterior Analytics, 72b 6-
15), Agrippa, and Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.164-177). Although some of the aforementioned 
authors sometimes raised the problem as an argument for skepticism, nowadays it is mostly being raised in 
discussions about the structure of justification. 
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reason: we don’t have an infinite stock of justified beliefs. We are limited creatures with a 
finite number of neurons, with limited computational and memorial capacities, and who live a 
finite amount of time.
61
 
Another (but this time popular) response to the problem is (3) foundationalism.
62
 
Foundationalism comes in different varieties, but the core idea is that the principle above, 
which says that a belief can only be justified by another justified belief, is wrong. More 
specifically, it is wrong because the regress eventually comes to an end with what is called 
basic beliefs—i.e., beliefs that are justified by something other than beliefs, the most popular 
candidate being experience. Thus, according to the foundationalist, the justification we have 
for our beliefs can ultimately be traced back to basic beliefs which are justified by 
experience.
63
 This gives us an elegant pyramidal picture of the structure of justification where, 
at the bottom, you have basic beliefs that are justified by experience, and to which all your 
other beliefs (floating above) in some sense owe their justification. However, there are some 
problems with foundationalism; one of which is that it appears to condone some sort of 
bootstrapping argumentation, according to which experience can justify belief in its own 
reliability or accuracy.
64
 Another problem is what is known as the Sellarsian dilemma, 
according to which experience either has (assertive) representational content or not. If it does, 
then experience cannot by itself generate justification. But if it doesn’t, then experience cannot 
play a justifying role at all.
65
  
The last response, which also has been very popular (especially in the twentieth 
century), is (4) coherentism.
66
 According to coherentism, the principle that a belief can only 
be justified by another belief is true, but the chain of justification eventually circles back on 
itself so that the regress need not be infinite or terminate in a basic belief. This means that 
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 Although see Klein (1999) who argues, by drawing a distinction between occurrent and dispositional belief, 
that we do have an infinite stock of (justified) dispositional beliefs. For example, someone who has taken an 
introductory course in logic plausibly does believe (in a dispositional sense) with justification that p  p q, 
that p  p  r, that p  p  s, and so on. 
62
 Proponents of foundationalism include Russell (1910-1911): Lewis (1929); Moser (1989); Fumerton (1995); 
Fales (1996); Pryor (2000); Huemer (2001); BonJour (2003); and Smithies (2014a). 
63
 According to this version of foundationalism, experience thus functions as a source of what we might call 
ultimate evidence, in the sense that experience (or perhaps perceptual experience more specifically) justifies 
basic beliefs but without standing in need of justification itself. In paper 3 I will revisit the notion of ultimate 
evidence which I there discuss in relation to Conee and Feldman's (2008) view of justification and its source. 
However, in that paper I rely on an interpretation of Conee and Feldman's position according to which they use 
the notion of ultimate evidence in the same way that epistemologists usually use the notion of (regular) evidence. 
64
 For more on bootstrapping, see van Cleve (1979); Alston (1986); and Vogel (2000).  
65
 See Sellars (1956). See also Bonjour (1985, ch. 4), who provides a good reconstruction of Sellars' somewhat 
intricate argument. 
66
 Proponents of coherentism include Neurath (1983[1932]); Blanshard (1939); Quine & Ullian (1970); Harman 
(1973; 1986); Sellars (1973); Lehrer (1990); and BonJour (1985). 
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whereas B1 is justified by B2, B2 by B3, and B3 by . . .  Bn, Bn can then circle back around 
and be justified by B1. The structure of justification thus has the shape of a circle in which 
beliefs are justified solely by the fact that they cohere with one another.
67
 However, 
coherentism, just like the other responses to the regress problem, also has problems of its 
own. One of the objections to coherentism is the alternative systems problem, which says that 
there can be sets of belief that cohere, but which clearly are absurd. Such sets of belief don’t 
seem to be justified, but, according to coherentism, they are. Another objection to coherentism 
is the input problem; i.e., the problem that experience does appear to be sufficient in order to 
have justification for certain beliefs, contrary to how coherentism would have it: if you have a 
visual experience of a car driving past you, then (absent any defeaters) you have justification 
to believe that a car is driving past you. 
A lot of digital ink has been used on the internalism-externalism debate and the 
foundationalism-coherentism debate. Whereas internalism and foundationalism can be said to 
be the traditional views insofar as the majority of epistemologists before the twentieth century 
(including Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant) accepted them, the opposing views have 
gained a lot of traction lately—especially externalism. This dissertation is mainly an attempt 
to defend the tradition. My own view is that facts about justification are internal in the ways 
specified by both mentalism and accessibilism. Moreover, I think that the justification we 
have in some sense has its ultimate foundation in basic beliefs which are justified, but not by 
other beliefs. Whereas many foundationalists focus on how perceptual experience justifies 
such basic beliefs without itself having to be justified, I am inclined to include among the 
sources of such foundational justification things like intuition, so-called memory seemings, 
and facts about logic and mathematics. However, although I do endorse foundationalism, my 
focus in the dissertation will be on internalism and externalism. More specifically, I will argue 
for, defend, and develop a particular brand of internalism, both in general and with respect 
specific sources of justification, like testimony and memory.  
Moreover, it should be noted that there is an important and ongoing debate about what 
exactly it is that is doing the justifying, or, in other words, what one’s justifiers are. There are 
three positions in the literature that stand out as plausible answers: first, it might be that it is 
the propositional content of (some of) one’s mental states that is doing the justifying (Fantl & 
McGrath, 2009); second, it might be that it is the mental states themselves that are the 
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 Coherence is usually taken to involve logical consistency, explanatory relations, and inductive/probabilistic 
relations. 
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justifiers (Cone & Feldman, 2008; Gibbons, 2014; McCain, 2014, 2016; Mitova, 2015); and 
third, it might be that it is facts or true propositions about (some of) one’s mental states that 
are responsible for the justification we have (Smithies, forthcoming). In the dissertation, I will 
remain neutral when it comes to this debate. So even though my wording in the dissertation 
sometimes might seem to indicate support for some of the aforementioned positions, my 
papers should be considered non-committal with respect to this issue. 
 
3. Dissertation Synopsis 
The dissertation argues for mentalism and accessibilism, both of the internalist theses.
68
 
Mentalism and accessibilism receive strong support from our intuitive judgments about 
various scenarios; indeed, so much so that they provide the best explanations for our 
intuitions. Reflection on various scenarios thus provides grounds for a couple of abductive 
arguments with the conclusion that the internalist theses are true.  
However, this kind of argument, which already is familiar from the literature, has 
come under heavy fire by proponents of externalism. The externalist objections usually either 
target the internalist intuitions, the abductive inferences that the arguments employ, or the 
internal coherence of mentalism or accessibilism. I will defend the arguments using a two-
pronged strategy: first, I will argue from the assumption that the relevant scenarios do elicit 
internalist intuitions among many, if not most, professional philosophers when they are 
described with sufficient detail, that we haven’t been provided with sufficient reason to think 
that our intuitions about those particular scenarios somehow are biased or skewed; second, I 
will argue that the internalist theses do provide the best explanations for why our intuitions 
are true since (i) they receive the most support from the evidence which our intuitions 
provide,
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 (ii) reductios and other problems internal to mentalism or accessibilism can be 
                                                          
68
 While many internalists endorse both mentalism and accessibilism, some only endorse one of the theses while 
rejecting the other. However, by endorsing either mentalism or accessibilism, while rejecting the other thesis, 
one becomes vulnerable to certain explanatory problems. For example, the mentalist who rejects accessibilism 
has to explain what it is that makes one's non-factive mental states so special that they provide the supervenience 
base of justification. That one always has a priori access to those states seems to be a good explanation, but it is 
of course unavailable to the mentalist who rejects accessibilism. On the other hand, the accessibilist who rejects 
mentalism has to provide an explanation of what the determinants of justification are, such that they always are a 
priori accessible. That the determinants of justification are one's non-factive mental states seems to be a good 
explanation, but it is unavailable to the accessibilist who rejects mentalism.  
69
 I should say that I neither operate with a particular conception of how abductive reasoning functions, nor do I 
purport to make any progress when it comes to providing such a conception. Abductive arguments appear to be 
holistic by nature—and somewhat mysterious at that. Nevertheless, most philosophers agree that they can be 
used in order to generate both justification and knowledge. For more on abductive reasoning, see Douven (2017).  
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shown to disappear upon closer analysis, and (iii) alternative, externalist explanations face 
problems that the internalist views avoid. The upshot is that internalism remains motivated 
and as plausible as ever. 
The tradition will be defended, but not without incurring any criticism of its own. 
Although I argue that the internalist theses are correct, some of the most prominent versions 
of them have to be abandoned. This is especially the case when it comes to accessibilism. I 
will argue that some of the most prominent versions of accessibilism in the literature are 
vulnerable to serious problems (about, e.g., vicious regresses and over-intellectualization). 
Fortunately, however, there are other, more recent versions of accessibilism that avoid the 
problems and are plausible in their own right. Part of my task is to figure out what 
commitments the internalist should make in order to avoid the externalist’s objections, while 
at the same time receiving support from considerations that have motivated internalism in the 
past. 
Mentalism informs us about the supervenience base of justification, but it doesn’t tell 
us which non-factive mental states are justification-conferring. When it comes to empirical 
belief (i.e., belief in empirical propositions), I suggest that all and only one’s beliefs and 
perceptual experiences can confer justification. The suggestion is then defended, on the one 
hand, against expansive views which claim that other non-factive mental states also can 
confer justification, and, on the other hand, against contractive views which claim that not all 
beliefs and perceptual experiences can confer justification.  
Lastly, I argue for internalism about some specific sources of justification, like 
testimony and memory. A substantial part of the recent literature on the internalism-
externalism debate has focused on the different sources of justification. Here, several novel 
and interesting challenges have been posed to the internalist. In the dissertation I take on some 
of the challenges and defend internalism about testimonial and memorial justification. Doing 
so, I aim to offer a comprehensive and plausible internalist view about the nature of 
justification, both in general and with respect to specific sources of justification. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Moreover, I should note that when I make abductive arguments for internalism, I rely on an implicit 
assumption to the effect that our intuitions about simple epistemological issues—such as whether or not 
individuals in hypothetical scenarios have justification for their beliefs—generally track the truth. The 
explanandum will be the content of our internalist intuitions, and the explanans will be (or contain) some 
internalist thesis. 
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4. Paper Summaries 
The dissertation is a compilation thesis, meaning that it is a collection of individual research 
papers that all relate to a single topic—in my case, the internalism-externalism debate. Some 
of the papers have already been accepted for publication. Below you will find summaries of 
the papers, including information about where they have been accepted for publication. 
 
Paper I: The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended 
Paper 1 is about mentalism. More specifically, it argues, using Lehrer and Cohen’s (1983) 
New Evil Demon Problem, that facts about justification supervene upon one’s non-factive 
mental states. That kind of argument, however, is often criticized by externalists. The paper 
takes a closer look at three prominent objections—a pair of which is offered by Littlejohn 
(2009) and one by Williamson (2007)—and argues that none of them is successful. Its 
conclusion is that mentalism remains motivated, and that recent attempts by externalists to 
undermine the argument from the New Evil Demon scenario fail. 
This paper has been accepted for publication in Philosophical Studies. See Egeland, J. (2019). 
The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended. Philosophical Studies, 176(12) 
1-18. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1167-7 
Reprinted with permission. 
 
Paper II: The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: Accessibilism Defended 
Paper 2 is about accessibilism. More specifically, it argues, using BonJour (1980; 1985) and 
Lehrer’s (1990) clairvoyance and Truetemp scenarios, that there is an accessibility condition 
on justification. That kind of argument, however, is often criticized by externalists. The paper 
takes a closer look at three prominent objections—one by Bernecker (2008), one by Ghijsen 
(2016), and one by Bergmann (2006; 2013)—and argues that none of them are successful. 
Moreover, it also explores what commitments the accessibilist should make, arguing (i) that 
many internalists have defended implausible versions of the view, and (ii) that the objections 
levelled against it only undermine those implausible versions of it. Its conclusion is that 
accessibilism remains motivated, and that recent attempts by externalists to undermine the 
argument from the aforementioned scenarios fail. 
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Paper III: Epistemic Internalism and the Basis of Justification 
Paper 3 is about the basis of justification. Starting from the assumption that mentalism is true, 
it aims to answer two questions: 1) which non-factive mental states can play a justification-
conferring role with respect to empirical belief? And 2) why does this set of states play the 
epistemic role it does? In response to question 1, it argues that all and only one’s beliefs and 
perceptual experiences have justificatory relevance. In response to question 2, it argues that 
one’s beliefs and perceptual experiences are one’s strongly representational states, and that 
strongly representational states necessarily provide support to certain empirical propositions. 
Lastly, the paper grapples with the issue of how strongly representational states confer 
justification upon certain propositions, something which largely has been overlooked 
(especially by internalists) in the Internalism-externalism debate. 
A version of the paper (or, more specifically, section 3.1 of the paper) has been accepted for 
publication in Episteme. See Egeland, J. (forthcoming). Imagination Cannot Justify Empirical 
Belief. Episteme, 1-7. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.22 
Reprinted with permission. 
 
Paper IV: Scientific Evidence and the Internalism-Externalism Distinction 
Paper 4 is about scientific evidence. It explores a couple of arguments to the effect that 
considerations of scientific evidence eliminate internalism as a viable theory about the nature 
of justification. The first argument is offered by Williamson (2000), and it claims that the E = 
K thesis (in contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the fact that scientists 
appear to argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) that are common knowledge 
among the members of the scientific community. In response, the paper shows that the E = K 
thesis isn’t supported by the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is 
unable to account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as 
justified scientific belief in the history of science. The second argument is offered by Kelly 
(2008; 2016), and it claims that only externalism is suited to account for the public character 
of scientific evidence. In response, the paper argues that there are internalist views that can 
account for the publicity of scientific evidence, and that those views indeed do better in that 
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regard than the (externalist) view proposed by Kelly. The paper concludes that considerations 
of scientific evidence don’t eliminate internalism as a viable theory about the nature of 
justification, contrary to what many epistemologists and philosophers of science assume. 
 
Paper V: Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification 
Paper 5 is about testimonial justification. More specifically, it argues that testimonial 
justification should be understood along internalist lines. It then explores three objections 
offered by Wright (2016a; 2016b) and defends the argument against them. Moreover, it also 
argues that the version of externalism endorsed by Wright either collapses into internalism or 
a more robust kind of externalism that he opposes. The paper’s conclusion is that externalist 
conditions do make an epistemic difference when it comes to our testimonial beliefs, but that 
they cannot make any difference with respect to their justificatory status—i.e., they are 
justificationally irrelevant. 
This paper has been accepted for publication in Episteme. See Egeland, J. (forthcoming). 
Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification. Episteme, 1-17. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.48 
Reprinted with permission. 
 
Paper VI: Against Overconfidence: Arguing for the Accessibility of Memorial 
Justification 
Paper 6 is about memorial justification. It argues, using a two-pronged strategy, that access 
internalism should replace preservationism as the standard view about memorial justification. 
First, it argues that the considerations which motivate preservationism also support access 
internalism. Second, it argues that preservationism faces a couple of problems which access 
internalism avoids. The first problem is that there is a certain scenario involving a subject who 
exhibits a special sort of overconfidence with respect to the memory beliefs he has and which, 
on the one hand, functions as a counterexample to preservationism, and, on the other hand, 
provides intuitive support for access internalism. The second problem is that preservationism, 
in light of recent research in cognitive psychology, is vulnerable to skepticism about 
memorial justification, whereas access internalism remains unthreatened. The paper concludes 
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that access internalism provides the best theoretical framework for understanding the nature 
and structure of memorial justification. 
This paper has been accepted for publication in Synthese. See Egeland, J. (forthcoming). 
Against Overconfidence: Arguing for the Accessibility of Memorial Justification. Synthese, 1-
21. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02604-4  
Reprinted with permission. 
 
5. Comments and Corrections 
Given that some of the papers have been accepted for publication, and that Stockholm 
University requires that parts of a dissertation that have been accepted for publication must be 
presented the exact way in which they appeared when they were accepted, this has prevented 
me from making further changes to those papers. In order to clarify certain issues, or rectify 
certain mistakes, I therefore provide some comments to that effect below. 
1. Paper 6 discusses Goldman's Fake Barns scenario, but without mentioning that he 
credits it to Carl Ginet. 
2. In the second sentence of paper 6, I use the notion of a priori in what I call a "narrow" 
sense, insofar as I take a condition to be a priori just in case it doesn't depend on any 
of the sense modalities. However, that involves a mischaracterization, as I actually use 
the notion in what more aptly should be called a "wide" sense. 
3. The argument that is presented and defended in paper 6 is offered in support for a 
version of accessibilism. However, the argument should more plausibly be seen as 
supporting mentalism about testimonial justification. When I talk about "internal 
reasons" in that paper, it should therefore be interpreted as the reasons one has that 
supervene upon one's non-factive mental states, rather than the reasons one has that 
are a priori accessible.  
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Swedish Summary 
 
 
 
 
Vi månar om att ha övertygelser som är berättigade. Ta som exempel följande vanligt 
förekommande uppfattningar: 
 
1. Vatten utgörs av H2O-molekyler. 
2. Albert Einstein hade mustasch. 
3. Det libertarianska partiets kandidat kommer inte att vinna nästa presidentval i USA. 
 
När det gäller påståenden av detta slag så önskar vi oss i allmänhet berättigade övertygelser. 
Vi föredrar väl i själva verket generellt att hysa välgrundade övertygelser och anser rentav att 
ogrundade uppfattningar är på något vis defekta och därför bör överges. Föreställ dig 
exempelvis att du vill avgöra om din tilltro till det tredje påståendet ovan är välgrundad. Du 
överväger ämnet och ställer en serie frågor till dig själv, frågor som rör vilken evidens du har 
för påståendet, varför du har kommit att ha uppfattningen i fråga och om du har skäl att tro att 
den evidens du förlitar dig på i själva verket är vilseledande. Om det efter att du begrundat 
detta står klart för dig att du har robusta skäl för övertygelsen att det libertarianska partiets 
kandidat inte kommer att vinna nästa amerikanska presidentval så är din uppfattning 
berättigad. Skulle du däremot upptäcka att din övertygelse inte stöds av evidensen – kanske 
medger du att du knappt känner till något alls om amerikansk politik – så är den inte 
berättigad och du bör då om du vill vara rationell sluta omfatta den. 
Eftersom vi bryr oss om huruvida våra övertygelser är berättigade är det naturligt att 
detta väcker frågan om berättigandets natur: vad innebär det att ha en berättigad uppfattning? 
I den filosofiska litteraturen finns två övergripande och oförenliga svar: det internalistiska 
alternativet hävdar att vad man är berättigad att hålla för sant på något speciellt sätt beror på 
ens interna mentala tillstånd, medan det externalistiska alternativet förnekar det. Distinktionen 
mellan internalism och externalism utgör en djup intellektuell klyfta som har separerat 
filosofer som arbetar med frågan om berättigande i två motsatta läger. För att förstå skillnaden 
bättre behöver vi emellertid först introducera en skillnad mellan två olika slag av berättigande. 
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Filosofer poängterar ofta att berättigande kan röra endera av två saker; påståenden 
eller övertygelser. I ena fallet kan du vara berättigad att tro på ett visst påstående, oavsett om 
du faktiskt tror på det eller ej. Om du till exempel har sett väderleksprognosen kan du vara 
berättigad att tro att det kommer att regna i morgon, och detta oavsett om du börjar hysa 
uppfattningen i fråga eller ej. I det andra fallet kan du ha en övertygelse som är berättigad. 
Om du exempelvis tror att det kommer att regna i morgon och denna uppfattning härrör från 
något som utgör en god grund för uppfattningen – som väderleksprognosen – så är din 
övertygelse berättigad. 
Epistemisk internalism bör förstås som en teori om berättigande av det första slaget; 
det är en teori om vad som gör en övertygelse berättigad (oavsett om man hyser den eller ej). 
Mer specifikt, för att räknas som internalist behöver man acceptera minst en av följande två 
teser: Den första benämns mentalism och den hävdar att det inte kan ske någon förändring vad 
gäller vilka påståenden vi är berättigade att tro på såvida det inte sker någon förändring av 
våra icke-faktiva mentala tillstånd (ett mentalt tillstånd är icke-faktivt om dess 
påståendeinnehåll inte nödvändigtvis är sant). Den andra tesen kallas accessibilism och 
hävdar att alla relevanta fakta som rör berättigande är åtkomliga genom reflektion. Detta 
innebär med andra ord att man alltid har priviligierad tillgång till de fakta som avgör vad man 
är berättigad att tro. Internalister behöver alltså acceptera mentalism eller accessibilism (eller 
båda). 
Medan internalism är den traditionella ståndpunkten, vilken accepterades utan så 
mycket diskussion fram till mitten av förra århundradet, är externalism nykomlingen som 
försöker utmana den etablerade ordningen. Epistemisk externalism definieras helt enkelt som 
förnekandet av såväl mentalism som accessibilism. Internalisten anser att fakta som rör 
berättigande i någon speciell mening är interna och externalisten förnekar detta. Sålunda är 
det för externalisten inte fallet att vi har priviligierad tillgång till vad som gör våra 
övertygelser berättigade, eller att icke-faktiva mentala tillstånd är det enda som kan göra 
skillnad i sammanhanget. Externalisten kan exempelvis anse att vad man är berättigad att tro 
beror på vilken kunskap man har, eller i vilken utsträckning de processer som ger upphov till 
ens övertygelser är känsliga för vad som är sant.   
Avhandlingen försvarar och utvecklar en särskild form av internalism både generellt 
och med avseende på specifika källor till berättigande såsom vittnesmål och minne. Jag menar 
att frågor om berättigandets natur bör hanteras utifrån ett internalistiskt perspektiv, och jag 
försöker ta några steg i denna riktning. Avhandlingen är en s.k. sammanläggningsavhandling 
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vilket innebär att den består i en samling artiklar som kretsar kring ett enda ämne – vilket i 
mitt fall är debatten mellan internalism och externalism. 
Följande är en lämplig ingång till diskussionen: Anta att du, utan att känna till detta, är 
ett offer för en illvillig cartesiansk demon som bedrar dig angående den externa världens 
beskaffenhet. Även om dina övertygelser om världen är falska så stöds de av erfarenheter som 
från din subjektiva utgångspunkt är oskiljaktiga från de erfarenheter du skulle ha haft om 
världen var sådan du tror att den är. Fråga nu dig själv: är dina övertygelser om världen under 
dessa omständigheter berättigade trots att de är falska? 
Ovanstående är känt i litteraturen som ”The New Evil Demon Problem” och 
tankeexperimentet är avsett att aktivera intuitionen att dina övertygelser under 
omständigheterna är berättigade, i själva verket lika berättigade som de hade varit om de hade 
varit sanna. Denna intuition anses av många ge stöd åt internalism. I avhandlingens första 
artikel försvarar jag detta argument mot tre inflytelserika invändningar från senare tid – varav 
två presenterats av Littlejohn (2009) och en av Williamson (2007). 
Den andra artikeln behandlar accessibilism. Den hävdar, med utgångspunkt från ett 
par i litteraturen vanligt förekommande scenarier, att det finns ett tillgänglighetsvillkor för 
berättigande. Denna typ av argument har emellertid ofta kritiserats av externalister. Artikeln 
gör en närmare granskning av tre tongivande invändningar – av Bernecker (2008), Ghijsen 
(2016) respektive Bergmann (2006; 2013) – och hävdar att ingen av dem är framgångsrik. 
Artikeln utforskar vidare vilka åtaganden en accessibilist bör göra och gör gällande att (i) 
många internalister har försvarat mindre plausibla versioner av ståndpunkten och (ii) att 
invändningarna som rests endast drabbar dessa versioner. Slutsatsen är att den 
accessibilistiska positionen kvarstår som välmotiverad och att externalistiska försök att 
underminera argumentet från ovan nämnda scenarier misslyckas.  
Den tredje artikeln handlar om grunden för berättigande. Utifrån antagandet att 
mentalismen är riktig så försöker den besvara två frågor: 1) vilka icke-faktiva mentala 
tillstånd kan ha en berättigande funktion för övertygelser om empiriska förhållanden? 2) 
varför har dessa tillstånd denna epistemiska funktion? Med avseende på fråga 1 är det 
föreslagna svaret att alla och endast våra övertygelser och perceptuella erfarenheter är 
relevanta för berättigande. Med avseende på fråga 2 är tesen att våra övertygelser och 
perceptuella erfarenheter är starkt representerande tillstånd – tillstånd som representerar sitt 
innehåll som sant – och att starkt representerande tillstånd med nödvändighet skänker stöd åt 
empiriska påståenden. Artikeln tar sig slutligen an frågan om hur starkt representerande 
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tillstånd ger berättigande åt vissa påståenden, vilket är en fråga som debatten mellan 
internalister och externalister i stort sett har förbisett. 
Fjärde artikeln inriktar sig på vetenskaplig evidens. Den undersöker ett par argument 
som hävdar att överväganden kring vetenskaplig evidens visar att internalism inte kan vara en 
gångbar teori om berättigande. Det första av dessa presenterades av Williamson (2000) och 
hävdar att tesen E = K – enligt vilken vår berättigande evidens helt enkelt är de påståenden 
som utgör vår kunskap – ger bästa förklaringen av förhållandet att vetenskapsmän tycks 
argumentera utifrån sanna påståenden som är allmänt accepterade av det vetenskapliga 
samfundet. Mot detta hävdas att tesen E = K inte finner stöd i vårt sätt att tala om 
vetenskaplig evidens, och att den inte heller kan förklara sådant som har betraktats som 
vetenskaplig evidens och berättigad övertygelse under tidigare skeden av vetenskapshistorien. 
Det andra argumentet härrör från Kelly (2008; 2016) och går ut på att endast externalism 
förmår redogöra för den offentliga karaktären hos vetenskaplig evidens. Mot detta hävdar 
artikeln att det finns internalistiska synsätt som kan förklara offentligheten hos vetenskaplig 
evidens, och som lyckas bättre i detta avseende än det (externalistiska) alternativ som Kelly 
föreslår. Artikelns slutsats är att överväganden som rör vetenskaplig evidens inte utesluter 
internalism som en gångbar teori om berättigandets natur, i motsats till vad många 
epistemologer och vetenskapsfilosofer antar. 
Avhandlingens femte artikel diskuterar berättigande genom vittnesmål, alltså det 
berättigande vi erhåller utifrån vad andra talar om för oss. Artikeln hävdar att berättigande 
genom vittnesmål bör förstås i enlighet med internalism. Denna ståndpunkt försvaras mot tre 
invändningar som framförts av Wright (2016a; 2016b). Det visar sig att Wrights version av 
externalism i själva verket kollapsar, antingen till internalism eller till en form av externalism 
som han själv inte accepterar. Artikelns slutsats är att externalistiska villkor gör en epistemisk 
skillnad när det gäller övertygelser som baseras på vittnesmål, men de kan inte göra någon 
skillnad för deras status med avseende på berättigande – de är alltså irrelevanta för 
berättigande. 
Den sjätte och sista artikeln behandlar berättigande via minnet. Med hjälp av en 
tvådelad strategi argumenteras här för att accessibilism bör ersätta preservationism – givet 
vilken minnet bevarar den (positiva) berättigande-status som vidlåder de övertygelser som det 
innehåller – som standardsynsättet på berättigande via minnet. För det första görs gällande att 
de omständigheter som motiverar preservationism också stöder accessibilism. För det andra 
hävdas att preservationismen stöter på ett par problem som accessibilismen inte drabbas av. 
Det första av dessa problem är att det finns ett scenario vari subjektet hyser en särskild form 
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av överdriven tilltro till sina minnen. Detta scenario innebär ett motexempel mot 
preservationism men ger samtidigt intuitivt stöd för accessibilism. Det andra problemet består 
i att preservationism i ljuset av senare tiders kognitionsforskning inbjuder till  skepticism 
angående berättigande via minnet, medan accessibilismen förblir ohotad. Artikeln landar i 
slutsatsen att accessibilismen tillhandahåller det bästa teoretiska ramverket för att förstå 
naturen och strukturen hos minnesbaserat berättigande.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

I
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The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism 
Defended 
 
 
 
1. Mentalism 
Facts about justification are not brute facts. They are epistemic facts that depend upon more 
fundamental non-epistemic facts. Internalists about justification often argue for of mentalism, 
which claims that facts about justification depend upon one's non-factive mental states.
1,2
 
Externalists, on the other hand, reject this claim. In this paper, I will argue that the 
justification facts—i.e., the facts about which doxastic attitudes one now has justification (to a 
certain degree) to hold—depend upon one's non-factive mental states in the following 
manner: 
Mentalism: the justification facts supervene upon one's non-factive mental states. 
It is common to distinguish between three types of justification: 
Propositional justification: the justification someone has for 
believing/withholding/disbelieving a certain proposition. 
Doxastic justification: the justifiably held beliefs (or other doxastic attitudes) someone 
has. 
Personal justification: someone's being justified in believing/withholding/disbelieving 
a certain proposition.
3
 
The focus of this paper will be on propositional justification, as my definition of the 
justification facts should make clear. So although certain formulations in this article might 
appear to be about personal or doxastic justification, it is propositional justification that is the 
                                                          
1
 Proponents of mentalism include Pollock & Cruz (1999); Conee & Feldman (2001); Wedgwood (2002); 
Smithies (2012); and McCain (2016). 
2
 A mental state is non-factive just in case it doesn’t entail that it has propositional content that is true. By 
contrast, a factive mental state—like knowing p—entails that its propositional content is true. 
3
 Cf. Littlejohn (2012, 5). 
52 
 
topic at hand.
4
 Moreover, in contrast to the mentalist thesis above, I take facts about doxastic 
justification to be external. The reason is simply that doxastic justification plausibly can be 
defined as propositional justification plus proper basing,
5
 and that whether one satisfies the 
basing requirement is (at least in part) a causal, hence external, matter. So even though the 
externalist objections discussed in this article focus on doxastic justification, they aren't 
levelled against the implausible view that proper basing somehow is an internalist notion, 
which means that the relevant issue really is the nature of propositional justification (i.e., 
whether it is internal or external).
6
 
Mentalism is often thought to receive support from our intuitive judgments about 
cases, most famous of which is the one described by Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen's (1983) 
New Evil Demon Problem. The New Evil Demon Problem tells you to imagine yourself the 
victim of a Cartesian demon who deceives you about what the external world is like, and then 
asks whether you nevertheless have justification for your beliefs about the external world. 
Internalists and externalists agree that there is something that is epistemically good or 
valuable about both your actual beliefs and your beliefs in the demon scenario. Internalists 
claim that the epistemic property which these sets of beliefs share most intuitively should be 
thought of as sameness of justification. Externalists, on the other hand, reject this claim, 
usually either by challenging the internalist intuition directly, or by arguing that there is a 
more plausible way to think about the epistemic property in question. Recently, both kinds of 
externalist objection have been raised against the argument from the New Evil Demon 
Problem for mentalism. In this paper, I will defend the argument against three of them—a pair 
of which attack the internalist intuition directly, and one that provides an alternative way of 
understanding the epistemic property in question. 
This is the plan for the paper. Section 2 uses the New Evil Demon Problem to argue 
for mentalism. Section 3 defends this argument against three recent objections—two of which 
are offered by Clayton Littlejohn and one by Timothy Williamson. Section 4 concludes by 
                                                          
4
 I suspect that it won't always be possible to clearly differentiate talk about the various types of justification 
without additional commentary. 
5
 Turri (2010) provides counterexamples to the definition. Smithies (2015) responds that we simply can define 
proper basing as whatever turns propositional justification into doxastic justification. Thus, "immunity from 
counterexample may be gained at the cost of reduction." (Smithies, 2015, footnote 19.) 
6
 Some (e.g., Engel, 1992; and Littlejohn, 2009, 2012) have argued that personal justification should be 
understood along internalist lines whereas doxastic justification should be understood along externalist lines. On 
this view, subjects in skeptical scenarios (like those that will be discussed in this paper) will be justified, whereas 
their beliefs won't. However, not everyone agrees that personal and doxastic justification can come apart this 
way. For example, Kvanvig and Menzel (1990) argue that personal justification entails doxastic justification; i.e., 
a person cannot be justified in believing p while his belief that p isn't justified. 
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taking stock and reflects on the relevance of the paper's arguments for the current state of 
epistemology. 
 
2. The New Evil Demon Problem 
The demon scenario, first presented by Lehrer and Cohen (1983; Cf. Cohen, 1984), goes as 
follows: 
The New Evil Demon Problem 
Imagine that, unbeknown to you, you are the victim of a Cartesian demon who 
deceives you about what the external world is like. Although your beliefs about the 
external world are false, they're supported by experiences that are, from your 
subjective point of view, indistinguishable from the experiences you would have if the 
world were exactly like you believe it to be.  
Now, ask yourself whether your beliefs about the external world are justified despite being 
formed in ways that are unreliable. Intuitively, or so the argument goes, your beliefs in this 
scenario are just as justified as they would be if they were true—after all, it is conceivable that 
you're actually in such a scenario right now. Thus, the New Evil Demon scenario indicates 
that changing the reliability of one's doxastic dispositions doesn't affect which propositions 
one now has justification to believe.
7, 8
 Instead, it seems that the facts about which 
propositions one now has justification to believe, and also the degree to which one has 
justification to believe them, remain unchanged as long as one holds fixed one's non-factive 
mental states. Indeed, the best explanation (or so the internalist thinks) for why epistemic 
agents in normal cases and epistemic agents in subjectively indistinguishable demon cases 
seem to be equally justified in holding the same doxastic attitudes is that they have the same 
non-factive mental states. By abductive reasoning we can therefore conclude that mentalism is 
true: the justification facts supervene upon one's non-factive mental states. 
                                                          
7
 Originally, the scenario was presented as a counterexample to the claim that reliability is necessary for 
justification. Other counterexamples to this claim are provided by Putnam's (1981) envatment scenario and, more 
popularly, the Matrix movies. On the other hand, counterexamples to the claim that reliability is sufficient for 
justification are provided by BonJour (1985, 41); Lehrer (1990, 163-164); Plantinga (1993, 199); and Smithies 
(2014). 
8
 A variety of reliabilist responses have been offered. Goldman (1986, 1988); Comesaña (2002); Sosa (2003); 
and Majors & Sawyer (2005) try to come up with a reliabilist view that accommodates the intuition elicited by 
the New Evil Demon Problem. On the other hand, Bach (1985); Brewer (1997); Engel (1992); Sutton (2007); 
and Lyons (2013) claim that they don’t share the internalist intuition or that it simply is wrong. For discussions 
of many of these objections, see Fumerton (1995, Ch. 4); and Littlejohn (2012, Introduction). 
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Mentalism provides a simple and natural explanation for shared philosophical 
intuitions about the New Evil Demon Problem. To see this, note that mentalism entails that if 
the non-factive mental states of epistemic agents are the same, then the facts about which 
propositions they now have justification to believe, and the degree to which they have 
justification to believe them, are also the same (Cf. Conee & Feldman, 2001, 2). And since 
epistemic agents in normal cases and epistemic agents in subjectively indistinguishable 
demon cases have the same non-factive mental states, they are therefore equally justified in 
believing the same propositions.
9
 
Moreover, one need not consider extreme cases of global deception in order to 
appreciate this point. Consider the following case, which only involves local deception:  
Illusory Ring 
Claire is a collector of ancient artefacts. All the artefacts in her collection are bought 
from sources that seem highly trustworthy: she has vivid memorial beliefs
10
 that the 
sellers were honest and reliable. However, unbeknown to Claire, many of the sellers 
are notorious scam artists who, from time to time, sell replicas disguised as true 
originals. One of Claire’s artefacts—the rare ring with runic inscriptions from the 
Viking Age—is such a replica. One day, when Claire is looking through her collection 
of artefacts, she recalls her impression of the sellers and forms the belief that the ring 
with runic inscriptions is from the Viking Age. 
Although Claire's belief in the Illusory Ring case is unreliable
11
 and false, it doesn't seem any 
less justified than her belief would be in a subjectively indistinguishable case where the 
sellers actually are trustworthy and the ring is from the Viking Age. Once again, the best 
explanation for why Claire's beliefs are equally justified in both cases is that she has the same 
non-factive mental states in both. As long as one's non-factive mental states are held fixed, 
there can be no change in which doxastic attitudes one now has justification to hold or the 
degree to which one has justification to hold them. 
                                                          
9
 Wedgwood (2002) similarly argues that the intuitions that underwrite the New Evil Demon Problem for 
reliabilism also underwrite an argument against all versions of externalism about justification. 
10
 I operate with a distinction between having a memory/memorial belief, which is a non-factive mental state, and 
remembering that something is the case, which is a factive mental state. 
11
 I take it that in order for a belief-forming process to be reliable it must produce a sufficient amount of true 
beliefs both locally (i.e., in scenarios closely linked to the case under consideration) and globally (i.e., in 
different scenarios in a wide range of cases). For a discussion of local and global reliability, see Craig (1991). 
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It is often assumed in contemporary epistemology that the justification facts are a 
function of one’s (epistemic) reasons for holding certain doxastic attitudes.12 In the 
discussions that follow, I will rely on this assumption when I talk about reasons for belief (or 
other doxastic attitudes). And, with this assumption in place, mentalism can plausibly be 
interpreted as a thesis about what reasons one has. Given that the justification facts are a 
function of one’s reasons, a plausible construal of mentalism says that one’s reasons are 
provided by one’s non-factive mental states.13 Alternatively, adopting the evidentialist’s 
parlance, we can say that one’s evidence is provided by one’s non-factive mental states.14 
Thus, insofar as concepts like reason or evidence are used in this article, this is what the 
internalist will be taken to be committed to.
15
 
However, cases like these and the intuitive epistemological lessons they are supposed 
to teach haven't gone unchallenged. Lately, the argument from the New Evil Demon Problem 
for mentalism has come under heavy fire. In the next section, I will defend the argument 
against three objections—a pair of which is offered by Littlejohn and one by Williamson.  
 
3. Objections and Replies 
3.1 Littlejohn's First Objection 
According to the first objection offered by Littlejohn, our intuitions about the New Evil 
Demon Problem support the following thesis:  
Parity: Necessarily, if S and S' are epistemic counterparts [which is to say that they 
have the same non-factive mental states], S is justified in believing p iff S' is justified 
in believing p. (Littlejohn, 2009, 400.)  
                                                          
12
 For a discussion by someone who holds a dissenting view, see Broome (2013). 
13
 Plausibly, they're either identical to a subset of one's non-factive mental states or their propositional content.  
14
 After the publication of Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits (2000), it has become common for 
epistemologists to think that only true propositions (or facts) can be evidence. (Williamson (2000, 185), of 
course, famously argues for the E = K Thesis: “knowledge, and only knowledge, constitutes evidence”, and later 
(2007, 120) for what we may call the R = K Thesis: “that p is available to you as a reason if an only if you know 
p.” Cf. Hyman (2006) who also endorses the E = K thesis, but arrives at it via another route than Williamson.) 
However, this is not a commitment that we need to make. Indeed, there is also an older tradition preceding 
Williamson that understands evidence in terms of what goes on inside the head rather than outside it, and that 
allows false propositions (like the content of false visual experiences) to be included in one's evidence. Here, I 
simply want to point out that the internalist naturally aligns himself with something more akin to the traditional 
view. For a useful survey of some of the ways in which the concept of evidence has been understood, see Kelly 
(2008).  
15
 Here, I will remain neutral on whether one's reasons/evidence is propositionally specified. For useful (and 
disagreeing) discussions of the issue, see Turri (2009); and Glüer and Wikforss (forthcoming).  
56 
 
However, as Littlejohn points out, Parity doesn't entail mentalism since epistemic 
counterparts can be justified in believing the same propositions, but without having the same 
reasons/evidence. For example, epistemic counterparts may satisfy Parity and thus be justified 
in holding the same beliefs, while one of them has external reasons/evidence that the other 
doesn't. Moreover, as a result, Parity also allows that there can be (external) factors that make 
the epistemic agent in the normal case more justified in holding certain beliefs than his 
counterpart in the bad case is. Indeed, for all that Parity tells us, epistemic counterparts are 
always justified in holding the same beliefs. But it doesn't tell us anything about what their 
justifiers are or the degree to which they are justified in holding the same beliefs; perhaps 
there are external reasons that play a justification-conferring role and that make the epistemic 
agent in the normal case more justified in holding the beliefs he does.  
In order to rule out such a position, one must also endorse a stronger thesis: 
Equality: Necessarily, if S and S' are epistemic counterparts, the fact that q is relevant 
to the justification of what S believes iff the fact that q is relevant to the justification of 
what S' believes. (Littlejohn, 2009, 406.) 
However, Littlejohn claims that Equality has implausible consequences and therefore is 
vulnerable to a modus tollens.
16
 To see why this is so, recall the case about the Illusory Ring 
from the previous section. Consider Claire and an epistemic counterpart, Blaire, both of who 
believe that the ring with the runic inscriptions is from the Viking Age. The only difference is 
that in Claire's case the sellers are untrustworthy and the ring is a perfect replica, whereas in 
Blaire's case the sellers are trustworthy and the ring is a true original. Now, let's say that their 
reason for believing that the ring is from the Viking Age is that they both have a memory to 
the effect that they bought it from a trustworthy source.
17
 Blaire's reason is her memorial 
knowledge that the seller is a trustworthy source, whereas Claire's reason is her false 
                                                          
16
 Another interesting view that clearly rejects Equality is epistemological disjunctivism. (See, e.g., McDowell 
(1982); Snowdon (1981-1982; 1990); and Pritchard (2012).) According to disjunctivists, the perceptual 
experiences (especially visual experiences) of epistemic counterparts in normal and bad cases are fundamentally 
different both in kind (see McDowell, 1982, 472ff.) and insofar as the agent in the normal case can have 
justification or rationality-conferring reasons that the counterpart in the bad case doesn't have (see Pritchard, 
2012, 16; Cf. 2012, 42). Moreover, it is interesting to note that despite his rejection of Equality, Pritchard (2012, 
1) claims that epistemological disjunctivism is the "holy grail" of epistemology because it is able to reconcile 
internalism (with its demand for an accessibility condition on justification) and externalism (with its demand for 
a strong connection between justification and truth). However, in a recent paper Madison (2014) argues that by 
failing to do justice to internalist intuitions and the theses they support (like Equality), disjunctivists are 
ultimately unable to reconcile internalism and externalism. 
17
 Their memory should in this instance be understood as a motivating reason, rather than a normative reason, so 
as not to beg any questions against the externalist. For more on this distinction, see McNaughton & Rawling 
(forthcoming).  
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memorial belief that the seller is a trustworthy source.
18
  Plausibly, Littlejohn tells us, 
knowledge of a proposition p is sufficient for p's inclusion in one's evidence; so the 
proposition that the seller is trustworthy is included in Blaire's evidence and rationally 
supports her belief that the ring is from the Viking Age. On the other hand, the falsity of a 
proposition p is surely sufficient for the exclusion of p from one's evidence; so the proposition 
that the seller is trustworthy is not included in Claire's evidence and doesn't rationally support 
her belief that the ring is from the Viking Age.
19
 However, if Equality is true this cannot be 
the case since it tells us that there can be no difference in the facts that are relevant to the 
justification of the beliefs of epistemic counterparts like Claire and Blaire. Equality therefore 
has the implausible consequence that Blaire's memorial knowledge either need not be seen as 
providing a true proposition that is included in her evidence, or Claire's memorial belief can 
be seen as providing a false proposition that is included in her evidence. Littlejohn puts the 
issue in the form of a trilemma: 
To save Equality, you either have to say that we cannot have knowledge of 
propositions about the external world, that there can be false propositions included in 
someone's evidence, or that knowledge is not enough for a proposition's inclusion in 
someone's evidence. (Littlejohn, 2009, 407.) 
Now, there are two plausible ways of responding to this particular objection. First, one 
can accept the second of Littlejohn's triad of claims by affirming that there indeed can be false 
propositions included in someone's evidence. In the Illusory Ring case we saw that, 
intuitively, Claire's belief about the origins of the ring was just as justified as it would have 
been if she was in Blaire's epistemic position—i.e., if the sellers actually were trustworthy and 
the ring in fact was from the Viking Age. And since Blaire's memorial knowledge that the 
seller is trustworthy clearly provides evidence for her belief in the origins of the ring, so must 
Claire's false belief.
20, 21
 
                                                          
18
 This is to say that Blaire remembers that the seller is trustworthy, whereas Claire only has a memory that the 
seller is trustworthy. 
19
 In other words, whereas Claire's memory only is a motivating reason, Blaire's memory also provides a 
normative reason. 
20
 Counterexamples to the claim that false propositions cannot be included in one's evidence abound. See, e.g., 
Warfield (2005); Fitelson (2008); Klein (2008); Arnold (2011); and Rizzeri (2011). Littlejohn (2012, 106-109) 
argues against this kind of example, and McCain (2016, 25-27) responds to his argument.  
21
 In other words, the internalist need not accept the Williamsonian idea, with which Littlejohn is sympathetic 
(although he (2011) rejects the E = K Thesis), that only true propositions can be evidence. Focusing only on the 
objection at hand, the present case about Blaire and Claire doesn't carry much force against the internalist. 
Indeed, our intuitions seem to favor the view that one's evidence is, as suggested above, provided by one's non-
factive mental states and thus that false propositions can be included. 
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There is, undeniably, an epistemic difference between Claire and Blaire's beliefs about 
the trustworthiness of the seller. Whereas Claire's belief, which seems to be true from her 
subjective point of view, in fact is false, Blaire's belief is true and satisfies all the (externalist) 
conditions for knowledge. The point is just that not all epistemic differences are 
justificationally relevant. What is relevant for the inclusion of one's mental states or their 
propositional content
22
 in one's evidence is that they satisfy non-factive epistemic conditions. 
For example, on a plausible view of knowledge, one needs an unGettiered (doxastically) 
justified true belief in order to know that something is the case.
23
 Blaire therefore satisfies 
these epistemic conditions. But what is relevant for the inclusion of her memorial knowledge 
or its propositional content that the person who sold her the ring is a trustworthy source in her 
evidence is that the mental state (or its propositional content) satisfies non-factive epistemic 
conditions—like being a belief (or the propositional content thereof).24 In general, if a mental 
state/proposition involves elements (non-factive epistemic conditions) that are sufficient for 
explaining certain effects (a change in one's stock of evidence) which that state/proposition 
produces, then it is those elements that really are responsible for those effects.
25
 Blaire's 
memorial knowledge (or its propositional content) is therefore included in her evidence, but 
only under the guise of being a mental state (or proposition) that satisfies certain non-factive 
epistemic conditions. And since Blaire and Claire are stipulated to satisfy the same non-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
There are, of course, other considerations that motivate Williamson and Littlejohn's views on evidence. 
For example, Williamson (2000, 193) argues that in normal scientific discourse, evidence is treated as true 
propositions that are commonly known or perhaps just widely available in the scientific community. I think this 
is right. However, I suspect that if the scientist or scientific community is pressed to specify what they take their 
evidence to be, in light of certain possible skeptical scenarios, by citing what their evidence/reasons are for 
various scientific hypotheses and theories in a variety of cases, that they will find themselves referring to certain 
non-factive mental states or their propositional content—perhaps they will endorse what may be called the E = B 
Thesis: that only propositions believed or accepted by the scientific community are evidence. For a critical, and 
much more detailed discussion of Williamson's views, see McGlynn (2014). 
22
 An anonymous referee pointed out that the proponent of the view that one's evidence is propositionally 
specified and can include false propositions will have a hard time maintaining consistency, which says that one's 
propositionally specified evidence must be consistent (and which is motivated by the way in which conditional 
probabilities are treated in probability theory). In response, the proponent of this kind of view can always pursue 
the idea that even though false propositions can be included in one's evidence, not all of them can—in particular, 
he may say that inconsistent propositions never are included. However, unless he is able to motivate this idea, 
the suggestion appears to be ad hoc.  
Although this raises issues that are somewhat beyond the purposes of this article, I think one way to 
motivate the idea is to consider various possible scenarios involving (what appears to be) false evidence and see 
whether they can teach us something about which (if any) constraints there are on false evidence. Doing this, I 
wouldn't be surprised if we found ourselves convinced that false propositions often can be evidence, but that 
inconsistent propositions never can be evidence. 
23
 Some epistemologists have rejected this view. For example, Foley (1993) and Alston (1989) deny that 
justification is necessary for knowledge, whereas Sutton (2007) claims that justification is sufficient for 
knowledge.  
24
 Contrary to Williamson's knowledge first approach, this presupposes that knowledge can be factored into 
constituent parts. 
25
 The same point is also made by Wedgwood (2002, 362-363). 
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factive epistemic conditions, they therefore have the same evidence and, hence, equally 
justified beliefs about the origins of the ring. 
Second, claiming that our (including the internalist's) intuitions about the New Evil 
Demon Problem only support Parity and not Equality is question-begging. As I formulated the 
argument in the previous section, the New Evil Demon Problem supports the mentalist thesis 
according to which the justification facts supervene upon one's non-factive mental states. And 
formulated in this manner, mentalism entails Equality. The intuitions appealed to in my 
presentation of the argument from the New Evil Demon Problem therefore do support 
Equality and, moreover, were also thought to do so from the very beginning. According to 
Cohen's (1984, 281) original version, ". . . on the demon hypothesis, we would have every 
reason for holding our beliefs, that we have in the actual world."
26
 So even though I take the 
first reply to be successful, Littlejohn's objection doesn't really have what it takes to get off 
the ground. Instead, it simply assumes that the argument from the New Evil Demon Problem 
is false by claiming that our intuitions don't support Equality. In order for this claim to be able 
to do its intended work, Littlejohn would have to argue that our intuitions about the New Evil 
Demon Problem somehow fail to support Equality—and this brings us to his second 
objection. 
 
3.2 Littlejohn's Second Objection
27 
According to Littlejohn's second objection, internalist intuitions about the New Evil Demon 
Problem are undermined by other intuitions that support the denial of mentalism. Consider the 
following thesis: 
Asymmetry: It is possible for there to be a pair of epistemic counterparts, S and S', such 
that (a) only one of the pairs has good enough reason to believe p and have a justified 
belief about p or (b) S has better reasons to believe p than S' does. (Littlejohn, 2009, 
408.)  
Littlejohn claims that Asymmetry receives intuitive support from reflection on a case 
involving an epistemic agent, Alice, who imagines her counterpart, Cooper, who is deceived 
by a Cartesian demon. In this case, Alice should believe the following two claims: 
                                                          
26
 That the new evil demon problem supports mentalism and, as consequence, Equality is also argued by 
Wedgwood (2002) and Smithies (forthcoming). 
27
 What I'm here calling Littlejohn's second objection is, as will become clear, really two objections.  
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(1) If there is no more reason for me to believe I have hands than there is for Coop to 
believe he has hands, I should not believe I have them. (Littlejohn, 2009, 408.) 
(2) If my reasons for believing I have hands are no better than his, I really have no 
good reason for believing I have hands. (Littlejohn, 2009, 408.)
28
 
And she should reject the third: 
(3) Even if there is no more reason for me to believe I have hands than there is for 
Coop to believe he has hands, there is nothing wrong with my continuing to 
believe I have hands. (Littlejohn, 2009, 408.) 
Now, if we supply the case with a little more detail, I think most philosophers will 
discover that their intuitions actually speak in favor of (a slightly modified and internalist 
version of) the third claim and neither of the former two. Consider the first claim. The reason 
Alice shouldn't believe she has hands, on the assumption that she has no more reason to 
believe it than Coop, is that Coop's non-factive mental states don't provide him with sufficient 
reason to believe that he has hands. But does it seem plausible that Coop doesn't have 
sufficient reason to believe that he has hands? Coop has visual experiences of having hands, 
experiences of other people telling him that they see him having hands, and it clearly appears 
as if he is successfully interacting with his environment by using his hands. Indeed, from 
Coop's perspective, it clearly seems that he should believe that he has hands because he has 
several good reasons for believing that he does. And this fact—namely, that his belief that he 
has hands is strongly supported by his non-factive mental states—indicates that he does have 
sufficient reason to justifiably hold his belief. 
When it comes to the second claim, the reason Littlejohn thinks that Alice has no good 
reason to believe she has hands, on the assumption that her reasons are no better than Coop's, 
is that Coop's non-factive mental states don't provide him with a single good reason to believe 
that he has hands. However, Coop has several kinds experience (visual, testimonial, tactile, 
etc.) supporting his belief that he has hands. And, once again, having visual experiences of 
having hands, auditory experiences of other people talking about one's having hand, and 
feeling and using what clearly appears to be one's hands on a daily basis seems to provide one 
with not just one, but several good reasons for believing that one has hands. Intuitively, it 
therefore seems that Coop does have good reason to believe that he has hands.  
                                                          
28
 Littlejohn also mentions two other claims. But since they are very similar to (1) and (2)—only given a third-
person formulation—I'll assume that it suffices to respond to the latter ones.  
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Moreover, this is of course just what the New Evil Demon Problem indicates.
29
 Our 
experiences and beliefs provide us with good reasons for holding beliefs about the external 
world, despite their fallibility and unreliability. And these intuitions also support the third of 
Littlejohn's claims. The reason that there is something wrong with Alice's belief that she has 
hands, on the assumption that she has the same reasons as Coop, is that there also is 
something wrong with Coop's belief that he has hands. Now, epistemically, there is of course 
something wrong with Coop's belief—even the most ardent internalists should agree.30 For 
example, it is neither reliable nor true. However, his belief clearly seems justified. With all the 
aforementioned experiences to back it, his belief cannot be faulted for any rational failure. On 
the basis of these considerations, I therefore conclude that (3) is supported by intuition 
whereas (1) and (2) isn't. 
However, it is always possible for Littlejohn to insist that he has intuitions to the 
contrary and that they have to be respected. But seeing as most professional philosophers 
appear to have internalist intuitions—at least judging by the literature surrounding scenarios 
like the ones we've considered above—it seems safe to say, at least for now, that mentalism 
on balance receives more support from intuition than externalism.
31, 32
 
                                                          
29
 It is actually quite hard to see whether Littlejohn’s case is supposed to differ in any significant way from the 
original New Evil Demon scenario. Does the fact that we now are supposed to evaluate someone (Alice) who 
imagines someone else (Cooper) in a demon scenario, instead of simply evaluating someone in a demon 
scenario, really change matters? I have a hard time seeing why it should. 
30
 I suspect this is the real reason why Littlejohn thinks that the Alice and Coop scenario supports Asymmetry. 
However, the notion of epistemic wrongness, which (3) appeals to, needs to be unpacked. Without specifying 
what epistemic wrongness consists of, it cannot be considered a sufficient condition of having an unjustified 
belief that the belief somehow is wrong.  
A natural way of interpreting epistemic wrongness is to say that a belief is wrong if and only if it is 
false. But it is clearly possible to have justified false beliefs. Of course, no philosophical view is immune from 
dissent—Littlejohn himself being a case in point. However, the idea that justification entails truth is undeniably 
considered quite implausible by the majority of contemporary epistemologists, with most of them finding it 
counterintuitive or unmotivated. 
31
 Turri (2015a; and 2015b) has recently provided empirical evidence that ordinary belief evaluation by non-
philosophers tend to support externalism. However, in philosophical matters it seems reasonable that expert 
intuition should be given more authority. After all, I take it that few (if any) philosophers think it is reasonable to 
consider justified true belief sufficient for knowledge just because ordinary evaluation by non-philosophers 
might support a pre-Gettier conception of knowledge. 
32
 An anonymous referee objected that my reasoning might involve a fallacious appeal to authority, and that if it 
doesn't, it relies on unpopular assumptions. In response, I will simply point out that appealing to authority X isn't 
fallacious as long as we have good reason to think that X is a reliable source of information when it comes to the 
subject matter at hand. Moreover, when it comes to technical epistemological issues, like those that are the topic 
of this article, we should only rely on the philosopher's intuitions insofar as we have reason to think that they are 
a reliable source of information about those issues. And, indeed, this appears to be an assumption underlying 
standard philosophical practice; the whole dialectic of analysis and counterexample seems to be a case in point. 
Also, there is a growing literature supporting the claim that intuitions (or their propositional content) constitute 
evidence. For interesting discussions, see Bengson (2014); Devitt (2015); and Koksvik (2017). 
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Another worry Littlejohn has about internalist intuitions is that empirical research has 
shown that when it comes to action people usually think about justification in externalist 
terms, and that one should not expect people to have different intuitions about the justification 
of belief. The reason one shouldn't adopt a “hybrid view” which is internalist about the 
justification of belief and externalist about the justification of action is that anyone committed 
to such a view has to reject the following plausible principle: 
Link: If S's belief that Φ-ing is permissible is justified, S's Φ-ing is justified. 
(Littlejohn, 2009, 411.) 
And that by rejecting Link, one also has to reject another intuitively plausible principle: 
Fault: If S's Φ-ing were unjustified, S could be faulted for having Φ'd. (Littlejohn, 
2009, 412.) 
There are different ways of responding to this worry. For example, one can endorse 
the "hybrid view" and claim that rejecting Fault isn't too bad after all. However, I think a 
better option is to argue that Littlejohn has presented us with a false dilemma since the 
proponent of the “hybrid view” only has to reject Fault on the not-so-plausible assumption 
that a person cannot be faulted for actions committed on the basis their justified beliefs. And 
this is something he acknowledges: "Surely if someone was not wrong to believe that they 
ought to Φ or are permitted to Φ and Φ'd from the right sort of motives, they could not be 
faulted for having Φ'd." (Littlejohn, 2009, 412.) But it is not at all obvious that the standards 
for praise and blame are the same when it comes to action and belief. Consider the following 
example: 
Indoctrination Victims 
Jane is a victim of indoctrination. All her life she has been provided one-sided 
evidence that all and only people who commit suicide before the age of 18 enter into 
Paradise—e.g., trustworthy people whom she knows to be reliable about metaphysical 
and religious matters, but who only happen to be wrong about this particular issue, 
have told her so for as long as she can remember. As a result, Jane believes that her 
only chance of entering paradise is to commit suicide before she turns 18. And 
motivated by her belief (and her desire to enter into paradise), tragically enough, she 
does. 
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Similarly, Twin Jane, an epistemic counterpart of Jane, is also an indoctrination 
victim. Just like with Jane, Twin Jane has been provided one-sided evidence all her 
life that all and only people who commit suicide before the age of 18 enter into 
Paradise by the same kind of reliable testifiers. As a result, Twin Jane believes that her 
only chance of entering paradise is to commit suicide before she turns 18. And 
motivated by her belief (and her desire to enter into paradise), she does. However, in 
the case of Twin Jane, her indoctrinators are actually right. Moreover, it is common 
knowledge among people that one will in fact enter paradise just in case on commits 
suicide before turning 18.  
Now, it is clear from the description of the example that both Jane and Twin Jane's 
beliefs are justified.
33
 Their evidence, one-sided though it is, supports their beliefs. However, 
in the case Jane, it clearly seems that her action can be faulted. There are obvious reasons for 
why she shouldn't have committed suicide. For example, by doing so she will not in fact enter 
into paradise, she will "miss out" on good experiences she could have had, and her loved ones 
will probably have to endure a lot of unnecessary grief and suffering as a result. For these and 
similar reasons, it therefore seems completely natural to say that she shouldn't have 
committed suicide even though her evidence supported believing that she should. On the other 
hand, it doesn't seem that Twin Jane's action can be faulted. Indeed, the reasons for acting as 
she does far outweigh the reasons for not doing so. For example, as a result of committing 
suicide before she turns 18, Twin Jane doesn't only enter paradise, she also doesn't miss out 
on any good experiences (her experiences in paradise will be far better), and her family and 
loved ones will not suffer the tiniest bit (let's stipulate that they've themselves already 
committed suicide or that they're just genuinely happy for the fact that Twin Jane is in a better 
place). The general point is that it is possible to separate our reactive attitudes toward an 
action from our reactive attitudes toward the belief(s) which (together with the appropriate 
desires) motivated it. Hence, as the case above indicates, a person can faulted an action 
committed on the basis of their justified belief(s).
34
 
                                                          
33
 Not only does this seem intuitively right, it is also predicted by plausible internalist and externalist (e.g., 
reliabilist) views. 
34
 My suggestion of course goes against the widely shared assumption that the culpability (assuming this is what 
Littlejohn means by being subject to "fault") of action is to be understood along internalist lines. Although 
undoubtedly controversial, I think the example above provides a plausible case for the opposite view. Another 
relevant example is the following: 
Nuclear Attack 
Imagine that the President of a mighty nation launches an atomic bomb against another nation (let's call 
it "X") that has been hostile and warmongering for decades after being persuaded by his military 
64 
 
Moreover, the internalist about the justification of belief can also avoid the objection 
by committing himself to internalism about the justification of action (which I am very 
sympathetic to). For example, he might do this by arguing (as I similarly did above) that even 
though most people have externalist intuitions about the justification of action, when it comes 
to professional philosophers things are different, and that expert intuition should be given 
more weight.
35
 Doing this, the internalist need not argue against Littlejohn's assumption that a 
person cannot be faulted for an action committed on the basis of their justified belief(s). 
However, he can still do so. In that case, he should say that Jane's (but not Twin Jane's) action 
is blameworthy but justified. 
 
3.3 Williamson's Objection 
If the argument above is sound, then justification and blamelessness can come apart. But 
might not this create other problems for internalism? Perhaps one can object to the argument 
from the New Evil Demon Problem by claiming that the beliefs had by epistemic agents in 
demon cases are blamelessly unjustified—and that is precisely what Williamson does. 
According to the third objection, justification and blamelessness can come apart, and demon 
cases are prime examples where this is the case.
36
 Although the beliefs had by epistemic 
agents in demon cases are unjustified—presumably because they either are unreliable or fail 
to constitute knowledge—they nevertheless have an excuse for holding their beliefs and 
therefore cannot be blamed. This is how Williamson puts it: 
. . . the victim of a paradigmatic skeptical scenario is not to be blamed for forming 
false beliefs under the misapprehension that they constitute knowledge. The subject 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
advisors that X is close to developing their own nuclear weapons, and that unless he launches a 
preemptive nuclear attack X will likely terrorize and bomb the rest of the world with their own nuclear 
weaponry. As it turns out, however, the President's military advisors are wrong. X is not developing 
nuclear weapons. In fact, its leaders have recently decided, after reading Kant's Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, to live and govern in accordance with the categorical imperative.  
Now, there is clearly a sense in which the President shouldn't have bombed X even though he was justified in 
believing that he should. Indeed, it will in fact cause many deaths and extreme amounts of unnecessary suffering. 
And, for those reasons, one may think that the President does deserve (at least some) blame for his action.  
35
 Littlejohn (2012, Ch. 6) raises other objections against internalism about the justification of action, and in 
order to properly defend that kind of view those objections have to be met. However, the point I'm presently 
making is simply that the argument hinted at above provides an answer to the particular objection under 
consideration, rather than a full-fledged defense of internalism in the realm of action. 
36
 Some internalists have thought that justification and blamelessness come down to the same thing; i.e., they are 
the same epistemic property. See, e.g., Ginet (1975); Bonjour (1985) and Chisholm (1989). 
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has a cast-iron excuse for having formed those beliefs. . . [However,] excusable failure 
is not normatively equivalent to success. (Williamson, 2007, 116-117.)
37
  
So, in other words, whereas the epistemic agent in the normal case is blameless and justified, 
the counterpart in the demon case is blamelessly unjustified. 
However, the objection fails to recognize the way in which our intuitions about 
justification are sensitive to a distinction between perceptual failings and cognitive failings. In 
order to illustrate this, James Pryor (2001, 117) has us consider three victims of skeptical 
scenarios.
38
 The first victim is neither blameless nor justified: he fails to respect his perceptual 
evidence and simply believes whatever he feels like believing. The second victim is blameless 
but unjustified: he tries his best to form beliefs that are supported by his perceptual evidence, 
but fails due to brainwashing or some reason-distorting drug he's been given. The third victim 
is both blameless and justified: he successfully forms the beliefs that are supported by his 
perceptual evidence. By claiming that victims who respect or try to respect their perceptual 
evidence when forming beliefs about the world simply are blamelessly unjustified—like the 
second and third victims above—Williamson's proposal collapses an intuitive distinction 
between justified perceptual failings and unjustified cognitive failings.
39
  
Recently, Williamson (forthcoming) has responded to this worry by distinguishing the 
act of following a norm and merely being disposed to follow a norm. His claim is that while 
victims of skeptical scenarios are unable to follow the norms of justification, they may be 
disposed to do so—in which case they have an excuse for their beliefs which they wouldn’t 
have had if they weren't so disposed. The upshot is that a victim's beliefs are only really 
blameless (or excusable) when formed as a result of a disposition to follow norms that 
normally would produce justified beliefs.
40, 41
 
                                                          
37
 The same objection is also offered by Sosa (2003), Littlejohn (2009), and Pritchard (2012). 
38
 Following Pryor, Smithies (forthcoming, Ch. 2) also uses the three victims to argue that Williamson's 
objection fails. 
39
 It might be objected that my Indoctrination Victims example does the same. However, it should be clear that 
Jane and Twin Jane aren’t subject to anything as severe as what I here call cognitive failings. 
40
 "But once we realize how easily norms for belief which one violates in sceptical scenarios generate secondary 
and tertiary norms [i.e., higher order norms about one's dispositions to follow the lower order norms] with which 
one complies in those scenarios, we should abandon the naïve idea that the normative status which the subject's 
beliefs share in the good and bad cases might be justification, as opposed to blamelessness." (Williamson, 
forthcoming, 22.) 
41
 Another response offered by Littlejohn (forthcoming) is that internalist arguments involving skeptical 
scenarios, like Pryor's three victims or the New Evil Demon Problem, are false dilemmas (or, as Littlejohn calls 
them, "Contrast Arguments"). As he sees it, they involve the following pattern of reasoning:  
1. The beliefs of the victim of a skeptical scenario have something positive going for them. 
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However, the problem with this response is that it doesn't really account for the way in 
which our intuitions about justification are sensitive to the difference between perceptual 
failings and cognitive failings.
42
 To see why this is so, consider Pryor's second and third 
victims again. Both of them are generally disposed to form justified beliefs, which means they 
are blamelessly unjustified. But, intuitively, an obvious justificatory difference still persists 
between them: it is only the third victim which forms his beliefs on the basis of his perceptual 
evidence. Now, Williamson might claim that the brainwashing/reason-distorting drug 
somehow changes the dispositions of the second victim so that he no longer is disposed to 
comply with the norms for justification. But that wouldn't help to clarify the intuitive 
difference between the victims. For if the second victim neither is blameless nor justified, 
then he seems to be in the same epistemic position as the first victim. But that would be 
absurd: simply believing whatever one feels like, without any effort to respect one's evidence, 
is clearly more blameworthy than doing one's best in forming beliefs that conform to the 
evidence one has. Moreover, one can also come up with similar cases where the victim's 
dispositions are guaranteed to remain uncompromised, in which case the intuitive difference 
between that victim and Pryor's third victim still goes unaccounted for. In fact, Williamson 
himself provides such a case: 
Brain Scrambler 
A special device emits waves of some sort with a selective scrambling effect on brains. 
The waves inflict no permanent damage, and do not even change what ‘programme’ 
the brain is running, but they occasionally alter the contents of unconscious short-term 
working memory, so that some computations produce incorrect results. Thus a normal 
subject may confidently announce that 17 + 29 = 33. Similarly, consider Connie, a 
normal subject and competent mathematician who sincerely and confidently 
announces that 179 is and is not prime, because a scrambled piece of reasoning yields 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2. The victim's beliefs are either blameless or justified.  
3. They are not merely blameless. 
4. Therefore, they must be justified. (See Littlejohn, forthcoming, 7-8.) 
But, Littlejohn (forthcoming, 8-11) claims by following Strawson (1962) and others, the victim's beliefs may 
satisfy other positive epistemic properties, such as being excusable or exemptible. However, Madison 
(forthcoming, 9-11) has recently pointed out a plausible line of response for the internalist. According to 
Madison, the internalist can replace the third premise with a more comprehensive one saying that the victim's 
beliefs are not simply blameless, or excusable, or exemptible, etc. This way, the fact that the victim's beliefs may 
satisfy other epistemic properties besides justification or blamelessness doesn't threaten the conclusion by 
rending the argument fallacious. 
42
 Cf. Smithies (forthcoming, Ch. 2). 
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that conclusion, and a scrambled application of a contradiction-detector failed to sound 
the alarm in retrospect. (Williamson, forthcoming, 14.) 
As Williamson makes clear, Connie is disposed to form justified beliefs about 
mathematics and confidently exercises that disposition. Nevertheless, since her beliefs are the 
result of a brain-scrambling machine that makes her prone to cognitive failings, they are, just 
like those of Pryor's second victim, blamelessly unjustified. Williamson response therefore 
fails to account for the intuitive distinction between justified perceptual failings and 
unjustified cognitive failings. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Let me conclude by taking stock. In section 2, I used Lehrer and Cohen's New Evil Demon 
Problem to argue for mentalism. In section 3, I defended the argument against three recent 
objections—a pair of which is offered by Littlejohn and one by Williamson. 
Mentalism is an intuitively compelling thesis about how facts about justification 
depend upon more fundamental non-epistemic facts. By assessing the justificatory status of 
epistemic agents in various skeptical scenarios, we can infer that the justification facts 
supervene upon one’s non-factive mental states. However, this kind of argument from cases 
has recently come under heavy fire by proponents of a factive turn in epistemology. 
Philosophers like Littlejohn and Williamson argue that the intuitions supporting internalist 
views of justification can be undermined, and that in doing so they pave the way for an 
alternative kind of view according to which facts about justification depend upon facts about 
the external world, factive mental states, or other externalist conditions. The goal of this paper 
has been to show that the objections raised by Littlejohn and Williamson fail to undermine the 
intuitions that support internalism about justification. Although the factive turn has redirected 
much of contemporary epistemology away from its Cartesian roots, I conclude that a volte-
face toward the traditional non-factive paradigm is warranted.   
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The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: 
Accessibilism Defended 
 
 
 
1. Accessibilism 
Epistemic internalists claim that facts about justification in some special sense depend upon 
one's internal states. Traditionally, there are two different ways in which this idea has been 
developed. On the one hand, some internalists support mentalism; i.e., the view that facts 
about justification supervene upon one's non-factive mental states.
1
 On the other hand, others 
support accessibilism or access internalism; i.e., the view that facts about justification always 
are a priori accessible (henceforth, I'll just use the term “accessible”)—where a priori is used 
in the traditional sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of the 
sense modalities.
2, 3
 This paper focuses on the latter of the two internalisms, namely 
accessibilism. 
Accessibilism is often thought to receive support from intuitions about cases involving 
unfamiliar faculties, like clairvoyance. The general idea is that beliefs produced by unfamiliar 
faculties aren't justified, and that the best explanation for why that is so is that it must be 
possible for one to tell—at least in principle—what one's beliefs rationally have going for 
them, if they are justified.  Recently, however, this kind of argument has come under heavy 
fire by proponents of epistemic externalism; i.e., the view that internalism is false. This paper 
will defend the argument above by responding to three different objections developed in the 
literature; one of which criticizes the internalist intuitions, and two that criticize the abductive 
inference that the argument employs. Doing this, the purpose of the paper is to demonstrate 
                                                          
1
 Proponents of mentalism include Pollock & Cruz (1999); Conee & Feldman (2001); Wedgwood (2002); 
Smithies (2012a); McCain (2016); and Egeland (forthcoming). 
2
 Thus, the modes of a priori accessibility include not only reflection and reasoning, but also introspection and 
other cognitive mechanisms with an experiential aspect. For more on the distinction between narrow and broad 
notions of the a priori, see Casullo (2003, ch. 2). 
3
 Proponents of accessibilism or access internalism include BonJour (1985); Chisholm (1989); Fumerton (1995); 
Audi (1998); Steup (1999); and Smithies (2012b). 
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that the argument withstands recent externalist objections, and, consequently, that 
accessibilism remains as plausible as ever.  
This is how the paper is structured. In section 2, I identify and answer core questions 
about what commitments the accessibilist should make, while also pointing to prominent, but 
implausible, versions of accessibilism in the literature. In section 3, I present a couple of well-
known scenarios—Laurence Bonjour's (1980; 1985) clairvoyance case and Keith Lehrer's 
(1990) Truetemp case—and argue that the intuitions they elicit strongly support the 
accessibilist view endorsed in the previous section. In sections 4 to 6, I defend this argument 
against three objections recently developed in the literature. The first objection bites the bullet 
and says that the beliefs of the subjects in BonJour and Lehrer's scenarios actually are 
justified; the second says that there are alternative, externalist explanations of the intuitions 
elicited by the aforementioned scenarios that are more plausible than the one offered by the 
accessibilist; and the third is Michael Bergmann's (2006) dilemma, which is a reductio against 
accessibilism. Having responded to these objections, I summarize and conclude in section 7. 
 
2. What Kind of Accessibilist Should You Be? 
Before I present and defend the main argument, I want to spend a few pages on what 
commitments the accessibilist should make. This is important, not just because many 
internalists have defended implausible versions of the view, but also because many of the 
objections levelled against it only undermine those implausible versions of it. Let's therefore 
begin by taking a closer look at what commitments the accessibilist should make. My 
discussion will revolve around three core questions, the first of which is: 
 
2.1 What Kind of Justification Is Accessible? 
It is common to draw a distinction between two kinds of justification.
4
 First, you can have 
justification to believe a certain proposition, regardless of whether or not you actually believe 
it. For example, after listening to a history lecture you can have justification to believe that the 
Viking Leif Erikson was the first European to discover North America, but without actually 
believing it. Second, you can also have justifiably held beliefs (or other doxastic attitudes). 
For example, if you come to believe the proposition above in a way that is properly based on 
                                                          
4
 Some even operate with three kinds of justification. See, e.g., Littlejohn (2012, 5). 
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that which gives you justification to believe it, then your belief is justifiably held. Following 
Roderick Firth (1978), we can say that the first kind of justification is justification in the 
propositional sense, whereas the second kind of justification is justification in the doxastic 
sense.
5
 Given the above characterization of the distinction, it is clear that propositional 
justification is necessary, but not sufficient, for doxastic justification. 
Now, which of these kinds of justification is accessible? Although I don’t know of any 
internalist who thinks that one always has a special sort of access to facts about doxastic 
justification, it’s not hard to see how such a view would go. The internalist who advocates this 
kind of view thinks that facts about which beliefs one now justifiably holds somehow are 
within the subject’s cognitive grasp. The problem, however, is that, according to the analysis 
above, doxastic justification is propositional justification plus proper basing,
6
 and it is highly 
doubtful that one always has access to whether one satisfies the basing requirement. In other 
words, one has a justifiably held belief just in case (i) one has justification for holding that 
belief, and (ii) one holds it by properly basing it on that which gives one justification to hold 
it; but it is implausible that whether one satisfies the second condition is something that is 
accessible to one. 
 In order to illustrate why the basing requirement, which converts propositional 
justification into doxastic justification if satisfied, isn’t accessible, consider Jonathan 
Schaffer’s (2010) debasing demon. A debasing demon can make the beliefs one holds 
unjustified in the doxastic sense by undetectably changing the basis on which they are held, 
while still having it seem to the victim as if his beliefs are held on their proper justificatory 
basis: “[The debasing demon] throws her victims into the belief state on an improper basis, 
while leaving them with the impression as if they had proceeded properly.” (Schaffer, 2010, 
231.) The debasing demon is conjured by acceptance of the following claims: 
1. Knowledge [and doxastic justification] requires the production of belief, properly 
based on the evidence. 
2. Any belief can be produced on an improper basis. 
                                                          
5
 Other epistemologists use different terminology to draw the same distinction. See, e.g., Goldman (1979); 
Conee & Feldman (1985); Pryor (2005); and Smithies (forthcoming). 
6
 Turri (2010) provides counterexamples to the analysis. Smithies (2015a) responds that we simply can define 
proper basing as whatever turns propositional justification into doxastic justification. Thus, “immunity from 
counterexample may be gained at the cost of reduction.” (Smithies, 2015a, footnote 19.) 
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3. It is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem 
later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence. (Schaffer, 
2010, 232.) 
Moreover, as Schaffer points out, there are strong reasons for accepting each of the claims. 
The first is accepted by almost all contemporary epistemologists; the second is motivated by 
the idea that any belief can be held in an evidentially insensitive manner on the basis of, say, 
wishful thinking, blind guesses, or random hunches; and the third is supported by the idea that 
our awareness of one's past mental processes is fallible. Taken together, it follows from these 
claims that the basing relation isn't accessible: it is possible that there is a demon that debases 
one's beliefs, but while still having it seem as if they are properly based on one's evidence.
7, 8
 
Hence, accessibilism should be formulated as a thesis about propositional justification, rather 
than doxastic justification.
9
 
 
2.2 What Does Having Access to Facts About Justification More Specifically Require? 
Let’s define the justification facts as the facts about which doxastic attitudes one now has 
propositional justification (to a certain degree) to hold. Plausibly, one has access to the 
justification facts only if one has access to (facts about) one’s justifiers10; i.e., to whatever 
confers justification upon the doxastic attitudes one now has justification to hold. Indeed, it is 
                                                          
7
 According to Bondy and Carter (forthcoming), Schaffer's argument fails since the debasing scenario isn't 
possible. Beginning from the assumption that it is possible, they try to establish their conclusion by reductio. 
They do this by showing how the scenario is inconsistent with the most prominent analyses of the basing relation 
in the literature. However, a problem with their objection is that Schaffer's argument isn't committed to any of 
those analyses. Indeed, since all of them are subject to counterexamples (as Bondy and Carter rightfully point 
out), there are good reasons for why he shouldn't be committed to any of them. Instead, insofar as we have a 
good intuitive grasp of the basing relation, Schaffer can theorize about it without being committed to any 
particular analysis of the notion or the consequences that follow from it.  
8
 Another worry about Schaffer's argument is that it doesn't apply to doxastic theories of the basing relation, 
according to which having a meta-belief B2 to the effect that that one has a reason r supporting one's belief B1 is 
sufficient for B1 to be based on r (see, e.g., Leite, 2008). However, I do not think that this kind of doxastic 
theory about the basing relation is successful. For example, it appears to be possible to have the relevant meta-
belief B2, but without the belief B1 satisfying the basing requirement. For a counterexample along these lines, 
see Korcz (2015).  
9
 Henceforth, I will therefore only focus on propositional justification (as does the argument that is presented in 
the next section). However, I suspect that it won't always be possible to clearly differentiate talk about the 
various types of justification without additional commentary. 
10
 In the literature, there is a discussion among internalists about whether accessibilism should be analyzed in 
terms of one's access to one's justifiers or in terms of one's access to true propositions/facts about one's justifiers. 
I generally sympathize with the second view. More specifically, I think that what we have access to is true 
propositions to the effect that one now is/isn't in possession of a certain justified J—where J typically will be a 
belief or an experience (cf. paper 6). This, moreover, means that the version of accessibilism that I prefer doesn't 
rely on any sort of Russellian acquaintance. However, that said, I don't pursue this particular issue in this paper 
as it is somewhat orthogonal to its larger purpose. 
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(at least in part) in virtue of one’s access to one’s justifiers that the justification facts are 
accessible. This has led many epistemologists, internalists and externalists alike, to formulate 
accessibilism (or internalism more generally) as a thesis about one’s access to one’s justifiers. 
Here are a few examples: 
The basic thrust of internalism in epistemology, therefore, is that the properties that 
confer warrant upon a belief are properties to which the believer has some special sort 
of epistemic access. (Plantinga, 1993a, 6.) 
What we shall call “accessibilism” holds that the epistemic justification of a person’s 
belief is determined by things to which the person has some special sort of access. 
(Conee & Feldman, 2001, 2.) 
What all forms of internalism have in common is that they require, for a belief’s 
justification, that the person holding the belief be aware (or at least potentially aware) 
of something contributing to its justification. . . I shall take the following to be the 
canonical formulation of this requirement: The Awareness Requirement: S’s belief B is 
justified only if (i) there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of B—
e.g., evidence for B or a truth-indicator for B or the satisfaction of some necessary 
condition of B’s justification—and (ii) S is aware (or potentially aware) of X. 
(Bergmann, 2006, 9.) 
However, a problem with these formulations is that having access to one’s justifiers is 
only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for having access to the justification facts. They 
therefore fail to capture the sort of accessibility that internalism requires.
11
 By way of 
illustration, consider someone—let’s call him Johnny—who has justification for believing 
that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland. The reason Johnny has justification for believing that 
Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland is that he has a memory belief to the effect that a 
trustworthy geography teacher told him so (this is his justifier). Moreover, let’s say that 
Johnny has access to his memory belief, but not to the fact that it supports believing the 
proposition above. From Johnny’s first person perspective, his memory belief that a 
trustworthy geography teacher told him that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland has no bearing 
whatsoever on the belief that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland. Now, it is clear that Johnny’s 
                                                          
11
 However, Bergmann (2018, 111-112) doubles down and argues not just that his original formulation above 
captures the sort of accessibility that internalism requires, but also that the stronger formulation which I endorse 
below actually fails to qualify as an internalist position. 
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access to his memory belief isn’t sufficient for the kind of accessibility that internalism 
demands; i.e., access to the justification facts.
12
 The reason is simply that, from his subjective 
perspective, there's nothing supporting the proposition that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland 
(not even his memory belief does). Indeed, the weaker access requirement satisfied by Johnny 
and suggested in the formulations above is captured by William Alston’s (1989) externalist 
position—which he calls internalist externalism—according to which one’s justifiers are 
accessible, but the facts in virtue of which they confer justification (which Alston takes to be 
facts about reliability, understood in terms of objective probability) are not.
13
  
In order to remedy this problem, we should instead say that the justification facts are 
accessible if and only if both one’s justifiers and the facts about which doxastic attitudes they 
support (and the degree to which they support them) are accessible. This will rule out that 
someone like Johnny can have justification for holding a certain belief, but without being in a 
position to tell what that belief rationally has going for it. Thus, accessibilism can be 
formulated as the thesis that the justification facts are accessible, or, alternatively, as the thesis 
that one’s justifiers and the facts about justificatory support (i.e., which doxastic attitudes 
one’s justifiers support, and to what degree) are accessible.  
 
2.3 How Are the Justification Facts Accessible? 
Lastly, let's consider what kind of access we have to the justification facts. Generally 
speaking, there are two ways in which the accessibility in question has been understood. First, 
some internalists argue that the justification facts are psychologically accessible, in the sense 
that the subject always either has a committal attitude (like belief or knowledge) with respect 
to them or the ability of form such an attitude. For example, according to BonJour (1985), one 
has justification to believe that p only if one has a (justified) higher-order belief to the effect 
that one has justification to believe that p. As he says in his argument against foundationalism, 
a belief B is justified only if there is an argument of the following form: 
(1) B has feature Φ. 
(2) Beliefs having feature Φ are highly likely to be true. 
(3) Therefore, B is highly likely to be true. 
                                                          
12
 Consequently, according to internalism, Johnny’s doesn’t have justification for believing that Reykjavik is the 
capital of Iceland. 
13
 Glüer and Wikforss (2018) also endorse this view.  
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[And] in order for B to be justified for a particular person A (at a particular time), it is 
necessary, not merely that a justification along the above lines exist in the abstract, but 
also that A himself be in cognitive possession of that justification, that is, that he 
believe the appropriate premises of forms (1) and (2) and that these beliefs be justified 
for him. (BonJour, 1985, 31.)   
Similarly, according to Roderick Chisholm (1989), one has justification to believe that 
p only if one is able to know, in virtue of reflection alone, that one has justification to believe 
that p. This is how he puts the point.  
The internalist assumes that, merely by reflecting upon his own conscious state, he can 
formulate a set of epistemic principles that will enable him to find out, with respect to 
any possible belief he has, whether he is justified in having that belief. (Chisholm, 
1989, 76.) 
However, proponents of the psychological accessibility of justification face a couple 
of problems. First, they face a regress problem insofar as one has justification for a first-order 
belief only if one has (the ability to form) a second-order belief to the effect that one has 
justification for one's first-order belief, and one has justification for this second-order belief 
only if one has (the ability to form) a third-order belief to the effect that one has justification 
for one's second order belief, and so on ad infinitum. But since no human is able to have such 
and infinite stock of higher-order beliefs of ever-increasing complexity, it follows that no 
human has justification for their first-order beliefs, and this is clearly absurd.
14
  
Second, they also face an over-intellectualization problem insofar as there are 
unreflective creatures (e.g., children, non-human animals, or the mentally disabled) who seem 
to have justification to hold certain beliefs, even though they don't have the reflective or 
conceptual abilities to form higher-order beliefs about which lower-order beliefs they have 
justification to hold. Thus, the view that the justification facts are psychologically accessible 
again has counterintuitive consequences.
15
 
                                                          
14
 Alston (1989, ch. 8); Fumerton (1995, ch. 3); Bergmann (2006, ch. 1); and Kornblith (2012, ch. 1), to mention 
just a few, argue that internalism faces regress problems. 
15
 The over-intellectualization problem is raised by Goldman (1986); Alston (1989); Feldman (2005); Burge 
(2013); and Janvid (2017). 
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For these reasons, I think we should explore the other way in which the notion of 
“access” has been understood.16 On this view, the accessibility in question is understood in 
epistemic terms, but in a way that doesn't presuppose anything about one's psychological 
abilities or states. For example, according to Declan Smithies (2012b), one has justification to 
believe that p only if one has justification to believe that one has justification to believe that p. 
This idea is captured by the following iteration principle: 
The JJ Principle: Jp  JJp. (Smithies, 2012b, 274.)17 
Similarly, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) claims that internalism (which she opposes) should 
be understood as the view that a necessary condition for having (first-order) justification to 
hold a certain doxastic attitude is that one has higher-order justification to believe that one 
does. 
A natural way of putting more meat on these bones is as follows. Whenever you have 
(first-order) justification to hold a certain doxastic attitude—let's just say a belief—toward a 
proposition p, you also have (higher-order) justification to believe that you do. This higher-
order justification is provided by one's faculty of introspection and one's faculty of reflection. 
You thus have higher-order introspective and reflective justification to believe that you have 
the lower-order justification that you in fact do have. By way of example, let's say that you 
have a piece of evidence (e.g., a certain visual experience) e that gives you justification to 
believe that there is a chessboard in front of you. Now, according to the proposal at hand, a 
necessary condition for having any evidence is that you have introspective justification to 
believe that you do have that evidence: e  Je. Moreover, another necessary condition on e is 
that you have reflective justification to believe that it supports the proposition(s) p it in fact 
does support: esupp  Jesupp. Also, having introspective justification to believe that you have 
evidence e and reflective justification to believe that e supports p is sufficient for having 
(higher-order) justification to believe that you have (first-order) justification to believe that p: 
                                                          
16
 There are, of course, other internalists who define the relevant kind of accessibility in psychological terms, but 
who do so in a much weaker sense that avoids the problems above (see, e.g., Fumerton (1995)). However, a 
problem with views of this kind is that they aren't really supported by the considerations that motivate 
accessibilism in first place. For a larger discussion of this issue, see Bergmann (2006, ch. 2). 
17
 Smithies calls it The Positive Self-Intimation Thesis. Moreover, he actually supports principles that are a lot 
stronger than this. More specifically, he thinks propositional justification has the following structure:  
“The Accessibility Thesis: 
Positive: one has justification to believe that p iff one has justification to believe that one has 
justification to believe that p (Jp  JJp). 
Negative: one lacks justification to believe that p iff one has justification to believe that one lacks 
justification to believe that p (Jp  JJp).” (Smithies, 2012b, 273.) 
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(Je ∧ Jesupp)  JJp. Thus, if you have (first-order) justification to believe that there is a 
chessboard in front of you, then you have (higher-order) introspective and reflective 
justification to believe that you do.
18, 19
  
Now, notice how this kind of view doesn't tell us anything about our psychology. For 
example, in order to have justification to believe a certain proposition, it doesn't require that 
we actually believe (or have any other attitude or mental state toward the fact) that we do. 
Thus, the vicious regress problem
20
 and the over-intellectualization problem are avoided. This 
way, proponents of the epistemic accessibility of justification have a way of conceptualizing 
the relevant kind of accessibility, but without falling prey to common externalist objections. 
Moreover, I do not doubt that there are other plausible ways for the proponent of this kind of 
position to understand the accessibility in question. However, for present purposes, when it 
comes to how the justification facts are accessible, I will take the accessibilist to be 
committed to something like the JJ principle.
21
  
In sum, these are the core commitments that the accessibilist should make. First, he 
should claim that facts about propositional, and not doxastic, justification are accessible. 
Second, he should claim that the justification facts are accessible just in case both one's 
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 There are of course other ways of fleshing out the JJ principle, but I think this is a plausible first proposal. A 
similar suggestion is hinted at (but not endorsed) by Silins (forthcoming) and developed and argued for in great 
detail by Smithies (forthcoming). 
19
 Having discussed the JJ principle with colleagues, I have found that some of them feel that it somehow is too 
weak to capture the kind of accessibility that the internalist is (or should be) interested in. In response to this kind 
of worry, I simply want to point out that there isn't any general agreement among internalists about what the 
relevant kind of access involves. Rather, the idea is that reflection on certain kinds of cases (what I'm in this 
paper calling unfamiliar faculty cases) supports the idea that facts about justification are a priori accessible in 
some sense or other, and that the internalist should figure out how to spell out this access condition. That being 
said, the JJ principle seems like a perfectly fine proposal. 
20
 It still generates an infinite regress insofar as having first-order justification to hold a certain doxastic attitude 
ultimately requires an infinite regress of higher-order justifications to believe that one has the lower-order 
justifications. However, as Smithies (2012b, 277) points out, since this is a regress of propositional 
justification—in order to have first-order justification for a doxastic attitude it is not required that one actually 
believe any of these higher-order propositions—it is benign. Indeed, having such a stock of infinite (higher-
order) justifications doesn't seem any more problematic than it is for someone who has justification to believe 
that p to also have justification to believe that p q, justification to believe that p  r, and so on. Moreover, 
neither case of infinite justifications seems to require that the agent must be able to form the relevant beliefs. 
After all, the disjunctive propositions just mentioned may be too many or too large for any finite mind with finite 
computational capacity to believe. 
21
 A particularly tricky issue concerns the conceptually possible case where you have someone who has 
justification J to believe p, but who either doesn't have the concepts to form the higher-order belief that they have 
J, or who doesn't have the concepts to form the belief that J supports p. The issue, more specifically, is whether, 
in this case, the subject still has access to the fact that he has justification to believe p. Or, in other words, does 
having access to the justification facts in the epistemic sense require that one has the concepts to take advantage 
of this access (even though it doesn't require that one has the ability to do so)? Personally, I am undecided with 
respect to this issue. Moreover, if it turns out that having the kind of access with which I am concerned does 
require that one has the concepts to take advantage of it, then I would be happy to conclude that accessibilism 
only holds true of cases which don't involve conceptual deprivation. 
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justifiers and the facts about justificatory support are accessible. Third, he should claim that 
the justification facts are epistemically, and not psychologically, accessible. Taken together, 
this enables us to formulate the following plausible position, which avoids many of the 
traditional problems that have plagued the internalist: 
Accessibilism: necessarily, one always has propositional justification to believe the 
justification facts (i.e., the facts about what which doxastic attitudes one now has 
propositional justification (to a certain degree) to hold), or, alternatively, what one's 
justifiers are and how they support the doxastic attitudes they do. 
 
3. The Argument from Unfamiliar Faculties 
According to simple process reliabilism, like that of the early Alvin Goldman (1979), the 
justification facts are a function of the reliability of one's doxastic dispositions. However, by 
now, many counterexamples to this analysis are on the table. The counterexamples usually 
either demonstrate that reliability isn't necessary for justification or that it isn't sufficient for 
justification.
22
 One of the most famous counterexamples to the sufficiency claim is provided 
by BonJour and goes as follows:  
Clairvoyance 
Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence 
or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power 
or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that 
the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this 
belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power under 
circumstances in which it is completely reliable. (BonJour, 1985, 41; Cf. 1980.) 
Now, according to simple process reliabilism, since Norman's belief about the President's 
whereabouts is reliably produced (and there are no undefeated defeaters), it is justified. 
However, intuitively, the reliabilist verdict is clearly wrong; Norman's belief doesn't seem any 
more justified than a random hunch. Hence, simple process reliabilism is wrong.  
Consider now another counterexample provided by Lehrer: 
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 The most famous counterexample to the necessity claim is provided by Lehrer and Cohen (1983). 
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Truetemp 
Suppose a person, whom we shall call Mr. Truetemp, undergoes brain surgery by an 
experimental surgeon who invents a small device which is both a very accurate 
thermometer and a computational device capable of generating thoughts. The device, 
call it tempucomp, is implanted in Truetemp's head . . . and acts as a sensor to transmit 
information about the temperature to the computational system in his brain. . . Assume 
that the tempucomp is very reliable, and so his thoughts are correct temperature 
thoughts. . . Now imagine, finally, that he . . . accepts [these thoughts] unreflectively, 
another effect of the tempucomp. Thus, he thinks and accepts that the temperature is 
104 degrees. It is. (Lehrer, 1990, 163-164.) 
Once again, simple process reliabilism tells us that Truetemp's belief about the temperature is 
justified, since it is reliably produced (and there are no undefeated defeaters). However, just 
as with Norman, this is the wrong verdict: intuitively, Truetemp's belief is clearly not 
justified. Hence, simple process reliabilism is wrong.  
Moreover, when diagnosing where exactly simple process reliabilism goes wrong, 
BonJour and Lehrer provide the resources necessary for formulating an argument, based on 
the intuitions elicited by the scenarios above, for accessibilism. The argument makes use of 
the fact that the beliefs of the subjects in the scenarios above are produced by what we may 
call an unfamiliar faculty;
23
 i.e., a faculty for belief production which a subject has, but 
without any awareness of the fact that he has it or of why beliefs produced by that faculty 
should be true. Consider the following passage, where BonJour offers his diagnosis:  
One reason why externalism may seem initially plausible is that if the external relation 
in question genuinely obtains [i.e., the reliable relation between one's belief and the 
truth], then Norman will in fact not go wrong in accepting the belief, and it is, in a 
sense, not an accident that this is so: it would not be an accident from the standpoint of 
our hypothetical observer who knows all the relevant facts and laws. But how is this 
supposed to justify Norman's belief? From his subjective perspective it is an accident 
that the belief is true. And the suggestion here is that the rationality of justifiability of 
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 The term is borrowed from Moon (2018). 
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Norman's belief should be judged from Norman's own perspective rather than from 
one which is unavailable to him. (BonJour, 1985, 43-44.)
24
 
Similarly, Lehrer writes: 
Though he [i.e., Truetemp] records the information because of the operations of the 
tempucomp, he is ignorant of the facts about the tempucomp and about his 
temperature telling reliability. Yet, the sort of causal, nomological, statistical, or 
counterfactual relationships required by externalism may all be present. Does he know 
[or have justification to believe] that the temperature is 104 degrees when the thought 
occurs to him while strolling in Pima Canyon? He has no idea why the thought 
occurred to him or that such thoughts are almost always correct. He does not, 
consequently, know [or have justification to believe] that the temperature is 104 
degrees when that thought occurs to him. (Lehrer, 1990, 164.) 
What BonJour and Lehrer here tell us is that simple process reliabilism (and other 
forms of externalism) cannot be correct since it counts reliably produced beliefs that are 
wholly arbitrary or unsupported from the subject's first person perspective as justified. 
However, as the Clairvoyance and Truetemp scenarios above indicate, a subject can only have 
justification for a certain belief if it isn't an accident from his perspective why that belief 
should be true. In other words, beliefs produced by unfamiliar faculties cannot be justified 
since the truth of those beliefs would be completely accidental to the subject who has them. 
Indeed, according to the internalist, the most plausible explanation for why the intuitions 
elicited by the cases above are true—namely, that Norman and Truetemp's beliefs are 
unjustified—is that one must always have a special sort of access to the justificatory status of 
one's doxastic attitudes, if they are justified.
25
 By abductive reasoning, we can therefore 
conclude from these intuitions that accessibilism is true. 
Recently, the argument from unfamiliar faculties for accessibilism has been heavily 
criticized. In the next three sections, I will respond to three different ways in which the 
argument above has been challenged. Doing this, the goal is to demonstrate that the argument 
withstands recent externalist objections, and that its conclusion remains as plausible as ever.  
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 Cf. BonJour and Sosa (2003, 32): “[Norman is] being epistemically irrational and irresponsible in accepting 
beliefs whose provenance can only be a total mystery to [him], whose status is as far as [he] can tell no different 
from that of a stray hunch or arbitrary conviction.” 
25
 Internalists take it to be the best explanation because it is the explanation that is most virtuous. For example, it 
is very simple, and it provides a unified explanation that accounts for both BonJour and Lehrer's scenarios, but 
with the power to generalize to other similar cases as well. 
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4. The Bullet-Biting Response 
Some externalists have responded to the argument above by arguing that the intuitions elicited 
by cases involving unfamiliar faculties actually support externalism. For example, Sven 
Bernecker claims that the argument from unfamiliar faculties somehow is biased against 
reliabilism by assuming that those kinds of faculties aren't really reliable, and that if we 
properly acknowledge the fact that they are (in the relevant scenarios), then we will also 
realize that the beliefs they produce are justified. Focusing on BonJour's clairvoyance case, 
this is how he puts it: 
I think it is questionable whether the clairvoyance example poses a threat to externalist 
reliabilism. The intuitive plausibility of the thought experiment hinges on the 
presumption that clairvoyance is not reliable. Yet if a clairvoyant faculty actually 
existed, then either it would prove itself reliable or not. If it proved itself reliable, then 
intuitively there would be no reason to deny clairvoyants justification and knowledge. 
BonJour's internalist interpretation of the thought experiment presupposes a bias 
against clairvoyance. (Bernecker, 2008, 166.) 
Here, Bernecker is making the point that (presumably) there aren't any reliable 
clairvoyants in the actual world, and that if there are reliable clairvoyants in the possible 
world that Norman finds himself in and he happens to be one of them, then we should have 
intuitions to the effect that his belief about the President's whereabouts is justified.
26
 
Moreover, if I understand Bernecker correctly, the reason most of us don't have those 
intuitions is that we let certain facts about our world (that there aren't any reliable clairvoyants 
or temperature-tellers) skew our judgments about certain facts (the justificatory status of 
Norman or Truetemp's beliefs) in other possible worlds. 
However, in response, I will make two points against Bernecker. First, claiming that if 
clairvoyance (or the tempucomp) really is reliable, then “there would be no reason to deny 
clairvoyants justification and knowledge” is simply wrong. The majority of philosophers 
appear to be swayed by internalist intuitions when it comes to cases involving unfamiliar 
faculties (at least judging by the current state of the literature), and that does provide us with 
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 Lyons (2009, 119) seems to make an analogous point with his Nyrmoon case. 
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good reason to deny that beliefs produced by unfamiliar faculties are justified.
27
 Moreover, 
the internalist also has a good—indeed, I've argued, the best—explanation for why so many 
who reflect on the clairvoyance and Truetemp scenarios deny that the subjects in those cases 
have justification: namely, one must always have a special sort of access to the justificatory 
status of one's doxastic attitudes, if they are justified. 
Second, Bernecker's alternative explanation of internalist intuitions about the 
clairvoyance case—namely, that they are biased or skewed due to the fact that the faculty in 
question (i.e., clairvoyance) doesn't really exist—is problematic. To see why that is so, we 
must ask ourselves whether it is only the intuitions elicited by the clairvoyance case that are 
biased in the way Bernecker suggests? If so, then the Truetemp case still supports 
accessibilism and Bernecker's response fails. If, however, it isn't only the intuitions elicited by 
the clairvoyance case that are biased, then he needs to say something about which kinds of 
cases are likely to give rise to biased intuitions. If he thinks this is the case when it comes to 
all scenarios involving unfamiliar faculties (which I suspect he does), then, unless he is able 
to provide some principled motivation for this view, it is clearly ad hoc. After all, why should 
intuitions about reliable clairvoyants or temperature-tellers be less trustworthy than intuitions 
about, say, Gettier-cases, brains-in-vats, demon's victims, epistemic akrasia or belief in 
Moorean conjunctions? A possible response hinted at in the passage quoted above is that our 
intuitions are trustworthy only insofar as they are about cases involving phenomena that exist 
in the actual world—which, of course, reliable clairvoyants and temperature tellers don't. 
However, there are a couple of problems with this view. First, it is committed to denying the 
commonly accepted position that modal or counterfactual intuitions can teach us about things 
that are merely possible.
28
 For example, it seems that modal intuitions about, say, Sherlock 
Holmes and his extraordinary abilities can teach us that such a man possibly could have 
existed, but, according to the view at hand, they cannot. Second, it is hard to see what kind of 
considerations could motivate the view, especially since Bernecker doesn't provide any. It 
does of course save the reliabilist from having to give counterintuitive judgments about 
various cases, but that is of course a completely ad hoc reason for the view when the 
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 Here I'm not making the claim that most philosophers have internalist opinions, but that they have internalist 
intuitions about unfamiliar faculty cases. When looking at the literature that has developed around these kinds of 
cases, it seems that externalists generally tend to share the internalist intuitions, but rather give more weight to 
other theoretical considerations that speak against them. 
28
 See, e.g., Bealer (2002); and McGinn (2004). 
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plausibility of reliabilism itself is in question. For these reasons I think that Bernecker's 
response ultimately fails.
29
 
 
5. The Alternative Explanations Response 
On balance, most philosophers appear to agree that Norman and Truetemp don't have 
justification for their beliefs. According to accessibilism, the best explanation for this intuitive 
datum is that the justification facts always are epistemically accessible. However, this is not 
the only plausible explanation. Indeed, many externalists have offered their own explanations 
for the intuitive datum that Norman and Truetemp don't have justification for their beliefs. For 
example, Bergmann (2006) and Graham (2014a; 2014b) claim that the reason they don't have 
justification is that their beliefs aren't produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties; 
Breyer and Greco (2008) claim that the faculties responsible for their beliefs aren't properly 
integrated with their cognitive character; Lyons (2009) claims that their beliefs lack the 
appropriate etiology; and Comesaña (2010) claims that they aren't supported by reliabilist 
evidence. In a recent paper, however, Harmen Ghijsen (2016) has plausibly argued that all of 
these alternative explanations ultimately fail.
30
 Moreover, in order to remedy their 
shortcomings, Ghijsen offers his own externalist explanation of why neither Norman nor 
Truetemp has justification for their belief. In this section, I will take a closer look at Ghijsen's 
explanation and argue that it too ultimately fails.  
According to Ghijsen (2016, 102), we (as cognitively sophisticated agents) have 
certain largely unconscious monitoring mechanisms that detect and respond to the origins of 
the information we receive and its coherence with other information we possess. If, for 
example, these monitoring mechanisms detect information that comes from an unreliable 
source or information that doesn't cohere with certain other beliefs or experiences, then they 
reject it. Drawing on the work of Alvin Plantinga (1993a) and Peter Graham (2014a), Ghijsen 
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 Another bullet-biting response is offered by Janvid, who argues as follows: “From an externalist perspective, 
Norman is in the same predicament regarding his clairvoyant powers as many people are regarding their 
perceptual abilities. We cannot deny that Norman is warranted in his clairvoyant beliefs unless we also are 
willing to deny that these people are in positive epistemic states regarding their perceptual beliefs without having 
collected evidence, at least track records, in favor of the reliability of their perceptual mechanisms.” (Janvid, 
2017, 106.) 
In response, I think this way of biting the bullet ends up begging the question, since internalists like 
myself will be quick to contrast clairvoyance and perception precisely because only the latter faculty provides 
internally accessible reasons or evidence, like visual and auditory seemings, that can be known through 
reflection to provide justificatory support to certain propositions.  
30
 Although I don't have the space to go deeper into the issue here, let me just note that I think Ghijsen's 
criticisms are successful. Moreover, I'm not alone in doing so: see, e.g., Moon (2018). 
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claims that, taken together, these monitoring mechanisms make up one's defeater system; i.e., 
a system whose proper function is the reliable prevention of forming or maintaining false 
beliefs. This is why he says that there is a “Proper Functionalist Defeat (PFD)” condition on 
justification, which he formulates as follows: 
PFD S's belief in p at t is justified only if S does not have a defeater system D such 
that, had D been working properly, it would have resulted in S's not believing p at t. 
(Ghijsen, 2016, 106.) 
Moreover, according Ghijsen, PFD plausibly explains why Norman and Truetemp's beliefs 
are unjustified. Since their defeater systems would have rejected their beliefs if they had been 
functioning properly, they cannot be justified:  
[T]he information presented by their special senses is not corroborated by any of their 
other senses, nor does the information stem from a recognizable trustworthy source. 
This should give their monitoring mechanisms sufficient cause to prevent the 
information from rising to the status of belief. (Ghijsen, 2016, 108.) 
Now we have two plausible, but competing, explanations of the Clairvoyance and 
Truetemp scenarios. On the one hand, the accessibilist says that the reason Norman and 
Truetemp's beliefs are unjustified is that they have been produced by unfamiliar faculties and, 
as a result, their truth is completely arbitrary or accidental from their subjective point of view. 
On the other hand, Ghijsen says that the reason their beliefs are unjustified is that their 
defeater systems aren't functioning properly, since they would have prevented the formation 
of those beliefs if they had. How are we to decide between these explanations? In light of the 
scenarios presented above in section 3, this is rather difficult since both of them respect the 
intuition that Norman and Truetemp's beliefs are unjustified. In order to decide between them, 
we therefore need another scenario where they yield different verdicts. Continuing, I will 
present a scenario offered by Ghijsen himself (in response to Graham) and develop a slightly 
modified version of it where accessibilism and PFD disagree about how it should be 
interpreted.  
Consider the following variation on BonJour's original clairvoyance case: 
Norbert 
Norbert is the son of a mother and father who both have reliable clairvoyant abilities 
and have been able to reproduce because of the benefit these clairvoyant abilities have 
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provided for them. However, there are not (yet) many people who have these 
clairvoyant abilities, and their existence is kept secret. The abilities are due to 
specialized internal organs that pick up on special energy waves in the environment, 
and then output brief visual images which represent that such-and-so is currently the 
case at some distant place. Furthermore, the abilities usually become active quite 
suddenly some time after puberty. Norbert's parents have decided not to tell him about 
the existence of his clairvoyant abilities, and Norbert has no evidence for or against 
their existence in general or his own having them. Some time after puberty, Norbert 
suddenly experiences a brief visual image of the President being in New York City 
and on that basis believes that the president is in New York City. (Ghijsen, 2016, 98.) 
Ghijsen tells us that, intuitively, Norbert's belief is unjustified despite being reliably 
formed—and with this the accessibilist agrees. The explanations that Ghijsen and the 
accessibilist offer are of course different, but the intuition elicited by the example is called 
into question by neither.
31
 However, the case can easily be modified—or perhaps I should say 
expanded upon—so that it yields another result. Consider the following case, which I call 
Norbert Jr. 
Norbert Jr. 
Hundreds of years after Norbert developed his clairvoyant abilities, clairvoyance has 
become a widespread phenomenon with the majority of people now developing 
clairvoyant abilities, but without any associated visual imagery, shortly after puberty. 
The reason is that clairvoyants have an enormous evolutionary advantage; their 
chances of surviving and reproducing are far greater than those of people without 
clairvoyant abilities. Moreover, clairvoyance has now become such an integrated part 
of most people's cognitive lives that the people who have that ability also have 
defeater systems whose proper function no longer is to prevent the formation or 
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 This is somewhat of a simplification. Personally I have conflicting intuitions about the case due to the fact that 
Norbert's clairvoyant faculty is stipulated to output visual images that are (presumably) internally accessible. For 
this reason, the clairvoyant faculty might appear to function more or less as a quasi-visuoperceptual faculty, 
differing mainly insofar as it is able to provide the subject with visual representations of things that are 
happening at a far greater distance than regular perception. Thus, Norbert's clairvoyant belief might appear to be 
justified in more or less the same way and to more or less the same degree as regular visual beliefs. For this 
reason, I will stipulate in the scenario below that the subject (Norbert Jr.) doesn't have the kind of clairvoyance 
induced visual experiences that Norbert does. Doing this, the case is presented in such a way that Ghijsen and the 
accessibilist will offer different verdicts, but without relying on unnecessary elements (visual imagery) that only 
serves to complicate the scenario and our intuitions about it.  
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maintenance of clairvoyant beliefs.
32
 Norbert Jr. is one of Norbert's descendants. The 
community in which he lives (including his friends and family) has decided not to tell 
him about the clairvoyant abilities of his species, and Norbert Jr. has no evidence for 
or against their existence in general or his own having them. Some time after puberty, 
Norbert spontaneously forms the clairvoyant belief that the President is in New York 
City. 
Intuitively, Norbert Jr.'s belief is unjustified. After all, his epistemic position appears 
to be no better than that of Norbert. And according to the accessibilist, that is correct. Indeed, 
accessibilism tells us that the best explanation for why Norbert Jr.'s belief is unjustified is that 
it has been produced by an unfamiliar faculty and, as a result, its truth is completely arbitrary 
or accidental from his first person perspective. However, according to Ghijsen this cannot be 
correct. Since Norbert Jr.'s defeater system is functioning properly, his belief about the 
President's whereabouts should be justified. But this just does not seem plausible. Of course, 
Ghijsen can always insist that Norbert Jr.'s belief is unjustified, but that the right explanation 
for why that is so should be sought somewhere else; after all, PFD is only a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for justification. However, this would be a very problematic move: not 
only does it undermine the motivation for PFD (i.e., its ability to plausibly explain the 
intuitions elicited by clairvoyance-style cases), but it also puts Ghijsen in a position where he 
has to come up with another explanation for the Norbert Jr. case—and why not accessibilism? 
Hence, in light of the Norbert Jr. case, Ghijsen's PFD either gives what clearly appears to be 
the wrong verdict, or it loses its motivation.  
 
6. Bergmann's Dilemma 
The third objection I want to consider is offered by Bergmann. According to Bergmann, 
accessibilism is motivated by its ability to avoid what he calls “The Subject's Perspective 
Objection (SPO)”: 
The Subject's Perspective Objection
33
: If the subject holding a belief isn't aware of 
what that belief has going for it, then she isn't aware of how its status is any different 
from a stray hunch or an arbitrary conviction. From that we may conclude that from 
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 The clairvoyant beliefs might thus perhaps be a bit like spontaneous beliefs about the dangerousness of snakes 
for us. For more on snake-beliefs and proper function, see Moon (2018). 
33
 The SPO encapsulates why beliefs produced by unfamiliar faculties intuitively cannot be justified; the reason 
is that their truth is completely accidental or unsupported from one's subjective perspective. 
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her perspective it is an accident that her belief is true. And that implies that it isn't a 
justified belief. (Bergmann, 2006, 12.) 
However, as he sees it, accessibilism faces a dilemma, thus making it unfit to explain 
the intuitions elicited by unfamiliar faculty cases. The dilemma he presents is as follows
34
: 
A Dilemma for Internalism 
1. An essential feature of internalism is that it makes a subject's actual or potential 
awareness of some justification-contributor a necessary condition for the 
justification of any belief held by that subject. 
2. The awareness required by internalism is either strong or weak awareness. 
3. If the awareness required by internalism is strong awareness, then internalism has 
vicious regress problems leading to radical skepticism. 
4. If the awareness required by internalism is weak awareness, then internalism is 
vulnerable to the SPO, in which case internalism loses its main motivation for 
imposing the awareness requirement. 
5. If internalism either leads to radical skepticism or loses its main motivation for 
imposing the awareness requirement (i.e., avoiding the SPO), then we should not 
endorse internalism. 
6. Therefore, we should not endorse internalism. (Bergmann, 2006, 13-14.) 
In order to get a better grip on how the dilemma actually goes, we need to say a little 
bit about what Bergmann means by “weak” and “strong” accessibility/awareness. Strong 
awareness, more specifically, involves “conceiving of the justifier that is the object of 
awareness as being in some way relevant to the justification or truth of the belief” it supports 
(Bergmann, 2006, 13); i.e., it requires that one somehow conceptualizes the justifier as 
supporting the belief in question. Weak awareness, on the other hand, doesn't require this sort 
of conceptualization. So Bergmann's dilemma tells us that proponents of accessibilism either 
support weak or strong accessibilism. If they support strong accessibilism, then they face 
vicious regress problems that lead to radical skepticism. But if they support weak 
accessibilism, then they become vulnerable to the SPO. In either case, accessibilism fails.  
In the literature, both premise 3 and premise 4 have been challenged. For example, 
Thomas Crisp (2009) and Rogers and Matheson (2011, 65ff.) argue that premise 3 is false by 
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 An early and somewhat underdeveloped version of the dilemma was first presented by Fumerton (1995, 63-
65). 
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presenting a version of strong accessibilism that doesn't face vicious regress problems. 
However, since I have some reservations about their argument, I will focus on premise 4 
instead. 
When it comes to premise 4, Bergmann tells us that weak accessibility/awareness of a 
justifier isn't sufficient to make the truth of the doxastic attitude it supports non-accidental 
from the subject's perspective and therefore not sufficient to justify said attitude (i.e., it is 
vulnerable to the SPO). This is the case, according to Bergmann, for both conceptual and 
nonconceptual versions of weak accessibilism. According to nonconceptual versions of weak 
accessibilism, there is a weak accessibility condition on justification that doesn't require the 
subject to conceive of the justifier in any way. However, as Bergmann sees it, such 
conceptualization is necessary in order to avoid the SPO: 
[S]ince the awareness required is nonconceptual, a person can have the required 
awareness of [the justifier] without conceiving of [it] in any way—without 
categorizing it according to any classificatory scheme. But then [a subject] can be 
nonconceptually aware of [the justifier] without conceiving of [it] as relevant at all to 
the appropriateness of his belief. According to the SPO, if [the subject] does not 
conceive of [the justifier] as something relevant to the appropriateness of his belief, it 
is an accident from [his] perspective that his belief is true. Clearly this supposed 
problem is not solved by requiring [the subject] to be nonconceptually aware of [the 
justifier]. (Bergmann, 2006, 20.) 
Similarly, according to Bergmann, conceptual versions of weak accessibilism also 
face the SPO. According to conceptual versions of weak accessibilism, there is a weak 
accessibility condition on justification that does require the subject to conceive of the justifier, 
but not in any way that makes it relevant to the appropriateness of the belief (or other doxastic 
attitude) it supports. However, once again, conceiving of the justifier as supporting the belief 
it does is necessary in order to avoid the SPO:  
Would it help if we added instead the requirement that [a subject] has a conceptual 
weak awareness of [the justifier]? Here again the answer is 'no'. For [the subject] could 
satisfy this sort of requirement simply by being aware of [the justifier] and applying 
some concept or other to it. . . And that means that [the subject] can have a conceptual 
weak awareness of [the justifier] without conceiving of [it] as relevant in any way to 
the appropriateness of his belief B. But then, according to the SPO, even if this added 
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requirement were satisfied, it would still be an accident from [the subject's] 
perspective that B is true. For although [the subject] applies a concept to [the justifier], 
he doesn't apply the right sort of concept to it. He doesn't apply a concept that 
involves his conceiving of [the justifier] as contributing in some way to B's 
justification (or as indicating that B is likely to be true or some such thing). The only 
way to guarantee that he does apply such a concept to [the justifier] is to have B 
satisfy a strong awareness requirement. Thus, we are forced to concede that by 
imposing only a conceptual weak awareness requirement, the internalist is vulnerable 
to the SPO. (Bergmann, 2006, 20-21.) 
Thus, the upshot for Bergmann is that weak accessibilism—whether it is of a conceptual or 
non-conceptual version—becomes unmotivated since it is vulnerable to the SPO.  
In response, Rogers and Matheson (2011) have argued that versions of weak 
accessibilism that appeal to “seemings” as justifiers—including Michael Huemer's 
phenomenal conservatism
35—provide counterexamples to premise 4. As they see it, seemings, 
defined as inclinations to form certain beliefs,
36
 can satisfy the weak accessibility/awareness 
condition:  
[T]he seeming may result for the subject as a result of merely weak awareness of some 
object of first-order awareness. This being the case, an individual can be in a state 
wherein he hosts the seeming that some proposition is true while remaining in a state 
of weak—or even nonconceptual—awareness of that seeming, or while having no 
higher-order awareness of the seeming at all, and all while remaining in a state of 
weak awareness concerning the object of first-order awareness that gives rise to that 
seeming. (Rogers & Matheson, 2011, 60-61.) 
Moreover, not only can such justifying seemings satisfy weak awareness, they also escape the 
SPO. Absent any relevant defeaters, if it seems to one that p, then p's truth isn't accidental 
from one's subjective perspective. This appears to be correct. If a certain proposition—for 
example that I'm currently reading a philosophy paper, or that Reykjavik is the capital of 
Iceland—seems true, then the truth of that proposition isn't accidental or surprising from one's 
                                                          
35
 See Huemer (2001; 2007). 
36
 Cf. Swinburne (2001, 141-142); and Conee (2004, 15), who also claim that seemings are inclinations to 
believe. However, not everyone agrees. Huemer (2007), for example, argues rather plausibly that seemings and 
inclinations to believe are conceptually distinct and therefore can come apart. 
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first-person perspective. Referring back to BonJour's Clairvoyance scenario, Rogers and 
Matheson put the point as follows:  
There is a clear subjective difference, for example, between the belief that 
inexplicably (from his own perspective) pops into Norman the clairvoyant's head as a 
result of the operation of his clairvoyant powers, on the one hand, and a subject's 
belief in some proposition as a result of the proposition's actually seeming true to him 
upon his understandingly considering it and being weakly aware of some object of 
awareness (e.g., conceptual inclusion relationships), on the other. After all, in the latter 
case, the proposition seems true to the subject—to use the language of Plantinga 
(1993[b]), the subject feels 'pushed' or 'impelled' toward believing it. (Rogers & 
Matheson, 2011, 61.) 
Moreover, even though I think the authors mentioned above are correct insofar as 
versions of weak accessibilism that appeal to seemings as justifiers do provide genuine 
counterexamples to Bergmann's fourth premise,
37
 I want to argue that the version of 
accessibilism that has been the focus of this paper—something akin to the JJ principle of 
section 2.3—also provides a counterexample to it. Consider again the JJ principle. It says that 
one has justification to believe (or, alternatively, withhold/disbelieve) that p, only if one has 
higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe (or, alternatively, 
withhold/disbelieve) that p. By way of example, the principle says that if you have 
                                                          
37
 Bergmann (2013, 170-171) objects by presenting a couple of scenarios with the purpose of making it intuitive 
that it is possible to have a conscious seeming that p (that satisfies the weak accessibility condition), but that it is 
an accident from one's perspective that p is true. The scenarios he presents have the same structure: there is an 
epistemic agent who has the relevant kind of seeming and who holds the corresponding belief, but who is 
incapable (due to severe cognitive failings or malfunctions) to conceive of the seeming as relevant to the truth of 
the corresponding belief. Instead, the agent simply holds the belief for silly or irrational motives, and not because 
of the seeming itself. As a result, according to Bergmann, it is intuitive that the truth of the agent's belief is 
completely accidental from his first person perspective; in which case Rogers and Matheson's proposal falls prey 
to the SPO.  
However, Moretti and Piazza (2015) have plausibly responded by arguing that Bergmann's scenarios 
fail to show that beliefs properly based on, or justified by, seemings fall prey to the SPO since the agents in the 
scenarios hold the relevant beliefs in an irrational manner that isn't properly based on the seemings. This is how 
they put it: “It [i.e., Bergmann's example] only teaches us that if a subject S is just weakly aware of a seeming 
that P, believes that P but bases her belief that P on neither her seeming that P nor on any other source of 
epistemic justification, then it is an accident from S's perspective that her belief that P is true (if the belief is true 
at all). Thus Bergmann's example gives us no reason for claiming that S's weak awareness of her seeming that P 
cannot prevent S's belief that P from being accidentally true from S's own perspective when S's belief that P is 
based on her seeming that P.” (Moretti & Piazza, 2015, 1279.) 
Moreover, another problem with Bergmann's (2013) scenarios is that since the agents suffer from severe 
cognitive failings or malfunctions that make them unable to conceive of the seemings as relevant to the truth of 
the beliefs they hold, they might not actually have any genuine seemings after all. If it “seems” to one that p, but 
one doesn't have the cognitive capacity to recognize it as in any way relevant to the truth the belief that p, then 
the “seeming” might not be a proper seeming after all.  
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justification to believe, say, that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland, then you have (higher-
order) justification to believe that you have justification to believe that Reykjavik is the 
capital of Iceland. Now, there are two things to notice here. First, the JJ principle satisfies the 
weak awareness condition. It tells us that the justification facts are accessible in the sense that 
they are accompanied by higher-order justifications that enable the subject to believe with 
doxastic justification what those facts are, if he can take advantage of his epistemic position.
38
 
So, in other words, the subject need not be psychologically capable of believing the 
justification facts or even to have conceptualized the justifier as in any way relevant to the 
belief in question.  
Second, the JJ principle isn't vulnerable to the SPO. If one has higher-order 
justification to believe that one has justification to believe that p whenever one does have 
justification to believe that p, then p isn't accidental or unsupported from one's first person 
perspective; after all, by taking advantage of one's epistemic position and believing in 
accordance with one's higher-order justification, the subject will know what the justification 
facts are. Sure, the subject may not consciously recognize what the belief in question has 
going for it, but it doesn't follow from this that its truth would be accidental from his 
perspective. Consider the proposition about the capital of Iceland above. Let's say that you 
have justification to believe that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland and higher-order 
introspective and reflective justification to believe that you do. Let's also stipulate that you 
aren't consciously aware of your justification for belief in the proposition about the capital of 
Iceland above. It may, for example, be that your justifier is a memory belief to the effect that a 
trustworthy person told you that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland and that you're either 
unable to recall that memory at this particular moment or that you haven't even bothered 
trying. Still, it doesn't seem that the truth of the proposition that Reykjavik is the capital of 
Iceland is accidental from your subjective perspective. After all, you have introspective 
justification to believe that you have the aforementioned memory belief, and you have 
reflective justification to believe that it supports the proposition that Reykjavik is the capital 
of Iceland. And since you're already in possession of justifiers that enable to you consciously 
recognize and know that you have justification to believe that Reykjavik is the capital of 
                                                          
38
 Another way of cashing out this point is by using Smithies' (2015b) notion of an ideally rational counterpart. 
An ideally rational counterpart is someone who is identical to you in every relevant way (e.g., you have the same 
(relevant) justifiers/reasons/evidence), but who always takes advantage of their epistemic position by believing 
what they have justification to believe—at least as long as they hold any doxastic attitude about the matter. We 
can then say that the justification facts are accessible in the sense that your ideally rational counterpart always 
believes them with doxastic justification (as long as they hold any attitude toward them). 
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Iceland, provided that you can exercise your introspective and reflective faculties in a 
sufficiently virtuous manner, there is indeed something that strongly speaks in favor of 
holding that belief from your subjective perspective. Hence, the JJ principle avoids the second 
of horn of Bergmann's dilemma and can figure as a plausible explanation of our intuitions 
about unfamiliar faculty cases. 
 
7. Conclusion 
According to accessibilism, justification is in some special sense accessible to the subject who 
has it. Accessibilism is mainly motivated by intuitions elicited by unfamiliar faculty cases. 
Recently, however, the view has come under heavy fire from a variety of positions. In light of 
this, the purpose of this paper has been twofold. First, I have clarified what commitments the 
accessibilist should make. Doing this, I have shown why the most prominent versions of 
accessibilism are vulnerable to objections that the version endorsed in this paper avoids. 
Second, I have defended the main argument (from unfamiliar faculty cases) for accessibilism 
against three prominent objections levelled against it. The upshot of my discussion is that 
accessibilism, as understood in this paper, remains the best explanation for the evidence 
which our intuitive judgments about unfamiliar faculty cases provide: one must always have a 
special sort of access to the justificatory status of one's doxastic attitudes, if they are justified. 
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Epistemic Internalism and the Basis of Justification 
 
 
 
 
1. Epistemic Internalism 
This paper begins from the internalist assumption that one’s non-factive mental states provide 
the basis of epistemic justification. However, not all non-factive mental states have 
justificatory relevance. Only a proper subset of one's non-factive mental states can play a 
justification-conferring role. In this paper, I answer what I call the relevance question—i.e., 
the question of which non-factive mental states can play a justification-conferring role—and 
the explanatory question—i.e., why this set of states plays the epistemic role it does. 
The debate between internalism and externalism in contemporary epistemology is 
about the nature of justification. Epistemic internalists argue that the justification facts—i.e., 
the facts about which doxastic attitudes one now has justification (to a certain degree) to 
hold—supervene upon one's internal states.1 The most common way of interpreting the 
notion of internal states is to say that one’s internal states are one’s non-factive mental states, 
where a mental state is taken to be non-factive just in case it doesn’t necessarily have true 
propositional content. This version of internalism is known as mentalism, and it will be the 
version which I focus on in this paper.
2 
Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny that the 
justification facts supervene upon one’s internal states in this sense.  
This paper begins from the internalist assumption that the justification facts supervene 
upon one's non-factive mental states. From there, it provides an answer to the relevance 
question. Plausibly, the paper argues, all and only one's beliefs and perceptual experiences 
                                                          
1
 Formulated in this manner, internalism is a thesis about propositional, rather than doxastic, justification. 
Considering that doxastic justification just is propositional justification plus proper basing, and that the nature of 
the basing requirement plausibly is causal, this seems preferable. Here, I use the now standard terminology first 
introduced by Firth (1978). 
2
 Proponents of mentalism include Pollock & Cruz (1999); Conee & Feldman (2001); Wedgwood (2002); 
McCain (2016); Egeland (forthcoming); and Smithies (forthcoming). 
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have justificatory relevance.
3
 Moreover, the paper explains why beliefs and perceptual 
experiences play the epistemic role they do by pointing to their representational force: the 
answer I give to the explanatory question is that the reason justification has its basis in one’s 
beliefs and perceptual experiences is that they are one’s strongly representational states, and 
that strongly representational states necessarily provide evidential support to certain 
inferentially connected propositions. Briefly put, the paper thus argues for the conditional 
claim that one’s beliefs and perceptual experiences are the basis of justification due to the 
representational force they have, assuming that epistemic internalism is true. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the argument from the New 
Evil Demon Problem for mentalism. I will assume that the argument is sound and, as a 
consequence, that mentalism is true. In section 3, I answer the relevance question by arguing 
that all and only one’s beliefs and perceptual experiences are the basis of justification. I will 
defend this claim, on the one hand, against views that want to expand the supervenience base 
to cover other non-factive states as well, and, on the other hand, against views that want to 
shrink the supervenience base to cover only a proper subset of one's beliefs and perceptual 
experiences. In section 4, I argue that one's beliefs and perceptual experiences are one’s 
strongly representational states, and that this explains why all and only beliefs and perceptual 
experiences have justificatory relevance. Doing this, I will build upon recent suggestions by 
Glüer and Pryor concerning the distinct representational force that belief and perception have. 
In section 5, I grapple with the issue of how strongly representational states confer 
justification upon certain propositions, and I argue that this raises an explanatory problem 
which internalists and externalists alike must face. In section 6, I summarize and conclude. 
 
2. Mentalism 
One of the more popular externalist theories of epistemic justification is reliabilism. 
According to a simple version of reliabilism, the justification facts depend upon the reliability 
or truth conduciveness of one's doxastic dispositions.
4
 However, by now, many 
counterexamples to reliabilism are on the table. These counterexamples either undermine the 
claim that reliability is necessary for justification or the claim that reliability is sufficient for 
                                                          
3
 To be more precise, my claim is that all and only beliefs and perceptual experiences can justify empirical belief 
in propositions about the external world. Other non-factive mental states, like hoping or desiring to become rich, 
can arguably justify belief in propositions about the internal world—like that one now hopes or desires to 
become rich—but this is not the kind belief I’m interested in. I will have more to say about this later in the paper. 
4
 For a classical presentation and defense of reliabilism, see Goldman (1979). 
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justification. The most famous counterexample to the necessity claim is given by Keith Lehrer 
and Stewart Cohen (1983; Cf. Cohen, 1984) and is known as The New Evil Demon Problem. 
The scenario it presents is as follows: 
The New Evil Demon Problem 
Imagine that, unbeknown to you, you are the victim of a malevolent Cartesian demon 
who deceives you about what the external world is like. Your perceptual experiences, 
for example, are all hallucinations induced by the demon's machinations. As a result, 
your beliefs about the external world are false, even though they're supported by 
experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from the experiences you would 
have if the world were exactly like you believe it to be. 
Now, the objector to reliabilism asks, are your beliefs in the demon scenario justified despite 
being formed on the basis of radically unreliable doxastic dispositions? Intuitively, according 
to the objector, the answer is yes; your beliefs in the demon scenario are no less justified than 
they would be if they were formed on the basis of reliable doxastic dispositions. Reliability is 
therefore not necessary for justification. 
Moreover, in addition to providing a counterexample to reliabilism, the New Evil 
Demon Problem is often thought to provide a powerful argument for mentalism.
5
 To see this, 
note that the justification facts not only appear to remain unchanged despite the change in 
reliability, they also appear to remain unchanged because your non-factive mental states are 
held fixed. Since your experiences in the demon scenario are subjectively indistinguishable 
from your experiences in normal scenarios—i.e., things seem to be just as if you actually are 
having veridical experiences of the external world—your beliefs are just as justified as they 
would be if you were in a normal scenario. Indeed, the best explanation for why you and your 
epistemic counterpart in the demon scenario appear to be equally justified in holding the same 
doxastic attitudes is that you have the same non-factive mental states. We can therefore 
conclude, using abductive reasoning, that the following thesis is true: 
Mentalism: The justification facts supervene upon one's non-factive mental states. 
Contemporary epistemologists often assume that the justification facts are a function 
of one’s (epistemic) reasons for holding certain doxastic attitudes.6 When I talk about reasons 
                                                          
5
 For a more detailed presentation of the argument from the New Evil Demon problem for mentalism, see 
Wedgwood (2002). 
6
 Broome (2013), for example, has a dissenting view. 
110 
 
for belief (or other doxastic attitudes) later in the paper, I will rely on this assumption. And, 
with this assumption in place, mentalism can plausibly be construed as a thesis about one's 
reasons. Given that the justification facts are a function of one’s reasons, a plausible construal 
of mentalism tell us that one’s reasons are provided by one’s non-factive mental states. 
Alternatively, we can say that one’s evidence is provided by one’s non-factive mental states, 
if we adopt the evidentialist’s parlance.7 Thus, to the extent that concepts like reason or 
evidence will be used in this paper, this is what the internalist will be taken to be committed 
to. 
Many objections to the argument from the New Evil Demon Problem for mentalism 
have been offered. Roughly, they can be separated into two distinct categories. On the one 
hand, you have objections that in various ways criticize the internalist intuitions directly.
8
 
And, on the other hand, you have objections that criticize the internalist intuitions indirectly 
by arguing that there is a more plausible way to think about the epistemic status of the agent 
in the demon scenario; for example, instead of having justified beliefs, he only has blameless 
or excusable beliefs.
9
 I have responded to several of these objections elsewhere.
10
 For the 
present purpose, however, I will just assume that the argument is sound and, as a result, that 
mentalism is true. 
Now, given that the argument from the New Evil Demon Problem goes through, is it 
possible to further restrict the scope of states with justificatory relevance, or should we say 
that the whole set of non-factive mental states is the basis of justification? In other words, is it 
the case that all non-factive mental states can justify our doxastic attitudes, or is it just some 
of them that can? In the next section, I will answer the relevance question by arguing that all 
and only one’s beliefs and perceptual experiences have justificatory relevance. This I will do 
by considering a scenario involving a pair of epistemic agents who only share the same beliefs 
                                                          
7
 After the publication of Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits (2000), many epistemologists seem to think 
that only true propositions (or facts) can be evidence. However, this is not a claim we need to be committed to. 
Indeed, preceding Williamson there is an older tradition that understands evidence in terms of what goes on 
inside the head (e.g. in terms of one's phenomenally specified states) rather than outside it, and that allows false 
propositions (like the content of false perceptual experiences) to be included in one's evidence. Here, I just want 
to show the way in which internalism naturally aligns itself with the traditional view. For a useful survey and 
discussion of some of the ways in which the concept of evidence has been understood, see Kelly (2008).  
8
 For examples of this kind of objection, see Littlejohn (2009; forthcoming); Lyons (2013); and Turri (2015a; 
2015b). 
9
 For examples of this kind of objection, see Williamson (2007a; forthcoming); Pritchard (2012); and Littlejohn 
(forthcoming). 
10
 See Egeland (forthcoming). 
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and perceptual experiences, and, by assessing the justificatory status of the agents, inferring 
which kinds of mental state have justificatory relevance. 
 
3. Answering the Relevance Question 
In order to see how the kind of argument I have in mind goes, recall the scenario presented by 
the New Evil Demon Problem above. There, the demon’s victim was stipulated to have 
exactly the same non-factive mental states that you, being in a normal scenario, now are 
having, while differing with respect to your factive mental states (and other external 
conditions). For example, you and your counterpart in the demon scenario have the same 
beliefs and subjective experiences of the world, but it is only your beliefs that are true. In 
other words, we can therefore say that your counterpart in the demon scenario is a mental twin 
who only shares your non-factive mental states. Moreover, we also saw that, intuitively, you 
and your mental twin are equally justified in believing the same propositions; that is, despite 
the difference in factive mental states, the justification facts are the same for both. And by 
abductive reasoning this led to the conclusion that only non-factive mental states can confer 
justification. The argument thus puts pressure on proponents of epistemic externalism, like for 
example Timothy Williamson who supports factive mentalism—i.e., the view that (all and) 
only factive mental states have justificatory relevance.
11
 Continuing, I’m going to present a 
new scenario, using the same kind of argument, in order to further specify what the scope of 
justification-conferring mental states is. 
When it comes to empirical belief (and other doxastic attitudes) about the external 
world, not all non-factive mental states carry justificatory force. Indeed, if we focus on the 
justification facts as they are with respect to empirical belief—which is what I will do in this 
paper—then most kinds of non-factive mental state appear to be completely irrelevant for 
their justificatory status. A seemingly natural way of drawing the distinction between the 
kinds of non-factive mental state that can justify such belief and those that can’t is to say that 
only beliefs and perceptual experiences can confer justification. And in order to motivate this 
claim, I present the following scenario: 
The Believing and Experiencing Twin 
                                                          
11
 Williamson (2000, 185) famously argues for the E = K Thesis: “knowledge, and only knowledge, constitutes 
evidence”, and later (2007a, 120) for what we may call the R = K Thesis: “that p is available to you as a reason if 
an only if you know p.”  
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Twin-Lars is an epistemic counterpart of a normal epistemic agent, Lars, with respect 
to his beliefs and perceptual experiences. For example, two of the beliefs both Lars 
and Twin-Lars have are that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland and that there is a 
sandwich on the table before them. Their belief that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland 
is supported by their other belief that a knowledgeable and trustworthy geography 
teacher told them so a couple of years ago; and their belief that there is a sandwich on 
the table before them is supported by their (subjectively indistinguishable) perceptual 
experiences of a sandwich on a table before them. However, whereas both Lars and 
Twin-Lars’s beliefs about the capital of Iceland and the sandwich are supported by 
their (other) beliefs and perceptual experiences, Lars, but not Twin-Lars, has other 
non-factive mental states with the same (or relevantly similar) propositional content. 
While Lars also desires, hopes, wishes, and imagines that Reykjavik is the capital of 
Iceland and that there is a sandwich on the table before him, Twin-Lars doesn’t have 
any desires, hopes, wishes, or imaginings at all. 
Intuitively, Lars and Twin-Lars's beliefs about the capital of Iceland and the sandwich 
before them are both propositionally justified to the same degree. And since they only share 
the same beliefs and perceptual experiences, it appears that those are the only kinds of non-
factive mental state with justificatory relevance. After all, even though Lars and Twin-Lars 
are dissimilar insofar as Lars also has desires, hopes, wishes, and imaginings with the same or 
relevantly similar propositional content, that does not change the fact that they seem to be 
alike with respect to the justification facts. It is true that these additional non-factive mental 
states that Lars has justify beliefs about his internal world—say, beliefs about his desires, 
hopes, wishes, or imaginings—but, as already point out above, I’m only interested in 
empirical beliefs about the external world. Moreover, if we add to the list of additional non-
factive mental states that Lars has—we may for example say that he also supposes, considers, 
or merely thinks about the propositions under consideration—Lars still appears to have no 
more (nor no less) justification for believing that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland and that 
there is sandwich on the table before him than Twin-Lars does. The claim that only beliefs 
and perceptual experiences have justificatory relevance therefore seems intuitively plausible 
and well-motived. 
Moreover, given that epistemic internalism is true and that only beliefs and perceptual 
experiences can confer justification, I can’t see any convincing reason why the internalist 
should think that it isn’t the case that all beliefs and perceptual experiences can confer 
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justification. Sure, one may for example have beliefs that are irresponsibly formed—for 
example on the basis of wishful thinking—or experiences that clearly fail to represent the 
external environment as it really is—for example due to the ingestion of hallucinatory drugs. 
For the present purpose, let’s say that such beliefs and experiences are epistemically 
inadequate. However, in such cases, one is either in a position to know about the epistemic 
inadequacies of one’s beliefs and experiences, or one isn’t. On the one hand, if one is in a 
position to know that one has a belief or experience that is epistemically inadequate, then it 
still has justificatory force even though it is defeated by other reasons one has either for 
doubting that the belief/experience in question is true or that some incompatible proposition is 
true.
12
 In other words, we can say that the belief/experience functions as a justifier, but, due to 
the presence of a defeater, is prevented from exercising its justificatory force.  
On the other hand, if one has a belief/experience that is epistemically inadequate, but 
isn’t in a position to know so, then I take it that it does confer justification. By way of 
illustration, let's say that you believe on the basis wishful thinking that it's Saturday, and, 
moreover, since you know that you never have to go to work on Sundays you infer that you 
won't have to go to work tomorrow. Now, if you are in a position to know that your belief that 
today is Saturday was irresponsibly formed, then of course your belief that you won't have to 
go to work tomorrow isn't justified. However, if the fact that your belief that today is Saturday 
was irresponsibly formed is completely inaccessible to you—for all you know, you formed 
the belief after looking at the calendar or consulting someone you know to be trustworthy—
then your belief that you won't have to go to work tomorrow seems to be justified; in fact, it 
seems to be no less justified than it would be if you actually came to hold your belief that 
today is Saturday after looking at the calendar.
13, 14
 And, moreover, since I can't see any other 
reason why the internalist should think that only some, but not all, beliefs and perceptual 
experiences can confer justification, I suggest that the most plausible answer to the relevance 
question is that justification has its basis in all and only one's beliefs and perceptual 
experiences. In other words, one’s evidence or reasons for holding certain doxastic attitudes is 
provided by one’s beliefs and perceptual experiences, assuming that the justification facts are 
a function of one’s evidence/reasons. 
                                                          
12
 These two ways in which a belief/experience can be prevented from exercising its justificatory force 
correspond to Pollock's (1986, 38-39) distinction between undercutting defeaters and rebutting defeaters. 
13
 The analogous point concerning epistemically inadequate experiences is illustrated by the New Evil Demon 
scenario in the previous section. 
14
 This answers Sylvan & Sosa's (2018) objection that there is no general story as to why mere undefeated belief 
is sufficient for possessing a normative justifying reason.  
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3.1 Against Expansive Views 
My claim that one's beliefs and perceptual experiences are the basis of justification is 
challenged by views that want to include other non-factive mental states in the supervenience 
base. In this subsection, I will take a closer look at the epistemology of imagination, and, in 
particular, at a recently defended view to the effect that imaginings can confer justification. 
The upshot of my discussion will be that the arguments presented in favor of the view fail, 
and that it therefore doesn't undermine my answer to the relevance question.
15
 
In the last couple of decades, philosophers have increasingly started to look at 
imagination as a phenomenon of epistemological interest.
16
 One important question they've 
asked is: can imaginings teach us anything about the world? A standard answer has become 
that imaginings can either provide justification for modal beliefs about what is possible (and 
perhaps counterfactual conditionals too),
17
 or no justification (except for trivial beliefs about 
the internal world) at all.
18
 One reason it is standardly believed that imaginings cannot teach 
us about how the world actually is is that imaginings are governed by the subject's own 
volition and therefore don't exhibit the necessary sort of sensitivity to what the world is like. 
This has recently been called the Up-To-Us Challenge by Magdalena Jackson (2018), and the 
idea, as Peter Langland-Hassan (2016, 62) has put it, is that imagination cannot improve your 
epistemic positon any more than “handing yourself a dollar” can improve your finances. 
Consider, for example, the following passage from Colin McGinn: 
Imagining is subject to the will, while believing is not. . . Belief is a commitment to 
truth, and the truth cannot be willed into being. But imagining is not a commitment to 
truth, even possible truth, so there is no obstacle to willing it; imagining is simply 
contemplating it, holding it before the mind. . . That there is strong evidence against a 
proposition is no bar to imagining that it is true, since I am not, qua imaginer, in the 
business of conducting an investigation of how the world is. . . When I am in the 
                                                          
15
 Another expansive view says that one can have pragmatic reasons for belief, like reasons that are grounded in 
one's desires. Although I don't see any principled reason why that can't be the case, I also don't see any 
convincing reason to think that pragmatic reasons confer epistemic, rather than pragmatic, justification. And 
since I'm only interested in epistemic justification, I therefore don't consider pragmatic reasons a threat to my 
view. For someone who thinks that there are pragmatic reasons for belief, see Reisner (2009). 
16
 See, e.g., Williamson (2007b, ch. 5-6). 
17
 Williamson (2016, 115) says that “one might regard imagination [at least metaphorically] as a form of 
attention to possibilities.” Cf. Yablo (1993); Menzies (1998); and Chalmers (2002). 
18
 For a useful discussion about imaginings, the conceivability-possibility link, and justification, see Gendler & 
Hawthorne (2002, Introduction). 
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business of investigating the world, I adopt an attitude of evidential sensitivity, and my 
beliefs are formed accordingly; but not so when I am merely imagining. Here I am 
indifferent to how things actually are. (McGinn, 2004, 132.)
19
 
Recently, however, in a couple of articles, Amy Kind (2016; forthcoming) has argued 
that just because imagination is under the imaginer's volitional control, it doesn't follow that it 
cannot teach us anything about the world. More specifically, she tells us that as long as the 
“imaginative project” satisfies (or at least comes close to satisfying) a couple of important 
conditions, it can justify belief in propositions about how the world actually is. Paraphrasing a 
bit, the conditions are as follows: 
The Reality Constraint: The world must be imagined as it really is in all relevant 
respects. 
The Change Constraint: If one's imaginative project requires one to imagine a change 
to how one believes the world to be, then it must be constrained by all and only the 
relevant consequences of that change. (Kind, 2016, 150-151.)
20, 21
 
 
Having thus informed us about conditions under which imagination can justify belief 
about how the world is, in order to support her view, Kind draws our attention to the animal 
scientist and inventor Temple Grandin. Grandin reportedly has an amazing ability to visually 
imagine how things work. Moreover, as Kind tells us, in her design process she uses her 
imagination much in the same way designers nowadays use three-dimensional computer 
                                                          
19
 Cf. Wittgenstein (1981, §632): “Imaginings tell us nothing about the external world . . . Imaginings are subject 
to the will. . . It is just because forming an imagining is a voluntary activity that it does not instruct us about the 
external world.”  
20
 Cf. Gendler's (2003) condition of imaginative mirroring. 
21
 Williamson seems to think that when we are engaged in imagination, we usually satisfy these and other similar 
conditions: “The default for the imagination in its primary function may be to proceed as 'realistically' as it can, 
subject to whatever derivations the thinker imposes by brute force . . . Thus the imagination can in principle 
exploit all our background knowledge in evaluating counterfactuals.” (Williamson, 2007, 143.) 
Similarly, a few pages later he says: “The best developed simulation theories concern our ability to 
simulate the mental processes of other agents (or ourselves in other circumstances), putting ourselves in their 
shoes, as if thinking and deciding on the basis of their beliefs and desires . . . Such cognitive processes . . . would 
involve just the sort of constrained use of the imagination indicated above. How would Mary react if you asked 
to borrow her car? You could imagine her immediately shooting you, or making you her heir; you could even 
imagine reacting like that from her point of view, by imagining having sufficiently bizarre beliefs and desires. 
But you do not. Doing so would not help you determine how she really would react. Presumably, what you do is 
to hold fixed her actual beliefs and desires (as you take them to be just before the request); you can then imagine 
the request from her point of view, and think through the scenario from there. Just as with the falling rock, the 
imaginative exercise is richly informed and disciplined by your sense of what she is like.” (Williamson, 2007, 
148.) Cf. Williamson (2016). 
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simulations, and supposedly with no less efficiency. One of the inventions Grandin developed 
in this way was a new dip vat design with the purpose of making it easier to rid cows of 
parasites. Before Grandin's invention, cows entering the dip vat would often panic, making 
things difficult for both the animals and the farmers. However, according to Kind,  
By taking a 'cow's eye view' of the situation, Grandin diagnosed the problems with the 
existing structures and was able to create an alternative in which the cows would 
calmly enter and exit the equipment voluntarily, without any use of force. Her design 
process, however, took place entirely in her mind. (Kind, forthcoming, 9.) 
Moreover, Grandin confidently believed in the efficiency of her new design, even 
before she saw it in action. Kind lists three propositions it is plausible to think that Grandin 
believed after imagining the new dip vat design: 
Dip vats built to these specifications are more effective than currently existing dip 
vats. 
An entry built to these specifications makes things easier on the cows than the entry on 
currently exiting dip vats. 
Cows entering a dip vat built to these specifications don't panic. (Kind, forthcoming, 
10.) 
And, Kind tells us, it seems intuitively plausible that Grandin's beliefs were justified. Also, if 
we consider someone running a computer simulation of Grandin's new dip vat design, 
showing cows peacefully entering and being immersed in the pesticide, watching the 
simulation does appear to provide justification for belief in the three propositions above. And 
since computer simulations are sufficiently similar to what Kind calls “imaginative 
simulations”—especially Grandin's—the same is true of them too. (See Kind, forthcoming, 
11-12.)  
Now, the problem with this argument is not that Grandin doesn't have justification for 
her beliefs. Rather, it is that it isn't her imagination that is responsible. A more plausible 
explanation of the scenario above is that Grandin's imagination contributes to the formation of 
her beliefs, but not to their justification. It is, I suggest, her background beliefs and perceptual 
experiences that really are responsible for justifying them.  
However, Kind anticipates this objection and says that Grandin's background beliefs 
and perceptual experiences aren't sufficient for justifying her beliefs about the new dip vat 
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design because she also needs an “understanding” of how cows will react to the new design. 
And, she says, it is her imagination that provides this understanding. In order to illustrate her 
point, Kind asks us to consider an owner of a cattle-handling facility with lots of knowledge 
about cows and dip vats. Indeed, the owner has “all the beliefs that are embedded in the 
programming of [a] computer simulation” that is able to demonstrate how cows are likely to 
react to any particular dip vat. Before the owner has run and observed the simulation, he lacks 
the necessary “understanding” for having justified beliefs about the efficiency of Grandin's 
new design. It is only after the simulation is run and he acquires a “cow’s eye view” of the 
situation that his beliefs about the design are justified. And, moreover, since the computer 
simulation is sufficiently similar to Grandin's “imaginative simulation,” it is only after she is 
done imagining her design in action that her beliefs become justified. (See Kind, forthcoming, 
13.) 
Here I agree that there is a difference in the justificatory status of Grandin's beliefs 
before and after the “imaginative simulation” and that the difference is due to the 
“understanding” it provides her with. However, I think the difference most plausibly should 
be understood as a difference in doxastic justification, not propositional justification. Let me 
elaborate. Grandin's “imaginative simulation” is constrained by her background beliefs and 
perceptual experiences of cows and dip vats. It is an attempt to try to figure out what is going 
to happen when the cows go through the dip vat given the information that she already has 
about cows and dip vats. Likewise, the cattle facility owner's computer simulation tries to 
figure out what is going to happen when the cows go through the dip vat given the 
information that he has about cows and dip vats (recall that we’re told his beliefs exhaust the 
programming of the simulation). Now, the simulations in these cases don't provide any new 
information about the world that isn't already somehow contained in Grandin or the owner's 
beliefs and experiences; they only try to figure out what their consequences actually are.
22, 23
 
As a result, they don't confer any justification upon their beliefs about the efficiency of the 
new dip vat design. However, the simulations do provide them with an “understanding” that 
                                                          
22
 Cf. Sartre (1972, 7): “The image teaches us nothing. . . No matter how long I look at an image, I shall never 
find anything in it but what I put there.” 
23
 Kind (forthcoming, 17) tells us that “a computer programmer can be provided with new information by the 
outputs of her program, even though the program contains nothing but what she put in it.” Normally, this is of 
course the case. However, since the owner of the cattle-handling facility in the example above has “all the beliefs 
that are embedded in the programming of the computer simulation,” this is not the case for him. And since 
Kind’s claim is that Grandin’s “imaginative simulation” is analogous to that of the owner of the cattle facility, 
and not the regular computer programmer, the fact that the regular computer programmer can learn something 
new about the world from the outputs of her program doesn’t tell us anything about why the same should be true 
of Grandin and her imaginings. 
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enables them to take advantage of their background beliefs and perceptual experiences. More 
specifically, they give a clear picture of what the consequences of their beliefs and 
experiences are, and, as a result, Grandin and the owner of the cattle facility are able to take 
advantage of the justification they already have by forming (doxastically justified) beliefs 
about the efficiency of the new design on their proper justificatory basis. Grandin's 
imagination therefore helps her to convert propositional justification into doxastic 
justification, thereby improving the justificatory status of her beliefs, but without conferring 
any justification upon them.
24
 
It is for this reason that I think imaginings cannot confer any justification; the kind of 
realistic imaginings Kind focuses on simply don’t provide any new information about the 
world.
25
 However, another problem Kind identifies as she responds to her imaginary 
interlocutor is that a denial that imagination can confer justification amounts to a denial that 
perception can confer justification. And, by modus tollens, since everyone should agree that 
perception can confer justification, they should also agree that imagination can too. This is 
how she puts her point: 
Suppose that Grandin did not engage in her imaginative simulation and that she didn't 
herself develop the specifications for a dip vat with this new design—instead, it was 
designed and built by one of her rivals. Normally, we would think her seeing her rival 
in action would contribute to the justification of her belief in its efficacy. But on the 
line currently being pursued by the proponent of [the view that the imagination cannot 
confer justification], that can't be right. Given that she has the prior beliefs that she 
does, her seeing the design in action is epistemically irrelevant to the justification of 
her belief in its efficacy. And this seems absurd. The fact that someone has a vast store 
of prior knowledge about cows does not mean that they couldn't learn something from 
seeing the device in action. And likewise, the fact that one has all this prior knowledge 
                                                          
24
 Kind (forthcoming, 18) also talks about examples having to do with which shoes to wear, whether one's 
children are ready to watch a scary movie, which kinds of office one prefers, and whether a colleague's ill-
advised emails were sent with nasty intentions. The response offered above also applies to these cases. 
Imagining the relevant scenarios doesn't confer any justification, but rather enables you to take advantage of the 
justification you already have. 
25
 Although it seems to me unclear exactly how the argument of Williamson (2016) should be understood, there 
is at least one reading of it under which it is making the same point as Kind's argument. Now, if that indeed is 
the correct reading, then my response to Kind applies equally well to Williamson. If, however, that isn't the 
correct reading, then Williamson appears to be making a similar point to one I make—namely, that imagination 
can help us improve our epistemic position by taking advantage of epistemic resource that we already are in 
possession of. 
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does not mean that one couldn't learn anything from imagining the device in action. 
(Kind, forthcoming, 14.) 
The problem with this piece of reasoning, however, is that it begs the question against 
the position I advocate by assuming that imaginings are epistemically analogous to perceptual 
experiences insofar as they either both can or can't confer justification. But, as I've argued, 
imagination, in contrast to perception, cannot confer justification since it doesn't provide any 
new information about the world that isn't already somehow contained in one's prior beliefs 
and perceptual experiences. Kind's response to the objection that the imagination can 
contribute to the formation of belief, but not to their justification, therefore fails. 
 
3.2 Against Contractive Views 
My claim that one’s beliefs and perceptual experiences are the basis of justification is also 
challenged by views that want to exclude some belief or experiences from the supervenience 
base. In this subsection, I will take a closer look at two such views—one of which says that 
only beliefs can confer justification, and the other of which says that only experiences can 
confer justification—and argue that neither of them is able to undermine my answer to the 
relevance question. 
Let’s begin with the latter view. According to Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, which 
beliefs (and other doxastic attitudes) you have justification to hold is a function of your 
current experiences.
26
 More specifically, they think that the justification facts are determined 
by your evidence and that all ultimate evidence is experiential: 
All ultimate evidence is experiential. Believing a proposition, all by itself, is not 
evidence for its truth. Something at the interface of your mind and the world—your 
experiences—serves to justify belief in a proposition, if anything does. What we are 
calling your ‘ultimate evidence’ does this without needing any justification in order to 
provide it. (Conee & Feldman, 2008, 88.) 
As they see it, only experience, and not belief, can confer justification.
27
 Moreover, 
since they think that your ultimate evidence
28
 not only includes perceptual experiences, but 
                                                          
26
 A related view is phenomenal conservatism, which says that if it “seems” or “appears” to you that p, then you 
have defeasible justification for believing p. (See Huemer, 2007.) 
27
 There is some unclarity about whether this really is how the passage should be interpreted. Alternatively, it 
could be interpreted as making the foundationalist claim that only experience can be a source of foundational 
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also experiences like feelings of certainty or conviction, Conee and Feldman in some sense 
want to shrink the scope of justification-conferring states and in another sense to expand it. 
However, by way of objection, I will present three well-known problems from the 
epistemology of memory and argue that they undermine both the claim that beliefs cannot 
confer justification and the claim that feelings of certainty or conviction can.
29
 Moreover, I 
will also demonstrate why my claim that justification has its basis in one’s beliefs and 
perceptual experiences isn’t threatened by the problems. 
First, consider the problem of stored belief. As Alvin Goldman (1999) points out, most 
of our beliefs are stored in memory rather than conscious judgments. Beliefs about your 
personal information, history, geography, or about the members of your family are good 
examples. Moreover, it is clear that many, if not most, of these beliefs are justified. However, 
very few of them are justified by your current experiences. Indeed, Goldman (1999, 278) tells 
us that “no perceptual experience, no conscious memory event, and no premises consciously 
entertained at the selected moment will be justificationally sufficient for such a [stored] 
belief.”30  
Conee and Feldman (2001, 7-8) respond by drawing a distinction between occurrent 
and dispositional senses of being justified. The idea is that a belief can be justified in the 
occurrent sense, but only if one has conscious experiential evidence supporting it. On the 
other hand, a belief can be justified in the dispositional sense, but only if one has “stored 
justification” or evidence, like “non-occurrent memories of perceptual experiences” (Conee & 
Feldman, 2001, 8), that support it. And with this distinction in mind, the idea is that our stored 
beliefs are justified, but usually only dispositionally.  
There are, however, a couple of problems with this response. One, it seems that the 
stored justification or evidence that is supposed to dispositionally justify our stored beliefs 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
justification for basic beliefs. Perhaps this is what Conee and Feldman mean when they write that whatever 
justificatory force beliefs have is inherited from experience: “We hold that experiences can be evidence, and 
beliefs are only derivatively evidence.” (Conee & Feldman, 2008, 87, the emphasis is added by me.) However, 
since they later, in the same text, say that they are coherentists (albeit of a non-traditional kind) (Conee & 
Feldman, 2008, 18), I lean toward the former interpretation and will therefore treat the passage under 
consideration as saying that only experience can confer justification. 
28
 They seem to use the notion of “ultimate evidence” in the same way that “evidence” usually is used in 
epistemology. 
29
 They also undermine Feldman’s (2004, 95) earlier suggestion that “S has p available as evidence as t iff S is 
currently thinking of p”, which also includes conscious beliefs or judgments in one’s evidence. 
30
 The problem of stored beliefs is often raised a problem against epistemic internalism in general. See, e.g., 
Huemer (1999); Williamson (2007a); and Senor (2009). Frise (2018), however offers an interesting response to 
the problem of stored belief, arguing that it fails to undermine internalism since, according to recent research in 
cognitive psychology, there are no stored (or memorial) beliefs in the first place. 
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cannot be experiences—at least not all of it. Take for example the “non-occurrent memories 
of perceptual experiences” they mention. Plausibly, these non-occurrent memories cannot be 
experiences since we're told that they aren't conscious or occurrent. Rather, a better way of 
construing them is as memory beliefs. But if they cannot be experiences, then Conee and 
Feldman’s view clearly fails.31  
Two, saying that most of our stored beliefs only are justified in a dispositional sense 
seems to commit them to a sort of skepticism about the epistemic status of those beliefs. 
Indeed, Conee and Feldman seem to admit that stored beliefs aren’t really justified or 
constitute knowledge: 
In the most fundamental sense of ‘justified,’ a belief can be justified for a person only 
by the person’s current evidence, and one’s current evidence is all conscious. In this 
sense, non-occurrent beliefs are typically not justified. (Conee & Feldman, 2008, 7.) 
On my view, in the most fundamental sense, one does not know things such as that 
Washington is the capital when one is not thinking of them. (Feldman, 2004, 99.)  
However, this is extremely counterintuitive. It seems that my stored beliefs about, say, 
the capitals of various nations or about the events of the Second World War are completely 
justified and constitute knowledge. Conee and Feldman therefore fail to respect the intuitions 
elicited by the problem of stored belief. 
In contrast, the view endorsed in this paper is clearly able to respect the intuitions we 
have about stored beliefs. Since both beliefs and perceptual experiences can confer 
justification, I suggest that whenever one has stored beliefs that are justified, but not by one's 
conscious beliefs or perceptual experiences, then they are justified by other stored beliefs.
32
 
So, for example, my stored belief that Washington is the capital of The United States of 
America is justified by my other stored belief that a trustworthy source told me that this is 
true. Thus, the problem of stored belief threatens to undermine Conee and Feldman's view, 
but not mine. 
                                                          
31
 It is common to draw a distinction between propositional memory and episodic memory. Propositional 
memory involves memorial belief in a proposition, whereas episodic memory is what you have when you recall 
an event. Moreover, note that even if the stored justification/evidence Conee and Feldman are thinking about 
only involves episodic memory, it cannot be exhausted by one’s experiences since it isn’t conscious. For more 
on propositional and episodic memory, see Squire (2009).  
32
 Another plausible suggestion is offered by Madison (2014), who argues that our stored beliefs often are 
justified by what he calls “memory-seemings.” 
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Second, consider the problem of stored defeat. Sometimes you have beliefs that are 
supported by your current experiences, but that nevertheless are unjustified because of a 
defeater stored in your memory. In order to illustrate this kind of scenario, Feldman has us 
consider the following example:  
Precarious Peak 
Suppose my friend Jones tells me that the hike up to Precarious Peak is not terribly 
strenuous or dangerous, and that it is the sort of thing I can do without undue 
difficulty. Assume that Jones knows my abilities with respect to these sorts of things 
and that he seems to be an honest person. On the basis of his testimony, I believe that 
the hike is something I can do. It seems that it is rational for me to believe this 
proposition. But suppose I've failed to think about the time Jones told me that I could 
paddle my canoe down Rapid River, something he knew to be far beyond my abilities. 
He just gets a kick out of sending people off on grueling expeditions. If you were to 
say to me, “Remember when Jones lied about the canoe trip?” I’d say “Yes! How 
could I have failed to think of that?” Once I was reminded of this episode, it would no 
longer be rational for me to believe that I can complete the hike, unless I had some 
additional information supporting the view that Jones was not lying this time. 
(Feldman, 2004, 84-85.) 
Here you have a scenario where your belief that you can summit Precarious Peak is 
supported by your current experiences, but where you also have stored in memory counter-
evidence which you could have been aware of. And, for that reason, your belief appears to be 
unjustified.
33
 But how can Conee and Feldman account for the intuition that your belief is 
unjustified considering that they view justification as a function of your current experiences? 
Feldman responds by considering another example which he takes to be epistemically 
analogous and in which your belief does appear to be justified. And this supports the view that 
your belief in the example above also is justified, despite appearances to the contrary. The 
example he considers is as follows:  
Suppose that the information about the falsity of my friend's claim about the hike is 
not stored in memory but rather is contained in a book—A Pocket Guide to the 
                                                          
33
 Alternative ways of describing the scenario is to say that your belief that you can summit Precarious Peak is 
prima facie justified, but not ultima facie justified; or that it is supported by your testimonial evidence, but not 
your total evidence. For a classic discussion about total evidence and how that is what determines what you have 
justification to believe, see Hempel (1960). 
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Difficulty of Hikes in the Precarious Peak Area—that I have in my pocket. Since I 
trust my friend, I don't bother to look up the difficulty of the proposed hike in the 
guidebook. (Feldman, 2008, 96.) 
Feldman tells us that your belief in this second scenario is completely rational or justified, 
and, moreover, since your epistemic position is the same as in the first scenario, your belief is 
justified there as well.
34
 
However, the problem with his response is that there is a crucial difference in your 
epistemic positions in the two scenarios. Whenever you have some evidence or relevant 
information stored in memory that you fail to take into consideration, you do (at least to some 
extent) fail to take advantage of your epistemic position. Consider, for example, someone who 
believes that Sydney is the capital of Australia, but who also was told the day before by their 
geography teacher that Canberra is the capital of Australia. If the person's memory is 
functioning properly so that he can, if prompted, recall his teacher's testimony, then it is clear 
that his belief that Sydney is the capital of Australia isn't justified because he has a defeater 
stored in his memory that he could have taken into consideration. In contrast, failing to 
consider the information contained in your pocketbook doesn't necessarily involve a failure of 
rationality. If, say, you find yourself in a library, then none of the potential defeaters lurking 
in the many books undermine the justification you already have for your beliefs—unless you 
read them, of course.
35
 Your epistemic positions in the two scenarios thus differ insofar as the 
information stored in your memory is included in your evidence, whereas the information 
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 “In the two versions of the example my belief is equally current-state rational, and there is no need, in order to 
account for our intuitive assessments of rationality, to say that the evidence I actually have in the two cases 
differs. Since it is clear that in the revised case I do not already have the counter-evidence provided by the book, 
there is no good reason to say that I have (in the relevant sense) the evidence I fail to think of in the original 
case.” (Feldman, 2004, 97.) 
35
 Kornblith (1983, 36) provides a related example involving a young physicist who, after presenting a novel 
theory, fails to hear an objection raised by a senior colleague due to his obsession with his own success. After 
this, Kornblith tells us that the physicist’s belief in the correctness of his theory is no longer justified since he 
violates an obligation to gather evidence in a responsible manner. However, considering that important details 
are left out in his presentation of the example, my view is that whether the example is more like Feldman’s 
original or revised example above depends on how these details are spelled out. If the physicist in no way even is 
aware than an objection is being made, then I take it that he finds himself in a similar position to that of the 
person who fails to look in his pocketbook; both of them have justified beliefs that are supported by their 
evidence, even though there is defeating information that they easily could have gathered if they were so 
inclined. On the other hand, if the physicist is aware that an objection is being made, but chooses to ignore it, 
then I take it that he finds himself in a similar position to that of the person who fails remember that Jones isn’t 
trustworthy; both of their beliefs are unjustified since they fail to take into consideration relevant information 
that they are aware of. Moreover, note that my view doesn’t imply that responsible evidence gathering is 
epistemically insignificant, just that it doesn’t have any direct bearing on the justification facts.  
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stored in your pocketbook isn’t.36 Conee and Feldman's view therefore fails to respect the 
intuitions elicited by the problem of stored defeat. 
In contrast, the view endorsed in this paper is clearly able to respect the intuitions we 
have about stored defeaters. Since both beliefs and perceptual experiences can confer 
justification, I suggest that whenever one has a stored defeater—like in the example about 
Precarious Peak—it takes the form of a stored/memory belief. Thus, the problem of stored 
defeat threatens to undermine Conee and Feldman's view, but not mine. 
Third, consider the problem of stored evidence. There are cases in which you have 
justified beliefs, and where your evidence for them appears to be (other) beliefs stored in 
memory. By way of example, Feldman provides the following scenario: 
The Expert Bird-Watcher 
Suppose, for example, an expert bird-watcher sees a bird that she immediately 
identifies as a scarlet tanager. We can imagine that she does not consciously think of 
the field marks of these birds when she forms the belief that she sees one. She just 
looks at the bird and classifies it. Do the stored beliefs she has about the distinguishing 
features of scarlet tanagers count as part of her current evidence? (Feldman, 2004, 84.) 
Now, the reason this is problematic for Conee and Feldman is that the only available evidence 
(besides her visual experiences) the expert bird-watcher has for her (justified) belief that she’s 
looking at a scarlet tanager appears to be beliefs stored in her memory. Yet, as they see it, this 
cannot be the case. 
Feldman (2004, 101) responds to this worry by saying that the expert bird-watcher 
doesn’t need to consciously consider the distinguishing marks of scarlet tanagers in order for 
her belief to be justified. Instead, all she needs is an experience or feeling of certainty about 
her identification of the bird. It is this, Feldman tells us, that distinguishes the justificatory 
                                                          
36
 Smithies (2018a) uses the same kind of reasoning to argue against Clark and Chalmers’ (1998, 12) Extended 
Cognition Thesis, which says that “beliefs can be constituted partly by features of the environment, when those 
features play the right sort of role in driving cognitive processes.” Clark and Chalmers consider similar scenarios 
to those offered by Feldman above, and argue that information stored in a notebook can instantiate a person’s 
beliefs. Smithies responds by pointing to epistemic disanalogies grounded in the norms of justification between 
the two scenarios. 
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status of the belief of the expert bird-watcher from that of a novice who doesn’t know what 
the distinguishing marks of scarlet tanagers are.
37
 
However, a problem with his response is that simply feeling certain that the bird is a 
scarlet tanager isn’t sufficient for justifying the expert’s belief. To see why that is so, let’s say 
that the novice, for whatever reason, also feels certain that the bird is a scarlet tanager. 
According to Feldman, the expert and the novice are now in the same epistemic position. But 
this is absurd. The novice doesn’t all of a sudden get justification for her belief just because 
she becomes confident that it’s true; justification isn’t that easy to come by! Rather, the 
reason the expert’s belief, and not the novice’s, is justified, is that she has a bunch of 
background beliefs that support the proposition that the bird she’s looking at is a scarlet 
tanager. And, moreover, this is something the view endorsed in this paper can account for. 
Thus, the problem of stored evidence threatens to undermine Conee and Feldman's view, but 
not mine.  
Turning now to the other contractive view that I’m going to consider, it says that only 
beliefs can confer justification. Famously, it is held by Keith Lehrer (1974) and Donald 
Davidson (1986, 310), the latter of which says that “nothing can count as a reason for holding 
a belief except another belief.”38 On this view, there are no experiences that can confer 
justification. Indeed, it amounts to a form of skepticism concerning the epistemic role of 
experience, something Davidson acknowledges
39
: 
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 Feldman (2004, 101) also considers the response that “’operative’ background beliefs, beliefs that are playing 
an active role in sustaining one’s current state, are also [available as evidence].” However, this of course just is 
to abandon the view that only experiences can confer justification. Also, it is doubtful that all background beliefs 
that we want to say confer justification are sustaining our current (justified) belief state. For example, my newly 
formed belief that a Third World War isn’t going to break out the next week is justified by many background 
beliefs. However, it’s not the case that all of them play an active role in sustaining my belief. In fact, I would not 
be able to bring even the majority of them into consciousness when I inferred that next week won’t witness 
another World War.  
38
 Cf. Lehrer (1974, 187-188): “In whatever way a man might attempt to justify his beliefs, whether to himself or 
to another, he must always appeal to some belief. There is nothing other than one's belief to which one can 
appeal in the justification of belief. There is no exit from the circle of one's beliefs. This might not seem obvious. 
It might, for instance, seem that one can appeal directly to experience, or the testimony of others, to justify one's 
beliefs. But this is illusory.” 
39
 Although Davidson was a skeptic concerning the justificatory role of experience, he nevertheless thought that 
most experiential beliefs are true since they're directly caused by the objects they're about. Thus, he tells us that 
“what stands in the way of global skepticism of the senses is, in my view, the fact that we must, in the plainest 
and methodologically most basic cases, take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief.” (Davidson, 
1986, 317-318.) So, for example, even though your experience that p cannot even justify the trivial belief that 
you now have an experience that p, the fact that the belief is caused by the experience guarantees its truth: “We 
cannot be wrong about how things appear to us to be. If we believe we have a sensation, we do; this is held to be 
an analytic truth, or a fact about how language is used. . . But in any case, it is unclear how, on this line, 
sensations justify the belief in those sensations. The point is rather that such beliefs require no justification, for 
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Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. 
But a causal explanation does not show how or why the belief is justified. (Davidson, 
1986, 311.) 
I suggest that we give up the idea that meaning or knowledge is grounded on 
something that counts as an ultimate source of evidence. No doubt meaning and 
knowledge depend on experience, and experience ultimately on sensation. But this is 
the ‘depend’ of causality, not of evidence or justification. (Davidson, 1986, 313-314.) 
In order to support his view, Davidson tells us that an experience can confer 
justification only if it has propositional content that is assessable as true or false, accurate or 
inaccurate. However, as he sees it, experiences are raw feels or sensations without 
propositional content. It therefore follows that experiences cannot confer justification.
40
 The 
argument can be presented as follows: 
1) If experiences can confer justification, then they must have propositional content. 
2) Experiences don’t have propositional content. 
3) Therefore, experiences cannot confer justification. 
Before evaluating the argument, note that an obvious issue with Davidson’s 
(in)famous slogan is that it seems to be saying that something is a reason for belief only if it is 
another belief. However, when your belief that p gives you a reason for believing that q, your 
reason is typically taken to be p and not your belief that p. In other words, your reason for 
believing q is p, which is provided by your belief in that proposition, but which nevertheless 
is distinct from your belief in it. A problem with Davidson’s formulation is therefore that it 
makes reasons needlessly subjective by saying that they are identical with contingent beliefs 
of a person, at least if we interpret his slogan in a literal manner, whereas it seems that 
something can be a reason regardless of which beliefs anyone has.
41
 However, for the purpose 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the existence of the belief entails the existence of the sensation, and so the existence of the belief entails its own 
truth.” (Davidson, 1986, 311.) 
40
 This is how Davidson in a later paper formulates his argument: “There is a simple explanation for the fact that 
sensations, percepts, and sense data cannot provide epistemic support for beliefs: reasons have to be geared 
conceptually to what they are reasons for. The relation of epistemic support requires that both relata have 
propositional content, and entities like sensations and sense data have no propositional content. Much of modern 
philosophy has been devoted to trying to arbitrate between an imagined unconceptualized given and what is 
needed to support belief. We now see that this project has no chance of success. The truth is, nothing can supply 
a reason for belief except another (or many another) belief.” (Davidson, 1997, 136.) 
41
 A natural way of formulating this idea is to say that all reasons that are possessed or believed are subjective, 
whereas all reasons that count in favor of a belief (or action) from an omniscient third-person perspective are 
objective. For more on the distinction between subjective and objective reasons, see Sepielli (2018). 
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of this paper, I will not focus on issues having to do with the ontology of reasons. Instead, we 
can just note that all Davidson requires for his view to undermine mine is that something is a 
reason for belief only if it is provided by another belief.
42
 
Now, one way of avoiding the argument's conclusion is to challenge an implicit 
assumption Davidson relies on. Davidson thinks that experiences cannot confer justification 
because they cannot provide reasons for belief. So, in other words, having a reason for 
believing p is a necessary condition for having justification for believing p. However, there 
are those who won't follow Davidson in making this assumption (thereby denying premise 1). 
For example, proponents of simple process reliabilism, like the early Goldman (1979), might 
instead claim that all that is required for justification is reliable doxastic dispositions (and no 
undefeated defeaters). Thus, a process reliabilist can claim that experiences can confer 
justification since they are reliable indicators of how things really are, even though they don't 
provide any reasons for belief. That being the case, considering that I reject reliabilism and 
other externalist views that typically deny that there is a reasons condition on justification, I 
won't pursue this line of objection any further. 
Another way of avoiding the conclusion and rejecting premise 1 is to claim that 
experiences can confer justification, but without having propositional content. For example, 
according to Laurence BonJour (2001; Cf. BonJour and Sosa, 2003), sensations without 
propositional content can justify empirical belief about the external world. But this kind of 
view is hard to reconcile with a core assumption that motivates premise 1. Formulated by 
James Pryor, the assumption is as follows: 
Premise Principle: The only thing that can justify a belief that p are other states that 
assertively represent propositions, and those propositions have to be ones that could be 
used as premises in an argument for p. They have to stand in some kind of inferential 
relation to p: they have to imply it or inductively support it or something like that. 
(Pryor, 2005, 210.) 
What the Premise Principle tells us is that the reason experiences must have 
propositional content in order to confer justification is that there must be a valid inference 
from the content of the experience to the content of the belief that is justified by it. Otherwise, 
it is very hard to see why the experience should have any justificatory relevance. And without 
a plausible story as to why there is a valid argument from sensations without propositional 
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 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Glüer (2012). 
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content to propositions one believes, or why such an argument isn't required, we have good 
reason accept premise 1.
43
 I therefore think that Davidson's argument stands or falls with 
premise 2. 
By rejecting premise 2, one is committed to the view that experiences—or at least 
perceptual experiences, which is what I'm interested in—have propositional content. In 
contrast to the other objections above, this is a very plausible view. Indeed, most philosophers 
nowadays think that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes, which is to say that 
they have propositional content.
44
 By representing the world as being a certain way, 
perceptual experiences require for their veridicality or truth that the world satisfies certain 
conditions. And this is sufficient for them to have propositional content. As one author has put 
it: “Perceptual experiences thus have, or determine, conditions of correctness, satisfaction, or 
truth, and that simply means that they have representational, or propositional, content.”45 
Although I'm not going to rehash the arguments that have been offered in favor of this view—
I advise the interested reader to consult the authors mentioned in footnote 44—I will simply 
point out that it is a widely accepted fact about folk-psychology that people treat perceptual 
experiences as representing the world as being a certain way, and thereby also as determining 
conditions of correctness. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that this kind of view usually is developed in either 
of two ways. On the standard approach, perception is a sui generis propositional attitude 
whose representational or propositional content is closely connected to its phenomenal 
character. So, for example, the fact that my visual experience represents a chessboard on the 
table before me is intimately related to the fact that my visual experience is characterized by 
the way certain colors and shapes qualitatively appear to me.
46
   
                                                          
43
 According to BonJour, we should not say that there is any evidential relation between sensation and belief. 
Rather, “even if we grant and indeed insist that the specific content of the experience is itself nonpropositional 
and nonconceptual, it, like various other kinds of nonconceptual phenomena, can of course still be conceptually 
described with various degrees of detail and precision. The relation between the nonconceptual content and such 
a conceptual description thereof may not be logical, as Davidson uses this term, but it is also obviously not 
merely causal. Rather it is a descriptive relation.” (BonJour, 2001, 30; Cf. BonJour and Sosa, 2003, ch. 4.) 
However, even if there is a descriptive relation, as BonJour calls it, between sensations without propositional 
content and propositions one believes, the mere presence of a descriptive relation is clearly not sufficient for 
there being a valid argument, and thus for there to be a justifying relation, between sensations and beliefs. 
Surely, something, A, may describe something else, B, but without being justified by it.  
44
 See, e.g., Searle (1983); Burge (1986); Byrne (2009); Pautz (2009); and Schellenberg (2011). 
45
 Glüer (2012, 199). 
46
 Proponents of the standard approach include Searle (1990); Horgan & Tienson (2002); Chalmers (2004); and 
Smithies (2018-b), to mention just a few. 
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On the non-standard approach, perception is a subspecies of belief. For example, 
according to Kathrin Glüer's (2009) doxastic theory of perception, perceptual experiences are 
beliefs with a special kind of content and distinct phenomenal character. Thus, the non-
standard approach, while consistent with Davidson's view that only beliefs can confer 
justification,
47
 still rejects the argument's second premise. As its proponents see it, perceptual 
experiences have propositional content since they are beliefs, which do have such content. 
However, in order to reject premise 2 one need not decide between these approaches. 
Although the proponent of the doxastic theory can endorse Davidson's view, both of them 
undermine his argument for it. Moreover, considering that the claim that perceptual 
experiences can confer justification is motivated by intuitions elicited by the Believing and 
Experiencing Twin scenario from the previous section, the philosopher's scales should be 
tipped against Davidson. 
In conclusion, for the reasons given above, I therefore think that my answer to the 
relevance question remains the most plausible. Given that mentalism is true, justification does 
appear to have its basis in one's beliefs and perceptual experiences. Since both expansive 
views and contractive views face problems that the view endorsed in this paper avoids, while 
also failing to respect relevant intuitions that motivate my view, my answer to the relevance 
question does seem to point out the proper supervenience base of justification.  
 
4. Answering the Explanatory Question 
In the previous section I answered the relevance question: justification has its basis in one's 
beliefs and perceptual experiences. However, this does not tell us why these states have 
justificatory relevance. Why is it that all and only beliefs and perceptual experiences can 
confer justification, whereas imaginings, hopes, desires, or any other such state cannot? 
Presumably, there must be something that unifies and explains why this particular set of states 
plays the epistemic role it does in our mental lives. But what is it? This is what I call the 
explanatory question, and the goal of section 4 is to answer it.
48
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 In fact, Glüer's (2009, 315ff.) argument for the doxastic theory of perception uses the Davidsonian claim that 
“the only propositional attitude that provides reason for first order belief is that of belief” as a premise.  
48
 Goldman (1979) argues that simple process reliabilism provides a plausible and unifying answer to the 
explanatory question, whereas internalists cannot, or at the very least have not yet provided any similarly 
plausible answer. 
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From the discussion above, it is clear that a mental state has justificatory relevance 
only if it is a propositional attitude. In other words, having representational or propositional 
content is a necessary condition for a mental state to confer justification. However, beliefs and 
perceptual experiences are not the only mental states with propositional content. Imaginings, 
desires, hopes, wishes, and many other kinds of mental state have propositional content, but 
without being able to confer justification. Being a propositional attitude is therefore not 
sufficient for having justificatory relevance. Indeed, there must be something else that 
explains why only beliefs and perceptual experiences play the epistemic role they do.  
The explanation I find most plausible points to the distinct representational force that 
beliefs and perceptual experiences have. The representational force of a propositional attitude 
refers to the way in which that attitude represents its content.
49
 For example, a desire might be 
said to represent its content as to be turned true, whereas a pain might be said to represent its 
content as to be turned false (assuming pains actually have propositional content). Now, when 
it comes to beliefs, they represent their content with what Pryor (2005, 187f.) calls assertive 
force. This is to say that they represent their content simply as true, or, more specifically, that 
they represent the world as being a certain way. According to Glüer (2009, 307), “belief is 
[therefore] the paradigmatic case of a strongly representational state,” where a mental state is 
taken to be strongly representational just in case it has propositional content that it represents 
as true. On the other hand, a mental state with propositional content but without assertive 
force, like a desire, is only weakly representational.  
Moreover, I also think it is plausible that perceptual experiences have assertive force, 
and that it is grounded in the distinct phenomenal character they have.
50, 51
 As Pryor puts it: 
I think there’s a distinctive phenomenology: the feeling of seeming to ascertain that a 
given proposition is true. This is present when the way a mental episode represents its 
content makes it feel as though, by enjoying that episode, you can thereby just tell that 
that content obtains. . . When you have a perceptual experience of your hands, that 
experience makes it feel as though you can just see that hands are present. It feels as 
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 See Heck (2000, 509) 
50
 This is of course not to say that the assertive force of belief also is grounded in some special phenomenal 
character. In fact, I am agnostic about whether belief has such phenomenology associated with it. 
51
 According to Smithies, the fact that perceptual experiences have assertive force that is grounded in their 
distinct phenomenal character explains why they play a foundational role in justifying empirical belief. “My 
claim now is that it’s in virtue of this distinctive phenomenal character that perceptual experience plays its 
distinctive epistemic role. Perceptual experience is an unmoved epistemic mover: it justifies belief about the 
external world without standing in need of any further justification.” (Smithies, forthcoming, 72.) 
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though hands are being shown or revealed to you. . . (Pryor, 2004, 357; Cf. 2000, 547, 
footnote 37.)  
I thus take it that beliefs and perceptual experiences are strongly representational 
states. However, I also claim that beliefs and perceptual experiences are the only strongly 
representational states. Consider, for example, imaginings. Although they clearly (often) have 
propositional content—like that one has won the lottery and treats oneself to a well-deserved 
vacation—they don’t represent them as true. I can imagine all sorts of things, but my 
imaginings will not represent those things as actually being the case. Similarly, when it comes 
to other propositional attitudes—be they desires, hopes, wishes, or any other such state—they 
do not represent their content with assertive force. Therefore, it seems that one’s beliefs and 
perceptual experiences just are one’s strongly representational states: they are the states one 
has that represent the world as being a particular way.
52
  
Now a related, but even more difficult question concerns how strongly representational 
states confer justification upon the different doxastic attitudes. Strongly representational states 
provide justification for the different doxastic attitudes depending on the degree to which they 
support certain propositions. The following claims are generally accepted: 
1. You have justification to believe p, if your evidence supports p to a sufficiently 
high degree. 
2. You have justification do disbelieve p, if your evidence supports p to a 
sufficiently high degree. 
3. You have justification to withhold judgment that p, if your evidence neither 
supports p nor p to a sufficiently high degree. 
But this raises the question: how exactly do strongly representational states support certain 
propositions? 
 
5. The How of Justificatory Support 
From an internalist perspective, there are two main proposals as to how this works. According 
to internalists like Moser (1989), Vogel (1990), BonJour (2002, ch. 7), Conee and Feldman 
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 It might be objected that intuition and introspection are strongly representational states which nevertheless 
don’t justify empirical belief about the external world. Against this view I would point out that I am sympathetic 
to doxastic accounts of intuition and introspection which liken those kinds of state to belief. 
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(2008), and McCain (2016), evidential support is a matter of an inference to the best 
explanation. Consider the following passage from Conee and Feldman: 
We believe that the fundamental epistemic principles are principles of best 
explanation. Perceptual experiences can contribute toward the justification of 
propositions about the world when the propositions are part of the best explanation of 
those experiences that is available to the person. Similarly, the truth of the contents of 
a memory experience may be part of the best explanation of the experience itself. 
Thus, the general idea is that a person has a set of experiences, including perceptual 
experiences, memorial experiences, and so on. What is justified for the person includes 
propositions that are part of the best explanation of those experiences available to the 
person. (Conee & Feldman, 2008, 97-98.) 
However, a worry with this view is that there are justified beliefs that don't appear to 
provide a good—let alone the best—explanation for the evidence one has. Consider the 
following example: 
Squirrel Watcher 
Tom is very interested in squirrels. Hoping that he will see many different squirrels, he 
has decided to go for a hike in an area where it's known that there are a lot of different 
squirrels. Suddenly, Tom spots a squirrel in a tree about 10 feet from where he is 
standing. As a result, he comes to believe that there is a squirrel in a tree before him 
and that there is an animal in a tree before him.  
Tom's beliefs are supported by his perceptual experiences and, as a consequence, 
clearly justified. Moreover, the proposition that there is a squirrel in a tree before him seems 
to provide a very good explanation for why he sees what appears to be a squirrel in a tree 
before him. However, the proposition that there is an animal in a tree before him doesn't seem 
to explain why he sees what appears to be a squirrel in a tree before him. Sure, the proposition 
is entailed by what is the best explanation for his visual experience (namely, that there is a 
squirrel in a tree before him), but it is not itself part of that explanation.
53, 54
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 Similar objections are provided by Lehrer (1974, ch. 7) and Goldman (2011). McCain (2016) tries to 
accommodate the various intuitions by claiming that evidential support is a matter of an inference to the best 
explanation or the logical consequences of such an explanation. However, I’m doubtful that his suggestion is 
able to account for the intuitions elicited by all the relevant cases of justified belief. Moreover, according to 
McCain, a proposition can be available to one as the best explanation only if one has the concepts required to 
understand it and is disposed to have a seeming that the proposition indeed is the best explanation on the basis of 
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In contrast to explanationism, which can be considered the received internalist view 
about evidential support, others—like Keynes (1921), Williamson (2000), Fumerton (2004), 
Huemer (2007), and Smithies (forthcoming)—have recently argued that evidential support 
should be conceptualized in terms of evidential probability:
55
 your evidence provides support 
to certain propositions by increasing their evidential probability. By way of illustration, let’s 
say that you have a strongly representational state, like a perceptual experience, that p, and 
that p has a strong inferential connection to q. p might be a proposition like that there is a 
squirrel in a tree before me and q a proposition like that there is an animal in a tree before 
me. Now, according to the view at hand, the reason your perceptual experience that p gives 
you justification to believe both p and q is that these propositions are made sufficiently 
probable by that experience (which represents p as true). In general, your reasons or evidence 
(which is provided by your strongly representational states) justifies a body of propositions 
about yourself, the world, and your place in it by providing probabilistic support to them. 
Moreover, the authors mentioned above claim that evidential probability cannot be 
defined in terms of either subjective probability (often called credence) or objective 
probability (often called chance). For example, Williamson points out that on an objectivist 
interpretation of evidential probability, we would be rationally committed to assign laws of 
nature an objective chance of 1, even though they might be rather implausible on one's 
evidence.
56
 Indeed, examples like this suggest that questions about how evidence supports 
propositions cannot be answered in terms of objective frequency or chance. Similarly, he also 
points out that on a subjectivist interpretation, our beliefs/credences must always correspond 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
reflection alone. But it is very implausible that facts about evidential support depend upon one's dispositions in 
this manner. Moon and Robinson (forthcoming) have convincingly argued that by relying on dispositions in this 
manner, McCain's account of evidential support becomes too subjectivist and, as a result, is vulnerable to 
counterexamples, including the New Evil Demon Problem. 
54
 Other objections to explanationism about evidential support have recently been offered by Fumerton (2018), 
who argues (i) that it is unable to account for introspectively justified beliefs and (ii) that it fails to describe an 
independent source of inferential justification, and Steup (2018), who argues that it fails to provide a reductive 
analysis of justification. McCain (2018) responds. 
55
 Fumerton (2004) and Huemer (2007, 52) call it “epistemic probability”. 
56
 Proponents of objectivist interpretations of evidential probability include Russell (1948, ch. 1); Alston (1989, 
ch. 9); and Plantinga (1993, ch. 9). However, it is interesting to note that one of the most famous expressions of 
this view is offered by the (access) internalist BonJour, who remarks as follows: “If epistemic justification were 
not conducive to truth in this way, if finding epistemically justified belief did not substantially increase the 
likelihood of finding true ones, then epistemic justification would be irrelevant to our main cognitive goal and of 
dubious worth. It is only if we have some reason for thinking that epistemic justification constitutes a path to the 
truth that we as cognitive beings have any motive for preferring epistemically justified beliefs to epistemically 
unjustified ones.” (BonJour, 1985, 8.) However, since BonJour is a strong accessibilist who thinks that a belief 
can be justified only if one has reflective access to both one’s reasons/evidence and the fact that it supports it, 
this arguably leads to skepticism since we usually don’t have reflective access to whether, and to what degree, 
our evidence increases the objective probability of certain propositions. 
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to the degree to which our evidence supports certain propositions.
57
 However, it is possible 
that one's evidence doesn't support a proposition p, or that it only supports p to a low degree, 
but that one nevertheless is highly (and irrationally) confident that p. Hence, relations of 
evidential probability cannot be defined in terms of belief/credence. 
Moreover, the aforementioned authors do not just agree that evidential probability 
doesn't reflect contingent relations having to with objective frequencies or a subject's 
credences, but also that it does reflect necessary connections between evidence and 
propositionally encoded hypotheses.
 58, 59
 In other words, according to the authors above, 
relations of evidential support are not a worldly matter, in the sense that they don't depend on 
contingent features of the actual world. Rather, according to Smithies (and some of the 
authors he follows) evidential probability should simply be defined as a sui generis kind of 
probability. However, a worry with this view is that evidential probability seems to become a 
rather mysterious thing. If it is neither credence nor chance, but rather some sui generis 
relation between one’s evidence and the propositions it supports, then it is very hard to get 
any sort of intuitive understanding of it. Moreover, one might worry that by divorcing one’s 
conception of probability from both the subjective and objective interpretations of it, one isn’t 
really theorizing about probability any longer, but rather some other notion.  
In response to the second worry, Smithies (forthcoming, ch. 5) argues that his 
conception of evidential support as a kind of sui generis probability is unproblematic since it 
is constrained by the axioms of the probability calculus and, moreover, that probability simply 
is whatever satisfies said axioms.
60, 61
 When it comes to the first worry, Smithies doesn’t 
                                                          
57
 Schmitt (1993) attributes a similar (though not identical) view that he calls epistemic perspectivism to 
BonJour, Foley, Pollock, and Lehrer. According to epistemic perspectivism: “thinking makes it so: a subject’s 
belief is justified in virtue of being sanctioned by the subject’s outlook or perspective on justification. . . To say 
that the subject’s belief is sanctioned by the perspective is not to say that it satisfies or conforms to some 
principle that is the content of a judgment of justification, but that it is judged to satisfy such a principle.” 
(Schmitt, 1993, 3.) However, I do not think that either of the aforementioned philosophers actually holds this 
view. What they do believe is that it is a necessary condition for having justification to believe that p that one 
believes that p is supported by one’s evidence. See, for example, BonJour (1985, 31). 
58
 Cf. Carnap (1950); Kyburg (1971); Moser (1988); Fumerton (1995); and Conee & Feldman (2008), who also 
argue that this is the case. 
59
 For a useful discussion of this issue, see Smith (2016). 
60
 The axioms are as follows: 
1. Non-Negativity: P(p) ≥ 0, for every proposition p. 
2. Normalization: P(T) = 1, for every tautology T. 
3. Finite Additivity: P(p∨ q) = P(p) + P(q), for every proposition p and q such that p is inconsistent with 
q.  
And the conditional probability of one proposition on another proposition can be defined by the following ratio 
formula: 
Conditional Probability: if P(q) > 0, then P(p | q) = P(p & q)/P(q). 
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really say much in order to ease any misgivings one might have; instead, he seems to rely on 
the Keynesian and Williamsonian idea that “probability begins and ends with probability” 
(Keynes, 1921, 332; cf. Williamson, 2000, ch. 10), and that it can’t be defined in more 
fundamental terms. Our theories must rely on certain fundamental concepts which cannot be 
defined in more fundamental terms, and there does not in principle seem to be any reason why 
probability cannot be allowed to function as such a concept.
62
 
Although these proposals are the most prominent internalist views of the evidential 
support relation in the critical literature, there are others besides. For example, according 
Michael Huemer (2001; 2007), one’s evidence supports believing that p just in case one’s 
evidence on balance makes it seem that p is true. However, a problem with this view is that 
seemings don’t appear to be necessary for justification. One can, for example, have a belief 
(whether occurrent or dispositional) that justifies another belief (with another propositional 
content), but without having any seeming that the content of the second belief is true. Another 
view of evidential support has been offered by Roderick Chisholm (1989), who holds that 
there are certain epistemic principles, such that if certain psychological conditions obtain, 
then certain propositions will be justified. For example, if a person undergoes a particular 
perceptual or memorial experience, then the person has justification for believing certain 
propositions about the world. However, neither Chisholm, nor anyone else, has been able to 
derive these principles that he endorses from more general ones, which makes them appear 
arbitrary and unmotivated. 
Now, insofar as one thinks that none of the aforementioned internalist views of 
evidential support is obviously unproblematic, the internalist faces the following problem: if 
one accepts the internalist intuitions elicited by the New Evil Demon scenario, then one needs 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The axioms are usually justified using Dutch Book Arguments purporting to show that anyone who 
violates them will be susceptible to accept a bet which guarantees that they will lose money, and that being so 
susceptible makes you less than ideally rational. For more on Dutch Book Arguments, see Hájek (2009). 
61
 He also uses this suggestion in order to argue that one always has privileged access to the facts about 
evidential support (Smithies, forthcoming, ch. 5 and 6). 
62
 Keynes (1921, 332) puts it as follows: “. . . there is no direct relation between the truth of a proposition and its 
probability. Probability begins and ends with probability. That a scientific investigation pursued on account of its 
probability will generally lead to truth, rather than falsehood, is at best only probable. The proposition that a 
course of action guided by the most probable considerations will generally lead to success, is not certainly true 
and has nothing to recommend it but probability.” 
Consider also the following passage from Williamson (2000, 211): “What, then, are probabilities on 
evidence? We should resist demands for an operational definition; such demands are as damaging in the 
philosophy of science as they are in science itself. To require mathematicians to give a precise definition of ‘set’ 
would be to abolish set theory. Sometimes the best policy is to go ahead and theorize with a vague but powerful 
notion. One’s original intuitive understanding becomes refined as a result, although rarely to the point of a 
definition in precise pretheoretical terms. That policy will be pursued here.” 
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to provide an account of the evidential support relation such that the beliefs of the demon’s 
victim will be justified. The issue, in other words, is that the internalist has to provide an 
account of evidential support that is compatible with internalist intuitions about skeptical 
scenarios and that is plausible in its own right.
63
 
However, that being said, I think that externalism faces the same kind of problem, 
insofar as the externalist too needs to provide a compelling account of evidential support—
though externalists are of course not subject to the constraint that the account must be 
compatible with the intuitions which motivate internalism. The externalist can always try to 
explain how one’s evidence provides justificatory support to certain propositions by claiming 
that it increases the objective probability of those propositions, as for example Alston (1989, 
ch. 9) and Plantinga (1993, ch. 9) do. However, this can only be done at the cost of denying 
the intuition that the beliefs of the victim in the New Evil Demon scenario are justified—not 
to mention the other problem hinted at above. After all, the victim's evidence clearly does not 
increase the objective chance that his beliefs are true.
64
 
The issue of how evidence provides support to propositions is a central one—one that 
both internalists and externalists must face. However, the issue is arguably more threatening 
to internalism, since it is only the internalist who must provide an account of evidential 
support that is compatible with the internalist intuitions on which he relies. Very much 
therefore seems to hinge on how one responds to the New Evil Demon scenario. If one is 
willing to bite the bullet and accept that the demon’s victim is unjustified in holding their 
beliefs, then one can account for evidential support in terms of objective probability, or in 
some other way that allows the victim to have unjustified beliefs. However, if one thinks that 
the intuition has to be respected, as I have argued at length in paper 1, then one needs to rely 
on an alternative conception of evidential support. My own view on this matter is that the 
internalist should opt for the least problematic view—what might be called the lesser evil—
and develop and defend it when pressed by the externalist. As I see it, I think that the 
Williamsonian view endorsed by Smithies and other internalists is the most plausible one. 
Indeed, I don't see any insurmountable issue with treating the notion of probability as 
fundamental, and therefore opt for a conception of evidential support as a sort of sui generis 
                                                          
63
 I think this is a somewhat underappreciated problem which deservers more discussion in the literature. Two 
exceptions are Fumerton (2004) and Littlejohn (2012). Littlejohn (2012, 26) formulates an argument according 
to which only externalism can account for the fact that the conditions that justify belief have to be truth-
conducive. 
64
 Another worry with this view, recently highlighted by Comesaña (2018, 316-317), is that it allows for lucky 
credence assignments to be justified, even though they intuitively aren't. 
137 
 
probability relation that necessarily holds between evidence and the propositionally specified 
hypotheses it supports. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
According to epistemic internalism, the justification facts supervene upon one’s non-factive 
mental states. However, not all such states can confer justification. In this paper, I have 
answered what I call the relevance question by arguing that all and only one’s beliefs and 
perceptual experiences have justificatory relevance. But this only tells us what the scope of 
justification-conferring mental states is; it does not tell why that set of states plays the 
epistemic role it does. In order to answer what I call the explanatory question, I have therefore 
argued that one’s beliefs and perceptual experiences are one’s strongly representational states, 
and that strongly representational states necessarily provide support to certain inferentially 
connected propositions. Doing this, the goal of this paper has been to make some headway 
toward developing a plausible internalist picture of justification and its basis in our mental 
lives. 
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Scientific Evidence and the Internalism-Externalism 
Distinction 
 
 
 
1. Epistemic Internalism and Externalism 
According to epistemic internalism, facts about justification are not brute facts; they are 
epistemic facts that depend upon more fundamental non-epistemic facts about one's internal 
states. A common way of unpacking the notion of internal states is by saying that one's 
internal states are one's non-factive mental states, where a mental state is non-factive just in 
case it doesn't necessarily have true propositional content.
1
 And, moreover, a common way 
explaining the way in which facts about justification depend upon one’s non-factive mental 
states is in terms of supervenience. Taken together this gives us the following definition of the 
internalist position: 
Epistemic internalism: facts about which doxastic attitudes one now has justification 
(to a certain degree) to hold supervene upon one's non-factive mental states.
2
 
Epistemic externalism, on the other hand, is naturally then defined as the denial of the 
internalist thesis above. 
The internalism-externalism distinction is a deep intellectual divide around which the 
contemporary epistemological discourse has been circling ever since Edmund Gettier (1963) 
first exposed the inadequacies inherent in our traditional analysis of our most cherished 
                                                          
1
 This position is known as mentalism, and its proponents include Pollock & Cruz (1999); Conee & Feldman 
(2001); Wedgwood (2002); Smithies (2012); McCain (2016); and Egeland (forthcoming). 
2
 Thus defined, epistemic internalism is a thesis about propositional, rather than doxastic, justification. In other 
words, it is a thesis about the justification someone has for believing/withholding/disbelieving certain 
propositions, rather than the justifiably held beliefs (or other doxastic attitudes) someone has. This is important 
since doxastic justification usually is taken to be propositional justification plus proper basing, and whether one 
satisfies the basing requirement is typically understood along externalist lines as a causal or counterfactual 
matter. However, for those who endorse an internalist conception of proper basing (e.g., some doxastic account 
of the relation), the thesis could just as well be defined in terms of doxastic justification. But since I don't want to 
commit myself to any position with respect to the nature of the basing relation, I will simply limit my focus to 
propositional justification. 
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epistemological concept—namely, knowledge.3 Internalists usually argue their case by 
reflecting on various scenarios in which the subject's rational standing appears to be a 
function of his or her own first-person perspective on the world. Externalists, on the other 
hand, often argue their case by reflecting on our concepts of evidence and reason, including 
the way in which we talk about what our justifying evidence or reasons for belief in various 
contexts are.
4
 In this paper, I will examine two such externalist arguments, both of which have 
as their conclusion the claim that internalism ultimately must be false insofar as it is unable to 
account for the way in which the concept of evidence is used in scientific discourse. The first 
of these arguments is offered by Timothy Williamson (2000) in support of his E = K thesis, 
whereas the second is offered by Thomas Kelly (2008; 2016) and focuses on the public or 
intersubjective character of scientific evidence. In response, I will argue that Williamson's 
view isn't supported by how we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to account 
for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified scientific belief 
in the history of science. And in response to the second argument I will argue that internalist 
views are just as suited to account for the public character of scientific evidence as externalist 
views; indeed, they do better in that regard than the externalist view proposed by Kelly. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 begins from the assumption that facts 
about justification largely are determined by one's evidence, while clarifying some confusion 
about the concept of evidence. Section 3 presents Williamson's views on evidence and the 
argument for the E = K thesis. Section 4 responds to that argument. Section 5 presents the 
argument that scientific evidence has a public character which internalism cannot account for. 
Section 6 responds by explaining the way in which internalism can account for the publicity 
of scientific evidence. Section 7 concludes and discusses the role of scientific evidence in the 
internalism-externalism debate. 
 
                                                          
3
 Indeed, after the publication of Gettier's seminal article, several epistemologists have shifted their focus from 
knowledge to justification. As one commentator puts it: “knowledge is not really the proper central concern of 
epistemologico-sceptical inquiry. There is not necessarily any lasting discomfort in the claim that, contrary to 
our preconceptions, we have no genuine knowledge in some broad area of thought—say in the area of theoretical 
science. We can live with the concession that we do not, strictly, know some of the things we believed ourselves 
to know, provided we can retain the thought that we are fully justified in accepting them.” (Wright, 1991, 88.) 
Similarly, focusing primarily on science rather than philosophy, John Earman (1993, 37) says that “the main 
concern is rarely whether or not a scientist 'knows' that some theory is true but rather whether or not she is 
justified in believing it.” 
4
 For an excellent introduction to many of the arguments that have made their mark on the internalism-
externalism debate (although it fails to cover the kind of externalist argument which this paper focuses on), see 
Littlejohn (2012, introduction). 
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2. Evidence 
Nowadays, it is common for epistemologists to think that one's evidence plays a big role in 
determining what one has justification to believe. Evidentialists think that facts about 
justification are a function of one's evidence, whereas others think that non-evidential factors 
can play a justification-conferring role as well. In this paper I will follow suit and assume that 
one's evidence is largely responsible for what one has justification to believe. This has some 
interesting implications for how we should understand the internalism-externalism divide. 
According to the internalist, all evidence is provided by one's internal states; and if they don't 
support evidentialism, they will have to say that the other, non-evidential, justification-
conferring factors also are provided by one's internal states. According to the externalist, on 
the other hand, some evidence isn't provided by one's internal states, or there must be external 
factors besides one's evidence that can confer justification upon our beliefs. However, we 
need to say a little bit more about what evidence is. For all the sentences above tell us, 
evidence is whatever (usually) justifies belief (or other doxastic attitudes). Consider for 
example the conception of evidence suggested by Jaegwon Kim: 
[T]he concept of evidence is inseparable from that of justification. When we talk of 
'evidence' in an epistemological sense we are talking about justification: one thing is 
'evidence' for another just in case the first tends to enhance the reasonableness or 
justification of the second. . . A strictly nonnormative concept of evidence is not our 
concept of evidence; it is something that we do not understand. (Kim, 1988, 390-
391.)
5
 
However, this conception of evidence is too liberal to be theoretically satisfying. 
Indeed, as Jack Lyons (2016, 1057) also has pointed out, Kim's conception of evidence faces 
a couple of serious problems. First, it renders evidentialism a wholly uninteresting thesis 
insofar as it becomes analytically true. If evidence simply is whatever justifies or rationalizes 
certain doxastic attitudes, then facts about justification will of course be determined by one's 
evidence. But we already knew that! Our beliefs are justified by whatever justifies our beliefs. 
There's nothing new under the sun. 
Second, Kim's conception of evidence is counterintuitive insofar as it encourages us to 
conceptualize certain phenomena as evidence that clearly don't appear to be evidence. 
Consider for example some externalist views of justification, like reliabilism and proper 
                                                          
5
 Cf. Kelly (2008, 941-942; 2016). 
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functionalism. According to such views, the reliability of one's doxastic dispositions or the 
proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties does (epistemically) contribute to the 
justification of our beliefs. Hence, according to Kim's conception, such phenomena constitute 
evidence (on those views). However, this clearly does not seem right. Reliable doxastic 
dispositions and properly functioning cognitive faculties should not count as evidence—
regardless of whether or not theories that emphasize the justifying role played by such 
phenomena are correct. 
How should we conceptualize one's evidence then? I want to suggest as an intuitive 
conception of evidence, with minimal theoretical commitments, that one's justifying evidence 
is the epistemic (as opposed to pragmatic) reasons for belief (or other doxastic attitudes) in 
one's possession.
6, 7
 This, in other words, means that evidence is the kind of thing that speaks 
in favor of the truth of certain propositions and which subjects typically find it natural to rely 
on in the practice of justifying their beliefs—i.e., in demonstrating what their beliefs have 
going for them that serve as indicators of their being true. Moreover, it also means that 
justifying evidence—i.e., the kind of evidence that justifies belief—must somehow belong to 
a subject. In order for someone to have a piece of evidence, it cannot simply be the case that 
the evidence exists somewhere in the world. Instead, the evidence must somehow be in the 
subject's cognitive possession; otherwise, it wouldn't be evidence that one has or is in 
possession of.
8
 
Continuing, I will rely on this intuitive conception of evidence in my discussion of the 
two externalist arguments purporting to show that there is a specific species of evidence—
namely, scientific evidence—that only can be accommodated in an externalist framework. 
Let's begin by turning to Williamson's views on the matter and the argument for the E = K 
thesis. 
 
3. Williamson on Scientific Evidence and the E = K Thesis 
Williamson thinks that only true propositions (or facts) can be evidence. First, he thinks that 
all evidence is propositional since one's evidence can be evaluated for properties like 
                                                          
6
 Although I do not have space to discuss his article, I think this suggestion avoids Brunero's (2018) 
counterexamples to the reasons-as-evidence view.  
7
 For a similar suggestion, see Brogaard (2018). 
8
 The present suggestion is neutral on the question of whether one's evidence/reasons are propositionally 
specified. For more comprehensive (and disagreeing) treatments of this issue, see Turri (2009) and Glüer & 
Wikforss (2018). 
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consistency and inconsistency, coherence, probabilification, entailment, explanatory fit, and 
the like. Such properties only hold among items that can be considered true or false, which 
means that they must be propositions. Indeed, he thinks that “propositionality is essential to 
the functional role of evidence” (Williamson, 2007b, 209, footnote 1).9 Second, Williamson 
thinks that only a proper subset of all propositions can be evidence—namely, the true ones—
since propositions that are inconsistent with one's evidence must be false. If propositions 
inconsistent with one's evidence must be false, then it follows that the propositions that 
constitute one's evidence must be true.
10
 Thus, Williamson thinks that all evidence consists of 
true propositions that support certain (other) propositions either by deductively entailing 
them, by increasing their probability, or by abductively supporting them. 
Moreover, Williamson also agrees that in order for evidence to play a justifying role it 
must somehow be in the subject's cognitive possession. More specifically, he thinks that the 
subject somehow must grasp the propositions that are included in his evidence:  
One can use an hypothesis to explain why A only if one grasps the proposition that A. 
Thus only propositions which one grasps can function as evidence in one's inferences 
to the best explanation. By this standard, only propositions which one grasps count as 
part of one's evidence. (Williamson, 2000, 195.) 
However, he doesn't think that it is sufficient for a subject to believe a true proposition p in 
order for p to be included in his evidence. Rather, what is required is that the subject knows p. 
Thus, only knowledge is evidence.
11
 Moreover, he also thinks that all knowledge is evidence, 
which leads him to endorse the famous E = K thesis: 
E = K: “knowledge, and only knowledge, constitutes evidence” (Williamson, 2000, 
185). 
 And later he endorses what we may call the R = K thesis: 
                                                          
9
 Williamson (2000, 194-196) appears to offer three different, but similar, arguments for the claim that all 
evidence is propositional. The first (194-195) argues from the fact that evidence typically is used in abductive 
reasoning; the second (195-196) argues from the role of evidence in probabilistic reasoning; and the third (196) 
argues from the fact that evidence sometimes can be used to rule out hypotheses. 
10
 Williamson (2007b, 209) puts the point as follows: “Why is it bad for an assertion to be inconsistent with the 
evidence? A natural answer is: because then it is false. That answer assumes that evidence consists only of true 
propositions. For if an untrue proposition p is evidence, the proposition that p is untrue is true but inconsistent 
with the evidence. Using 'fact' for 'true proposition,' we may say that evidence consists only of facts.” 
11
 To support this claim, Williamson (2000, 200-201) offers the now well-known “balls in a bag” argument. For 
a critical discussion of the argument, see Lyons (2016, 1060-1061). 
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R = K: “p is available to you as a reason if and only if you know p.” (Williamson, 
2007a, 120.) 
The E = K thesis is clearly an externalist theory of justification and evidence (and the 
same also goes for the R = K thesis, of course). This can easily be seen by comparing 
knowledge with internal states. Under the definition of internalism that we’re currently 
considering, internal states are non-factive mental states. By contrast, knowledge is a factive 
state since it necessarily has true propositional content.
12
 It therefore fails to qualify as an 
internal state, and if knowledge cannot be considered an internal state, while at the same time 
providing evidence for our beliefs, then E = K must be an externalist theory.  
Williamson offers several considerations in favor of the E = K thesis.
13
 Here I want to 
take a closer look at one of the less discussed reasons he offers.
14
 As he sees it, in the 
scientific discourse evidence is treated as true propositions that are commonly known (or 
perhaps just widely available) in the scientific community. This is how he puts it in his 
Knowledge and Its Limits: 
If one's evidence were restricted to the contents of one's own mind, it could not play 
the role it actually does in science. The evidence for the proposition that the sun is 
larger than the earth is not just my present experiences or degrees of belief.  If the 
evidence is widened to include other people's experiences or degrees of belief, or my 
past ones, then my identification of it becomes even more fallible. In any case, that 
does not seem to be the right widening; it is more plausible that the evidence for a 
scientific theory is the sort of thing which is made public in scientific journals. 
(Williamson, 2000, 193.) 
And later in The Philosophy of Philosophy, he writes: 
It is fanciful to regard evidence in the natural sciences as consisting of psychological 
facts rather than, for example, facts about the results of experiments and 
measurements. When scientists state their evidence in their publications, they state 
                                                          
12
 I say that knowledge is a factive state, rather than a factive mental state, because I don't want to commit 
myself to the view that it actually is a mental state. Williamson (2000) of course claims that it is, but there are 
strong arguments for the opposite view; see, e.g., McGlynn (2014, ch. 8). 
13
 See Williamson (2000, ch. 9). 
14
 The argument is really an objection to the internalist's conception of evidence, although it can be formulated 
without omitting any of his central points, as I do here, as an argument for the E = K thesis. Indeed, since the 
passage quoted from Williamson (2000) occurs in the middle of his chapter on evidence, where he argues that 
the E = K thesis is superior to more traditional internalist conceptions of evidence, I think an argument along the 
lines I present is hinted at in that chapter. 
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mainly non-psychological facts (unless they are psychologists); are they not best 
placed to know what their evidence is? (Williamson 2007b, 212.) 
In these passages, Williamson claims that when scientists argue for theories or 
hypotheses—like that the sun is larger than the earth—they don't rely on premises about their 
internal states as evidence for them. Rather, they argue from premises about true propositions 
(or facts) that are common knowledge among the members of the scientific community;
15
 
which is easily explained by his E = K thesis. Indeed, according to the E = K thesis, the 
reason we find it so natural to treat our knowledge as evidence in the scientific discourse (and 
other kinds discourse as well) is because it is our evidence. 
Moreover, this is also thought to pose a big problem for the internalist. Indeed, 
Williamson's point can be presented as a modus tollens against internalism. To see why that is 
so, recall that internalism holds that facts about which doxastic attitudes one now has 
justification (to a certain degree) to hold supervene upon one's non-factive mental states. Thus 
defined, it follows from internalism that a pair of epistemic agents, one of whom is in a 
normal scenario where everything is as it seems and the other of whom is in a subjectively 
indistinguishable deceptive scenario (like those that typically involve envatment or Cartesian 
demons) have the same evidence and are equally justified in holding the same beliefs. 
However, if Williamson's point is correct, then agents in subjectively indistinguishable 
normal and deceptive scenarios need not have the same (scientific) evidence (since one of 
them can have knowledge that the other lacks) and can therefore fail to be equally justified in 
holding the same beliefs—in which case internalism must be false.16 
 
4. Response to Williamson on Scientific Evidence 
In response to the argument that our conception of scientific evidence strongly supports the E 
= K thesis, and hence externalism in general, I will make three points as to why that isn't the 
case. 
                                                          
15
 The notion of common knowledge that I believe Williamson here (implicitly) is operating with is an intuitive 
notion; not the notion that we find in epistemic logics. According to the latter notion, Φ is common knowledge 
among the agents in A if and only if (i) Φ is true, (ii) everybody in A knows that Φ is true, (iii) everybody in A 
knows that everybody in A knows that Φ is true, and (iv) everybody in A knows that, . . . , everybody in A 
knows that Φ is true, ad infinitum: CAΦ = Φ ∧ KAΦ ∧ KAKAΦ ∧ KAKAKAΦ . . . 
16
 “That one has the same evidence in the good and bad cases is a severe constraint on the nature of evidence. It 
is inconsistent with the view that evidence consist of true propositions like those standardly offered as evidence 
for scientific theories.” (Williamson, 2000, 173.) 
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First, talk about evidence, both in scientific and everyday contexts, doesn't support the 
E = K thesis. Instead, it supports only a more moderate version of externalism according to 
which both internal states and external factors count as evidence.
17
 To see why that is so, 
notice that we often talk about evidence without referring to our knowledge. For example, if 
someone asks you what your evidence for believing that the Berlin wall fell on June 13
th
 1990 
is, it is completely natural to answer by pointing to an encyclopedia article in front of you, 
saying that “my evidence is right there, just take look yourself”—which refers to a physical 
object (i.e., the encyclopedia article), rather than a proposition you know, as your evidence. 
Or you can answer simply by saying that “I experienced the event myself”—which refers to 
an internal state as evidence. Either way, our ordinary and everyday talk about evidence 
doesn't support the E = K thesis. 
Similarly, when we talk about scientific evidence we also often talk as if internal states 
and external factors besides propositions we know are evidence. For example, if someone 
asks you what your evidence for a certain hypothesis h is, a natural reply is that “my evidence 
for h was gathered during last year's excavation”—which again refers to physical objects (i.e., 
those that were gathered at the excavation), rather than known propositions, as scientific 
evidence. Or, another natural way of answering the question is to say that “the evidence for 
the hypothesis h is observations o1, . . . , on”—which refers to internal states as scientific 
evidence.
18
 So even though we sometimes do refer to our knowledge as (scientific) evidence 
(either explicitly or implicitly), talk about evidence, both in scientific and everyday contexts, 
only seems to support a somewhat moderate externalism, according to which both internal 
states and external factors can provide (scientific) evidence.
19, 20
 
Second, the E = K thesis isn't supported by our intuitive conception of scientific 
evidence since it is possible that there are false propositions included in our scientific 
                                                          
17
 A similar point is also made by Turri (2009); and Kelly (2008). 
18
 Now, one might think that what is being referenced here are external states that have been observed. However, 
to me, that doesn't really seem all that plausible. I think that what is being referenced are observations of external 
states, rather that the external states themselves.  
19
 Moreover, it should be noted that this “moderate externalism” actually is compatible with internalism insofar 
its proponents can argue that although both internal and external factors can count as (scientific) evidence, only 
internal factors can count as justifying evidence.  
20
 In fact, to the extent that the the notion of “public evidence” can be analyzed in internalist terms (which I 
argue that it can in section 6), it doesn't even support that much. If there indeed is such an analysis available, 
then this fact about language use supports internalism. 
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evidence.
21
 For example, we can imagine scientific propositions that are false but treated as 
evidence since they enjoy great predictive success and are strongly corroborated by other 
things we know. Indeed, not only can we imagine such scenarios, but we also seem to find 
them in the actual history of science.
22
  
Consider the curious case of Bohr and Sommerfield who, by relying on a flawed 
model of the atom in which electrons literally orbit the nucleus in a circular or elliptical 
fashion, successfully predicted the spectral lines of various elements.
23
 At the end of the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, a problematic and up to that 
point unexplained phenomenon was the characteristic spectra of different elements; every 
element emits and absorbs light only at certain specific frequencies. Before Bohr, most 
explanations of the phenomenon were no more than far-fetched speculations.
24
 However, in 
1913 Bohr explained the spectral lines of any element in terms of the possible orbits of the 
electrons in the element's atoms. His theory had tremendous success in explaining the spectral 
lines of ionized helium. The physicist and science historian Abraham Pais writes as follows 
about the event: 
Up to that time no one had ever produced anything like it in the realm of spectroscopy, 
agreement between theory and experiment up to five significant figures. (Pais, 1991, 
149.) 
Indeed, his theory was so successful that many of his contemporaries were absolutely 
convinced that it had to be correct. Einstein, for example, said that “this is a tremendous 
result. The theory of Bohr must then be right.”25  
Nevertheless, as it turns out, Bohr's theory wasn't able to explain the spectral lines of 
hydrogen. So in 1916 Sommerfield further developed Bohr's initial theory and was able to 
offer accurate predictions. The expanded theory of Sommerfield was indeed so successful that 
                                                          
21
 Some epistemologists will of course just stipulate that evidence must be true. However, even if one were to 
make such a stipulation, the point I make in the following paragraphs would still hold true of justifying reasons 
for belief, which aren't necessarily true. 
22
 There are also many counterexamples to the claim that false propositions cannot be included in one's evidence 
in everyday situations. See, e.g., Warfield (2005); Klein (2008); Fitelson (2010); Arnold (2011); Rizzeri (2011); 
and Egeland (forthcoming). Littlejohn (2012, 106-109), however, critically argues against some these examples, 
and McCain (2016, 25-27) responds to his argument. 
23
 For an interesting discussion of the case, which relates it to the realism/anti-realism debate, see Vickers 
(2012). 
24
 According to Pais (1986, 197): “So it was when Bohr came along. In his words, in those early days spectra 
were as interesting and incomprehensible as the colors of a butterfly's wing.” 
25
 Cited in Pais (1991, 154). 
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by 1920 there was almost universal agreement among the physicists of the time that the theory 
not only had to be correct, but that it was the only viable model for atomic and quantum 
research.
26
 In fact, the formula Sommerfield derived from his theory in order to explain the 
frequency at which hydrogen emits and absorbs light is the exact same as the one that we 
nowadays use for the same purpose. However, as it turns out, we now know that the Bohr-
Sommerfield theory is wrong, and it has been replaced with a new theoretical model (which 
includes the Schrödinger equation). Yet, it remains a fantastic coincidence that Sommerfield 
was able to derive the correct formula from a wholly inadequate theory.
27
 In his discussion of 
the development, acceptance, and eventual rejection of the Bohr-Sommerfield theory, Helge 
Kragh offers the following remark: 
By some sort of historical magic, Sommerfield managed in 1916 to get the correct 
formula from what turned out to be an utterly inadequate model. . . [This] illustrates 
the well-known fact that incorrect physical theories may well lead to correct formulae 
and predictions. (Kragh, 1985, 84.) 
Now, for the present purposes, the question we need to ask is whether the false Bohr-
Sommerfield theory (or the false propositions comprising it) did, or at least could, count as 
evidence for other scientific hypotheses once it became clear that it was able to successfully 
explain the observational data about spectral lines? I think we should answer in the 
affirmative. The false Bohr-Sommerfield theory clearly played an important theoretical role in 
the epistemologico-scientific project at the time; indeed, so much so that when Sommerfield 
derived the true formula that successfully explained the relevant data from his theory, that the 
theory itself became justified to such a degree that it could be used as scientific evidence for 
other hypotheses or derivations.
28
 If, for example, the theory could be shown to support a 
certain interesting and not yet empirically tested hypothesis, then it does seem that we would 
have good reason to believe in that hypothesis. More specifically, Sommerfield's theory, 
which itself was justified by its explanatory power and predictive success, would provide 
evidence in favor of said hypothesis by conferring (some of) its justification upon it. 
Moreover, not only does this seem intuitive, it appears to be more or less what actually 
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 See Kragh (2012, ch. 4). 
27
 Kronig (cited in Kragh, 1985, 84), for example, says that it is “perhaps the most remarkable numerical 
coincidence in the history of physics.”  
28
 If someone were to object that we shouldn’t think of scientific theories or propositions as scientific evidence, 
which is more akin to observational data, then I would be happy to concede that such theories/propositions are 
evidentially significant, but aren’t scientific evidence. And that, moreover, is sufficient to counter the E = K 
thesis. All that is required is that false theories/propositions can function as evidence, scientific or other. 
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happened. Before its eventual downfall, when the Bohr-Sommerfield theory enjoyed almost 
universal support among contemporary physicists, the theory, with all its success, was, as 
noted above, thought to provide the only viable model for further research in the field. Indeed, 
not only does the theory appear to have been accorded evidential significance, it also appears 
to have created something like a scientific paradigm,
29
 the basis of which could be used in 
order to epistemically evaluate and justify further research—at least for a time.  
A possible—perhaps even obvious—objection to my argument is that the Bohr-
Sommerfield theory eventually was overturned and recognized as false, and that it therefore 
didn't really provide bona fide scientific evidence to begin with. Although it is completely 
understandable why physicists in the early twentieth century might have believed that the 
theory was true and should be included in their evidence set, the fact that it is false shows 
their belief to have been mistaken. In response, I want to point out the extreme skeptical 
consequences that seem to follow from this line of thought. For if one bites the bullet and 
says, contrary to intuition, that false (but strongly corroborated) scientific propositions cannot 
function as evidence, then beliefs based on those propositions cannot be justified (at least not 
by the propositions themselves). And if this truly is the case, then the history of science 
doesn't only appear to be filled with scientifically informed and ever more sophisticated false 
beliefs that (hopefully at least) gradually approximate the truth, but it is also filled with 
scientifically informed ever more sophisticated unjustified beliefs. But I don't think that this is 
the sort of skepticism we want to live with. If it were true, then the history of science would 
present us with a wonderful and gradually changing picture of the universe, albeit one that for 
the most part is unjustified. Moreover, by pessimistic meta-induction we might not only be 
compelled to conclude that our present picture of the universe most likely is false (for the 
most part), but also that it isn't even justified. However, since we clearly do seem to be 
justified in holding our scientific world-view and our scientifically informed beliefs (at least 
most of them), I therefore think that the objection ultimately fails. 
Another problem with the objection is that something similar to the Bohr-Sommerfield 
case appears to be going on today, especially when it comes to our reliance on scientific 
theories or models that strictly speaking are false or inaccurate, and which we may know to be 
false/inaccurate, but which nevertheless are accorded evidential significance. Good examples 
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 Although not necessarily in the sense that Kuhn (1996) uses the concept. 
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are provided by models involving idealizations, smoothing of data sets,
30
 or ceteris paribus 
clauses. Although such models often will be false or inaccurate, they can be very useful in 
calculating or predicting the outcome of experiments or real world events. They are, as 
Catherine Elgin (2017) recently put it, “felicitous falsehoods”—i.e., falsehoods which are 
“true enough” insofar as they are essential to our scientific practice, justify our acceptance of 
various theories and hypotheses, and contribute to our understanding of certain scientific 
topics and domains.
 31, 32
 Elgin provides an illuminating study of many such models. For 
example, astronomers often rely on models which don't take into account important features 
of planets, or which simply treat them as point masses without spatial extension when they 
want to calculate their motion (see Elgin, 2017, 27). Yet, despite systematically 
misrepresenting their objects of study in important ways, such models are evidentially 
significant insofar they contribute (epistemically) to the justification or various theories, 
hypotheses, or beliefs—or so I suggest. Although she is less appreciative of traditional 
epistemological notions—such as “belief, assertion, and knowledge”33—Elgin similarly 
stresses the epistemic importance that felicitously false models have, claiming that their 
falsity or inaccuracy “does not undermine [their] epistemic function[s]” (Elgin, 2017, 3).34 
As I already have discussed in greater detail in paper 1, the third problem with 
Williamson's view on scientific evidence is that there are many deception scenarios that seem 
to provide strong support for internalism, and hence against the E = K thesis. The kind of 
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 To smooth a data set is to create an approximating function that captures the most important patterns in the 
data, while leaving out noise or statistically unlikely occurrences. 
31
 One might think that knowing or believing that a theory is false prevents it from functioning as evidence. 
However, I don't think that is the case. Since, when using such a theory, one presumably has some background 
belief to the effect that it (e.g.) provides accurate predictions, I take it that the theory—even if false—can have 
evidential significance. 
32
 Following a recent trend in epistemology and philosophy of science (see, e.g., Grimm, Baumberger &Ammon 
(2017)), Elgin claims that the purpose of science (or at least one of its purposes) is to facilitate understanding 
rather than (propositional) knowledge. Understanding, moreover, involves competent use of the information one 
has in the furthering of one's epistemic goals: “To understand a topic involves knowing how to wield one's 
commitments to further one's epistemic ends. It involves being able to draw inferences, raise questions, frame 
potentially fruitful inquiries, and so forth. Since some of the commitments are likely to be felicitous falsehoods 
and others to be methodological or normative commitments that are not truth apt, understanding is not factive. It 
is not a type of knowledge; it does not consist exclusively or primarily in believing or accepting truths.” (Elgin, 
2017, 3.) 
33
 Elgin (2017, 9). 
34
 The proponent of the E = K thesis might respond that although such “felicitous falsehoods” indeed are known 
falsehoods, they might still be evidentially significant insofar as we know which elements of the models are 
difference-makers and which aren't (see Strevens (forthcoming) for such an account of how idealizations provide 
understanding). Although I have to confess that I'm not entirely sure how the resulting view, which combines the 
E = K thesis with Strevens' account of idealizations, will look, it seems to me that a model involving idealization 
can provide evidence for a certain hypothesis without the subject having to know exactly which elements of the 
model are difference-makers. Instead, might not the model provide evidence as long as the subject justifiably 
believes, and perhaps even falsely so, which elements of the model are difference-makers? 
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argument that I have in mind has played an important role in the epistemological literature on 
the internalism-externalism debate, but has had much less influence on discussions about 
scientific evidence in particular.
35
 Consider, for example, your favorite deception scenario. In 
it, everything seems to be just as if it isn't a deception scenario, even though it is. Indeed, it is 
subjectively indistinguishable from the corresponding good or normal scenario. As a result, 
despite their falsity and unreliability, our scientific theories and beliefs seem to be just as 
justified as they would have been in the corresponding good scenario. And this strongly 
supports the claim that our scientific evidence doesn't depend on typical external factors like 
knowledge, truth, or reliability. Instead, it only depends on factors that the normal and 
deceptive scenario have in common—the best candidate of which is our internal states. So 
reflection on deception scenarios and the epistemic status of our scientific theories and beliefs 
in those scenarios provides strong intuitive support for internalism. And, moreover, since 
internalism is incompatible with the E = K thesis, it also counts against Williamson's 
position.
36
  
Taken together, these three points show that, on balance, we have a conception of 
scientific evidence that Williamson's E = K thesis cannot account for. Philosophical reflection 
on scientific evidence shouldn't be seen as providing an argument for epistemic externalism 
via the E = K thesis. However, whether it supports internalism or a more moderate version of 
externalism remains to be seen. Much of the disagreement between the positions appears to 
depend on different intuitions (or different beliefs about their epistemic significance) about 
how we should evaluate epistemic agents (and theories/beliefs) in deception scenarios. 
Recently, I have defended the view that our philosophical intuitions about such cases provide 
strong support for internalism against various counterarguments.
37
 However, I will not revisit 
this issue here. Instead, in the next section, I will discuss a feature of scientific evidence that 
often is thought to provide a very strong argument—indeed, perhaps even a knockdown 
argument—against internalism; namely, its public character. 
 
                                                          
35
 The locus classicus of the argument is provided by Lehrer & Cohen (1983). 
36
 Williamson (2007a) has responded to this kind of argument by drawing a distinction between justification and 
blamelessness, while claiming that victims of deceptions scenarios are blamelessly unjustified in holding their 
beliefs. However, a problem with Williamson's response, first pointed out by Pryor (2001), is that it commits 
him to having to give highly counterintuitive verdicts about other scenarios. Other, more recent worries are 
raised by Greco (forthcoming).  
37
 See Egeland (forthcoming). 
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5. The Public Character of Scientific Evidence 
Scientific evidence is often believed to have a public character insofar as it can be appreciated 
and shared by different people. For example, according to Carl Hempel: 
[A]ll statements of empirical science are capable of test by reference to evidence 
which is public, i.e., evidence which can be secured by different observers and does 
not depend essentially on the observer. (Hempel, 1952, 22.) 
Similarly, Karl Popper writes: 
The objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be intersubjectively 
tested. (Popper, 1959, 44.) 
The publicity of scientific evidence has for several decades been thought to create 
problems for internalism, since the internalist conception of evidence seems to require that it 
have a much more private character. Peter Railton remarks: 
[O]bjective inquiry uses procedures that are intersubjective and independent of 
particular individuals and circumstances—e.g., its experiments are reproducible, its 
methods are determinate, its criteria are effective, and it makes no essential use of 
introspective or subjectively privileged evidence in theory assessment.
38, 39
 (Railton, 
1984, 815.) 
As recently has been made much more clear by Kelly, the problem for the internalist is that 
they cannot easily explain how scientific evidence comes to be shared by multiple individuals 
in the objective pursuit of scientific knowledge. As Kelly sees it, the internalist conception of 
evidence—which he occasionally, following Williamson (2000), calls the phenomenal 
                                                          
38
 Cf. Hempel (1952) and Feigl (1953), the latter of whom says: “The quest for scientific knowledge is . . . 
regulated by certain standards of criteria. . . The most important of these regulative ideas are: 
1. Intersubjective Testability. This is only a more adequate formulation of what is generally meant by the 
"objectivity" of science. What is here involved is . . . the requirement that the knowledge claims of science 
be in principle capable of test . . . on the part of any person properly equipped with intelligence and the 
technical devices of observation or experimentation. The term intersubjective stresses the social nature of 
the scientific enterprise. If there be any 'truths' that are accessible only to privileged individuals, such as 
mystics or visionaries—that is, knowledge-claims which by their very nature cannot independently be 
checked by anyone else—then such 'truths' are not of the kind that we seek in the sciences. The criterion of 
intersubjective testability thus delimits the scientific from the nonscientific activities of man.” (Feigl, 1953, 
11.) 
39
 Railton's statement is very strong. As a result, it fails to account for the fact that introspective reports by 
subjects provide key data in contemporary cognitive science and psychophysics—especially in the study of 
consciousness. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Goldman (1997). 
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conception of evidence
40—cannot account for the actual scientific practice wherein evidence 
is shared among different individuals in order to further the scientific project. This is how he 
puts it: 
[T]he phenomenal conception of evidence would seem to fit poorly with the way in 
which the concept is employed in scientific and legal contexts. Notably, in such 
contexts, a large value is placed on the publicity of evidence, i.e., on the fact that 
paradigmatic evidence is something that can be shared by multiple individuals. Indeed, 
it is this public character of evidence which is often taken to underwrite the possibility 
of an inquiry that is genuinely objective. If evidence is taken to include (e.g.) facts 
about the external world, then, inasmuch as multiple individuals can be aware of the 
same facts, one and the same piece of evidence can literally be shared by those 
individuals. In contrast, a view according to which my evidence is limited to my own 
non-factive mental states does not seem to allow for this, inasmuch as I do not literally 
share my own token mental states with anyone else. At best, the sense in which 
evidence can be shared by multiple individuals on such a picture is a matter of their 
being in distinct but similar mental states (perhaps: token experiential states of the 
same type). It is far from obvious that such a surrogate would provide the kind of 
objectivity which literally shared public evidence is often taken to afford. (Kelly, 
2008, 949-950.) 
Here, Kelly not only tells us that internalism will have a difficult time accounting for 
the public character of scientific evidence, he also provides an (externalist) example of what 
such evidence may consist of that does account for its publicity. He says that our scientific 
evidence may (at least for the most part) be comprised of facts about the external world. 
Moreover, as will become clear (in the quoted paragraphs below), facts about the external 
world should most naturally be understood as physical objects or states of affairs in which 
such objects figure, rather than true propositions. On this picture, it is mind-independent 
objects and the relations among them—like, for example, rock formations, cells in a Petri 
dish, or bone fragments found at burial sites—that constitute the evidence for our scientific 
                                                          
40
 This is actually a misnomer since even though some internalists do have a phenomenal conception of 
evidence, not all do. 
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theories and hypotheses, and which make relevant propositions about those objects and states 
of affairs true.
41
  
This kind of evidence has aptly been called “scientific evidence” (Conee & Feldman, 
2008) and “factual evidence” (Lyons, 2016) in the literature, and Kelly's view appears to 
receive support from the way in which we often find ourselves talking about scientific 
evidence. For example, we often talk about gathering evidence—whether it be fingerprints, 
rocks, or any other such object—which seems to assume that physical objects can function as 
evidence. Moreover, it isn't hard to see why Kelly, with his claim that scientific evidence is 
comprised of facts (understood in the manner above), easily will be able to explain the public 
character of scientific evidence. Since such facts typically are accessible to different observers 
or experimenters—the bone fragments found at ancient burial sites are in principle available 
for study by different scientists—the evidence they provide can literally be shared by different 
people. These are exactly the points Kelly (2016) makes in his Stanford Encyclopedia article 
on evidence:  
This [internalist] picture of evidence stands in no small measure of tension with the 
idea that a central function of evidence is to serve as a neutral arbiter among 
competing views. For it is natural to think that the ability of evidence to play this latter 
role depends crucially on its having an essentially public character, i.e., that it is the 
sort of thing which can be grasped and appreciated by multiple individuals. Here, the 
most natural contenders would seem to be physical objects and the states of affairs and 
events in which they participate, since it is such entities that are characteristically 
accessible to multiple observers. (I ask what evidence there is for your diagnosis that 
the patient suffers from measles; in response, you might simply point to or 
demonstrate the lesions on her skin.)  
 
Here, Kelly points out that the internalist will have a hard time accounting for the 
public character of scientific evidence, before arguing that the view which most naturally 
explains the publicity of evidence is one according to which one's evidence consist of physical 
objects and the states of affairs and events in which they figure. Moreover, he continues to 
                                                          
41
 Thus, the view clearly differs from that of Williamson, who thinks that it is the propositions we know that 
constitute our evidence. 
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press the point that internalism, in contrast to his own view, is incompatible with the public 
character of scientific evidence and that it therefore cannot account for scientific objectivity: 
On the other hand, to the extent that one's evidence consists of essentially private 
states there would seem to be no possibility of sharing one's evidence with others. But 
it is precisely the possibility of sharing relevant evidence which is naturally thought to 
secure the objectivity of science. Indeed, it has often been held that inasmuch as the 
objectivity of science is underwritten by the fact that science is evidence driven, it is 
the public character of scientific evidence which is crucial. On this view, it is a central 
methodological norm of science to eschew as inadmissible (e.g.) any alleged episodes 
of incommunicable insight in considering whether to accept or reject a claim.  
According to Kelly, internalism is therefore unable, or at the very least hard pressed, 
to account for the public character of scientific evidence. As he sees it, a much more plausible 
(externalist) view holds that our scientific evidence consist of facts about the external world, 
understood in terms of mind-independent physical objects and the states of affairs in which 
they figure. Contrary to internalism, such a view is clearly able to account for the publicity of 
scientific evidence insofar as facts (in principle) can be gathered, observed, shared, and 
studied by multiple individuals.  
 
6. Response: Scientific Evidence, Its Publicity, and Its Justifying Role 
Before I explain why I think that the internalist can account for the publicity of scientific 
evidence, I'm going argue that Kelly's view on the matter is problematic insofar as the picture 
of scientific evidence that it presents isn't epistemologically interesting. I take it that any 
epistemologically interesting theory of evidence must present it as something that makes an 
epistemic difference by rationalizing or justifying belief in certain inferentially supported 
propositions. However, this is precisely what Kelly's view fails to do. The problem, more 
specifically, is that if facts, understood as physical objects and the relations between them, are 
scientific evidence, then it is possible to have scientific evidence that doesn't make an 
epistemic difference since the evidence (contrary to what was established in section 2) needn't 
be in our cognitive possession. For example, there may some object—e.g., cells in a Petri 
dish, bone fragments, pieces of old parchment, etc.—on a table next to me, but that is not in 
itself sufficient to justify me (or anyone else) in believing any propositions. There may thus 
be a sense in which the object counts as “evidence” (or something approximating evidence)—
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after all, a colleague may tell you to “look at the evidence gathered on the table next to 
you”—but it isn't evidence in any epistemologically interesting sense. A similar point is also 
made by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, who write as follows about the view that facts are 
evidence: 
Suppose that some factor, S, is scientific evidence, for some condition, C. . . [O]ne can 
[then] have scientific evidence without having any reason at all to believe what that 
scientific evidence supports. . . More generally, something can be scientific evidence 
for a proposition without being justifying evidence for that proposition. Justifying 
evidence is by itself a reason for belief, something one could in principle cite as a 
justifying basis for belief. (Conee & Feldman, 2008, 84-85.)
42
 
So if we allow facts (in Kelly's sense) to function as scientific evidence, then it becomes 
possible to have evidence that doesn't have any rational or justificatory force.
43
 
This, however, is a problem that neither the internalist nor the externalist need be 
burdened with. Both kinds of view can account for the fact that we somehow need to be in 
cognitive possession of our evidence. Consider, for example, Williamson's E= K thesis again. 
According to it, only a proper subset of the true propositions is evidence. What is required in 
order for a true proposition to function as evidence is that it is grasped in the right sort of way, 
or, in other words, that it is known. And knowing a proposition to be true is clearly sufficient 
in order to possess that proposition as justifying evidence. Similarly, the internalist can also 
satisfy the possession requirement by, for example, claiming that only propositions that are 
the contents of some of our attitudes (e.g., our beliefs or experiences) can function as 
justifying evidence. The propositions, according to the internalist, will not necessarily all be 
true, but, as we saw above, this shouldn't stop them from having justificatory force. Our 
evidence, scientific and other, can include false propositions. 
Now, having argued that Kelly's view fails to be epistemologically interesting insofar 
as it counts as scientific evidence factors that need not make an epistemic difference when it 
comes to which propositions we have justification to believe,
44
 and that this is a problem 
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 Cf. Lyons (2016, 1058): “In order for e to serve as evidence for S that p, the evidence must be taken in by S, 
and done so in a way that allows S to in some sense appreciate its evidential significance vis-à-vis p. . . Even if 
there is some sense in which beliefs are indirectly based on—and justified in virtue of being based on—
extramental facts, this is only ever true in virtue of their being more proximately based on some mental state.” 
43
 A similar counterargument against the view that one's evidence is comprised of objects or states of affairs is 
offered by Neta (2008, 98-99). 
44
 Or the degree to which we have justification to believe them. 
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which neither internalists nor externalists must face, I will now explain why standard 
internalist and externalist views can account for the public character of scientific evidence. If 
it thus turns out that Kelly's view faces problems that other internalist and externalist views 
don't face, while the latter views also can account for the publicity of scientific evidence, then 
we will have good reason to reject Kelly's view in favor of the less problematic 
internalist/externalist views. Let me begin by pointing out two different ways in which 
scientific evidence appears to be public. On the one hand, scientific evidence appears to be the 
kind of thing that typically is shared between multiple individuals in scientific books and 
journals, and at conferences and symposia. On the other hand, scientific evidence also appears 
to be sharable, perhaps in a more direct sense, by multiple individuals making the same 
observations or that are involved in the same experiments. It seems to me that Kelly's view is 
able to account for the latter kind of publicity, but not the former, whereas there are internalist 
and externalist alternatives that are able to account for both kinds. Let me explain more 
precisely why I think that is so. 
If scientific evidence consists of physical objects and the states of affairs in which they 
figure, as Kelly would have it, then there is a straightforward sense in which scientists and 
researchers making observations (or that are involved in experiments) share the same 
evidence. It is after all the same objects or states of affairs that are responsible for their 
observations and experimental results. The scientists literally share the same scientific 
evidence since they make observations on the basis of the same facts (as Kelly understands 
the term). However, when we consider the way in which scientific evidence typically is 
shared in scientific books and journals, or at conferences and symposia, Kelly's view appears 
to be in trouble. For how can it be that physical objects or states of affairs literally are shared 
in journals or at conferences? There doesn't appear to be any straightforward sense in which 
this is possible. Indeed, it seems that the evidence that is provided in such fora is 
characteristically unlike the physical objects and states of affairs that are being researched.
45
  
In contrast to Kelly's position, however, internalist and externalist views according to 
which our evidence consists of propositions that are the contents of (some of) our attitudes 
can easily account for the way in which scientific evidence typically is shared in journals and 
                                                          
45
 As Peter Pagin and Staffan Carlshamre have pointed out to me, Kelly might respond by claiming that his view 
can account for the kind of evidence-sharing that goes on in scientific journals since scientists communicate 
propositions that represent the evidence, when the same propositions are entertained by different scientists. 
However, I don't think that this is an available line of response since Kelly seems to want to say that it is the 
evidence itself which literally must be sharable—not that propositional representations of the evidence must be 
sharable.  
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at conferences.
46
 Such fora allow for intersubjective dissemination and appreciation of 
scientific evidence through testimony that usually is offered in the form of written or spoken 
words, or figures, graphs, models, or illustrations. Thus, testimonially transferred propositions 
become a source of scientific justification and knowledge of (other) inferentially supported 
propositions by functioning as evidence for them.
47
 But what about the other way in which 
scientific evidence typically is shared—by different individuals making the same 
observations? According to the internalist and externalist views under consideration, the 
observations in question will have propositional content that can be shared by different 
scientists and researchers making the (qualitatively) same (but numerically different) 
observations. On these views, it is such evidentially significant propositions that naturally are 
shared and which eventually, if all goes well, make their way into journals or books, and that 
are presented at conferences or symposia. 
It thus seems that there are internalist and externalist alternatives that fare better than 
Kelly's view, both when it comes to accounting for the publicity of scientific evidence and the 
justifying role it plays. But what about the internalism-externalism distinction itself? Does, for 
example, Williamson's E = K thesis provide a better explanation of our conception of 
scientific evidence than internalism? I think not. The reason: not only do we refer to internal 
states (or their propositional content) as scientific evidence, but (at times) we also rely on 
theories and models that, strictly speaking, are false, but which nevertheless function as 
evidence for various hypotheses and scientifically informed beliefs.
48
 I therefore think that a 
more plausible (and moderate) externalist view says that some, but not all, scientific evidence 
is provided by our knowledge. This kind of externalist view will not only be able to account 
for our use of false models and the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, but to 
account for its publicity and justifying role as well. 
But this, however, still doesn't help us much when it comes to the internalism-
externalism distinction itself. Isn't it still the case that our conception of scientific evidence 
supports externalism rather than internalism, you may ask. If the arguments above are sound, 
then that would be a premature conclusion. Indeed, the goal of this paper has been to show 
that, contrary to what many epistemologists and philosophers of science assume, 
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 Cf. the quoted passage by Williamson (2000, 193) above. 
47
 Strictly speaking, figures, graphs, models, and illustrations are not necessarily propositional. But neither are 
strings of words. Moreover, just as strings of words often do facilitate transmission of (evidentially significant) 
propositions, so do figures, graphs, models, and illustrations. 
48
 Cf. Section 4. 
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considerations of scientific evidence do not clearly support either position. More specifically, 
the way in which we talk about scientific evidence seems to support a moderate version of 
externalism, according to which both internal states and external factors (like known 
propositions) can provide scientific evidence. However, by reflecting on deception scenarios 
it seems intuitive that only internal states can provide such evidence. I therefore suspect that 
the internalism-externalism debate won't be resolved until the parties agree (at least to a larger 
extent than what currently is the case) on more fundamental methodological issues about the 
epistemic significance of our philosophical intuitions and of our talk about epistemic 
concepts, like evidence and reason. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have presented and responded to two arguments from the literature to the 
effect that internalism cannot account for our conception of scientific evidence. The first 
argument is offered (or hinted at) by Williamson, and it claims that the E = K thesis (in 
contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the fact that scientists appear to 
argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) that are common knowledge among the 
members of the scientific community. In response, I showed that the E = K thesis isn't 
supported by the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to 
account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified 
scientific belief in the history of science. The second argument is offered by Kelly (for 
example), and it claims that only externalism is suited to account for the public character of 
scientific evidence. In response, I argued that there are internalist views that can account for 
the publicity of scientific evidence, and that those views indeed do better in that regard than 
the (externalist) view proposed by Kelly. 
The internalism-externalism debate has been raging for almost half a century, and 
there have been many arguments hoping to sway the opposing party to their own side. Some 
of the arguments that often are thought to provide a very strong case for externalism focus on 
our conception of scientific evidence. In this paper, I have argued that those arguments fail to 
provide the dialectical upper hand to externalism. Instead, it appears that the dialectical force 
which the various arguments in debate have—including those that focus on scientific 
evidence—are hostage to disagreement about deeper methodological issues. Arguably, the 
most important lesson we can learn from the decades of debate is that fundamental 
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philosophical disputes—like the internalism-externalism dispute—will not be resolved until (a 
larger amount of) agreement is reached between the parties about the epistemic significance 
of intuition, the way in which we usually talk about various concepts, and our common sense 
conceptions themselves. Although considerations of scientific evidence are unlikely to settle 
the internalism-externalism debate in the near future, it may do so given that the proper 
amount of attention and study is devoted to the deeper methodological issues that separate its 
disputants.   
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Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification 
 
 
 
 
1. Internalism and Externalism about Testimonial Justification 
Epistemic internalists claim that facts about justification depend upon one’s internal reasons. 
The traditional way of unpacking the notion of internal reasons is to say that one’s internal 
reasons are one’s a priori accessible reasons—where a priori is used in the narrow or 
traditional sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of the sense 
modalities.
1
 Thus, the modes of a priori accessibility include not only reflection and 
reasoning, but also introspection and other cognitive mechanisms with an experiential aspect. 
And, in this way, internalists emphasize the epistemic importance of one’s subjective point of 
view on the world. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, 
they deny that only internal or a priori accessible reasons can have justificatory relevance. 
Instead, they think that facts about reliability, factive mental states, or other conditions that 
are external to one’s subjective point of view can make a justificatory difference.  
The internalism–externalism debate has recently made its mark on the epistemology of 
testimony. Consider, for example, someone telling you that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle is the 
author of Sherlock Holmes, or that the New York Public Library has more than 50 million 
items. A significant number of the beliefs we hold come from assertions like these.
2
 
Assertions present propositions that the speaker represents as being true, and that a hearer 
under the right conditions can get knowledge or justified beliefs from. The epistemology of 
testimony is about how we should evaluate such beliefs under different conditions. According 
to the internalist about testimonial justification, the following thesis is true: 
                                                          
1
 For a discussion of the distinction between narrow and broad notions of the a priori, see Casullo (2003, Ch. 2). 
2
 I will only focus what Coady (1992) calls natural testimony. Natural testimony, unlike formal testimony which 
can be found in, for example, the courtroom, "is to be encountered in such everyday circumstances as exhibit the 
'social operations of mind': giving someone directions to the post office, reporting what happened in an accident, 
saying that, yes, you have seen a child answering to that description, telling someone the result of the last race of 
the last cricket score" (Coady, 1992, 38). 
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TJ Internalism: A hearer’s testimonial justification for believing that p supervenes 
upon his internal reasons for thinking that the speaker’s testimony that p is true.3  
TJ internalists thus think that testimonial justification has its primary source in the hearer, 
rather than the speaker. Moreover, as formulated above, TJ internalism entails the following 
thesis about the justificatory status of internal duplicates: 
Duplicates: If any two hearers are the same with respect to their internal reasons for 
thinking that a speaker’s testimony that p is true, then they are the same with respect to 
testimonial justification for believing that p. 
Externalists about testimonial justification, however, reject TJ internalism, instead claiming 
that conditions that are external to the hearer’s subjective point of view can make a difference 
with respect to his testimonial justification.
4
 
In this paper, I will argue for TJ internalism and defend it against recent objections. 
First, I will present an argument providing intuitive support for the view that only internal 
reasons can make a difference with respect to testimonial justification. Having thus motivated 
TJ internalism, I will defend it against three objections recently offered by Stephen Wright.
5
 
The upshot of my discussion will be that externalist conditions do make an epistemic 
difference when it comes to our testimonial beliefs, but that they cannot make any difference 
with respect to their justificatory status—i.e., they are justificationally irrelevant. 
This is how the paper is structured. Section 2 presents an argument in favor of TJ 
internalism. Sections 3, 4, and 5 respond to three objections recently offered by Wright. 
Section 6 comments on Wright’s criticism of Jennifer Lackey, arguing that he either must 
accept TJ internalism or an externalist position similar to Lackey’s. Section 7 concludes. 
 
                                                          
3
 Proponents of TJ internalism include Fricker (1994; 2006); Fumerton (2006); Lehrer (2006); and Madison 
(2016). Moreover, there are different views about what having internal reasons for considering the speaker's 
testimony true amounts to. Some, like Lyons (1997), Adler (2002), and Shogenji (2006), believe that the reasons 
must support the general trustworthiness of the testifier, while others, like Fricker (1994; 1995), Malmgren 
(2006), and Lipton (2007), believe that the reasons must support the testifier's trustworthiness in the particular 
case is question. 
4
 Proponents of TJ externalism include Lackey (2008); Sosa (2010); Faulkner (2011); and Wright (2016a; 
2016b). 
5
 Wright (2016a; 2016b) actually offers arguments for externalism about testimonial justification, but for the 
present purpose his arguments can be formulated as objections to the argument of this text without omitting any 
of his central points. 
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2. The Argument 
I will begin by presenting a scenario that will serve as the basis for an argument for TJ 
internalism. The scenario considers a pair of epistemic agents that are duplicates with respect 
to their internal reasons, but that differ with respect to external conditions, such as reliability 
and truth. And by evaluating the epistemic positions of both agents, the scenario provides the 
intuitive basis for an inference to the best explanation saying that the character of justification 
is epistemically internal. The argument's general structure is familiar from the internalism-
externalism debate,
6
 but has had less impact on the epistemology of testimony.
7
 The scenario 
I will consider is as follows. 
Trustworthy and Untrustworthy College 
Consider two ten-year-old epistemic agents, Barry and Larry, who are duplicates with 
respect to their internal reasons. Barry and Larry go to different, but subjectively 
indistinguishable, boarding schools. Barry goes to Trustworthy College and Larry to 
Untrustworthy College. Both Trustworthy College and Untrustworthy College are 
devoted to teaching its students how things really are with respect to traditional core 
subjects, like history and geography. The professors at the schools try their best to be 
honest and trustworthy, and they never intend to deceive their students. Moreover, 
both schools teach its students the same things; which is to say that the propositional 
content of the professors' testimonies at the two schools are the same. However, the 
schools are situated in different environments. In the environment in which 
Trustworthy College is situated, the propositional content of the professors' 
testimonies almost always turn out to be true. But in the environment in which 
Untrustworthy College is situated, the propositional content of the professors' 
testimonies usually turn out to be false. As a consequence, most of Barry's testimonial 
beliefs are true, whereas most of Larry's testimonial beliefs are false. However, despite 
the difference in their track records, the professors at the two schools seem to be, from 
the students' subjective point of view, equally trustworthy; they are all regarded as 
knowledgeable and well-informed with respect to their respective areas of expertise. 
Now, let's evaluate Barry and Larry's epistemic positions. First, it is clear that there is 
a difference between them. Whereas Barry's testimonial beliefs are highly reliable and almost 
all true, Larry's testimonial beliefs are generally unreliable. When Barry forms beliefs based 
                                                          
6
 The locus classicus being Lehrer and Cohen's (1983) New Evil Demon Problem for reliabilism. 
7
 A notable exception is Gerken (2013). 
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on the testimonies of his professors, his beliefs represent his environment in a truth-conducive 
manner. But when Larry does the same, his beliefs usually misrepresent his environment. 
Following a recent trend in epistemology, we can define epistemic entitlement as a condition 
that (primarily) turns on the reliability or truth-conduciveness of one's doxastic dispositions in 
one's normal environment.
8
 A natural way of conceptualizing the difference between Barry 
and Larry's epistemic positions is then to say that Barry's beliefs are entitled, whereas Larry's 
beliefs either are entitled to a much lower degree or, even worse, not entitled at all.  
A second difference between Barry and Larry is that Barry appears to get a lot of 
knowledge by relying on the testimonies of his professors. The professors at Trustworthy 
College undoubtedly know a lot about their respective areas of expertise. And the internal 
reasons Barry has for trusting his professors appear to facilitate transmission of much of this 
knowledge, via their testimonies, to him. Larry, on the other hand, appears to get very little 
knowledge by relying on the testimonies of his professors—even when what they say actually 
turns out to be true. The professors at Untrustworthy College are simply too unreliable and 
insensitive with respect to the facts about their (so-called) areas of expertise. Following Alvin 
Plantinga (1993), we can define epistemic warrant as the condition(s) that turns true belief 
into knowledge.
9
 Another natural way of conceptualizing the difference between Barry and 
Larry's epistemic positions is then to say that Barry's beliefs (often) are warranted, whereas 
Larry's beliefs usually aren't. 
However, despite the differences in their epistemic positions, there also seems to be 
something they have in common that speaks in favor of them. Both Barry and Larry’s 
testimonial beliefs are supported by their internal reasons, and, as a consequence, they appear 
to be equally justified. After all, as far as the students are concerned, the schools are 
indistinguishable in all the relevant ways. More specifically, from the students’ perspective, 
the professors at Untrustworthy College are no less trustworthy than the professors at 
Trustworthy College. And since the apparent trustworthiness of the professors at Trustworthy 
College seems to justify their students' testimonial beliefs, so does the apparent 
trustworthiness of the professors at Untrustworthy College seem to justify their students' 
testimonial beliefs. Indeed, despite the differences in entitlement and warrant, it seems that 
the justificatory status of Barry and Larry’s testimonial beliefs are the same as long as we 
                                                          
8
 See, e.g., Burge (2003); Graham (2010); and Gerken (2013). 
9
 Other epistemologists often use warrant as more or less synonymous with justification. However, for the 
present purpose, it will be useful to keep the notions separate. 
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hold fixed their internal reasons. And the best explanation for why this should be so is that the 
facts about which propositions one has testimonial justification to believe, and also the degree 
to which one has testimonial justification to believe them, supervene upon one’s internal 
reasons.
10
 By abductive reasoning we can therefore conclude that TJ internalism is true. 
To further support this argument, consider a similar scenario, but where Barry is 
transported from Trustworthy College to Untrustworthy College in the middle of the night 
while he is fast asleep. Unbeknown to himself, when Barry wakes up he finds himself at 
Untrustworthy College. Moreover, since the two schools are, from the students’ point of view, 
indistinguishable, Barry continues to believe that he is at Trustworthy College; as far as he 
can tell, there is nothing indicating that he isn’t or that his judgment is compromised. 
However, after a certain amount of time, Untrustworthy College becomes Barry’s new normal 
environment.
11
 As a result, the new (testimonial) beliefs he forms by relying on the 
testimonies of his professors are no longer reliable or truth-conducive. Although his new 
testimonial beliefs appear to be just as true as his earlier ones, most of them are in fact false. 
Now, it is quite clear that Barry’s new testimonial beliefs, in contrast to his earlier 
ones, neither are warranted nor entitled (to the same degree); his doxastic dispositions are 
simply not reliable or sensitive enough with respect to the facts about his new environment. 
However, his new testimonial beliefs appear to be just as justified as his earlier ones. After all, 
for all that he, or anyone else in his epistemic position, knows, Barry still finds himself at 
Trustworthy College where the professors are trustworthy. So, once again, it appears that the 
justificatory status of his testimonial beliefs turns on his internal reasons for believing that 
what the professors say is true.  
In order to see this more clearly, it is enough to point out that Barry in the second 
scenario has gone from the same position that he was in in the first scenario to the position 
that Larry was in. Moreover, according to Duplicates, which follows from TJ internalism, all 
internal duplicates are justificatory duplicates. And since Barry and Larry are internal 
duplicates, the testimonial beliefs Barry acquires at Untrustworthy College are no less 
justified than those he acquired at Trustworthy College. TJ Internalism thus appears to 
                                                          
10
 Internalists take it to be the best explanation because it is the explanation that is most virtuous. For example, it 
is very simple, and it provides a unified explanation that doesn't only account for the Trustworthy and 
Untrustworthy College scenario, but also has the power to generalize to other scenarios as well. 
11
 For more on the notion of one’s normal environment, see Gerken (2013, 543-544). 
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provide a simple and natural—indeed, I claim, the best—explanation for the intuitions elicited 
by the scenarios above. 
However, scenarios like these and the arguments they support are not without its 
critics. In a couple of recent papers, Wright has presented three objections with the purpose of 
undermining TJ internalism. In the next three sections, I will defend the argument above 
against them.
12
 
 
3. The Objection from Lack of Warrant 
The first two objections have also been responded to by Brent Madison (2016). For that 
reason, I will not spend too much time defending my argument against them. However, since 
I suspect that many externalists about testimonial justification share some of the concerns that 
Wright's first two objections raise when it comes to TJ internalism, it will be useful to 
demonstrate why they fail to undermine it. 
Plausibly, there exists some sort of necessary connection between justification and 
knowledge.
13
 According to Wright (2016b, 75), "justification is that which puts someone in a 
position to know things." Without providing us with any more detail, this presumably means 
that justification is warrant—i.e., it is whatever condition(s) that is required in order to turn 
true belief into knowledge.
14
 Now, with this claim in place, Wright considers a couple of 
scenarios similar to Trustworthy and Untrustworthy College—one of which is inspired by 
Frederick Schmitt (1999), and the other being Alvin Goldman's (1976) Fake Barns scenario—
and argues, as I also did above, that Barry and Larry's epistemic positions differ insofar as it is 
only Barry's testimonial beliefs that are warranted; that is, it is only he who is in a position to 
know that the contents of his professors' testimonies are true. And since warrant and 
justification is the same epistemic property, it therefore follows that only Barry has 
                                                          
12
 Externalists have offered many different responses to the traditional internalist argument that relies on 
intuitions elicited by Lehrer and Cohen's New Evil Demon Scenario. Although these responses cannot be 
ignored, they will not be the focus of this paper. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, they have been responded 
to in detailed manners before (see, e.g., Littlejohn (2012, introduction; and Egeland (forthcoming)); and 
secondly, I think the more novel externalists responses, like those of Wright, deserve their own hearing. 
13
 However, no philosophical position is immune from dissent. For example, Alston (1989) and Foley (1993) 
deny that justification is necessary for knowledge. 
14
 Indeed, this is what Wright appears to have in mind. He makes the statement above just after discussing 
Goldman's (1976) Fake Barns scenario, in which Henry (the person driving in fake barns country) fails to know 
that the barn he's seeing is real. And, as Wright makes clear, it is "in the same way" that Henry's true belief that 
the particular barn he's looking at is real fails to constitute knowledge that it also fails to be justified. See Wright 
(2016b, 75-76). It is for this reason that I think Wright's position plausibly can be reconstructed as saying that 
justification is Plantinga-warrant. 
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testimonial justification for his beliefs—despite the fact that Barry and Larry are stipulated to 
be duplicates with respect to their internal reasons. Hence, since Duplicates, which follows 
from TJ internalism, is false, so is TJ internalism. 
There is, however, a problem with this particular objection. Without providing any 
motivation for his claim that justification is warrant, the idea that Barry's testimonial beliefs 
are justified whereas Larry's aren't because only Barry's testimonial beliefs are warranted begs 
the question against the proponent of TJ internalism. The reason is simply that Wright 
assumes, without argument, that justification is an externalist notion (i.e., that it is the same as 
warrant).
15
 But the internalist can of course adopt a different theory of justification, one that 
doesn't presuppose the necessity of any externalist conditions. Indeed, not only is the 
internalist free to adopt an alternative view of justification, but there are also strong reasons 
for why he shouldn't adopt Wright's view. For example, by claiming that justification is 
warrant, Wright is committed to the view that justified true belief is sufficient for knowledge. 
However, as Madison (2016, 747) rightfully points out, in the aftermath of Edmund Gettier's 
(1963) counterexamples, it is clear that the tripartite analysis of knowledge intuitively fails.
16
 
We therefore have good reason to reject Wright's claim that justification is warrant, and with 
it the claim that Barry and Larry differ in terms of testimonial justification too.  
 
4. The Objection from Lack of Epistemic Value 
However, according to Wright, responding to the objection from lack of warrant in the 
manner above by denying that justification is warrant reveals another problem with TJ 
internalism. In the same paper, he tells us that maintaining that Barry and Larry's testimonial 
beliefs are equally justified despite their difference in warrant "amounts to a serious 
concession from the internalist, however, since it devalues justification, as internalists 
conceive of it, detaching it from knowledge." (Wright, 2016b, 73, footnote 10.) In other 
words, Wright thinks that if we deny that justification is warrant, thereby also denying that 
justification, together with true belief, is sufficient for knowledge, justification appears to lose 
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 If my reconstruction of Wright position somehow misses its mark, I still think his objection ends up begging 
the question insofar as it begins from the assumption that "justification is that which puts someone in a position 
to know", which clearly is an externalist condition. 
16
 An obvious reply Wright could make is of course that by stipulating that justification is warrant, the traditional 
justified true belief analysis of knowledge becomes true since warranted true belief by definition is sufficient for 
knowledge. However, a worry with this reply is that it doesn't really get at what we want to say that the notion of 
justification involves. The view under consideration can thus avoid Gettier cases, but only by trading in our 
traditional concept of justification for a rather uninteresting one. 
184 
 
the epistemic value that we (intuitively) want to accord it. After all, why should we care more 
about having justified true beliefs than mere true beliefs if the former isn't sufficient for 
knowledge?  
As far as I can see, there is only one reason why one might think that denying Wright's 
view of justification automatically devalues it, and it is as follows. If you are a monist about 
epistemic value, thinking that only knowledge is of intrinsic epistemic importance, then 
justification might appear to become trivial unless it is sufficient for turning true belief into 
knowledge. Then, and only then, does justification have instrumental epistemic value as a 
means to knowledge—the only epistemic property that is valuable in and of itself—or so it 
might be argued.
17
 
However, there are a couple of problems with this kind of objection. First, the 
internalist isn't committed to the view that the value of epistemic justification is exhausted by 
the fact that it is a means to knowledge. Alternatively, the internalist can argue that 
justification either has instrumental value insofar as it is means to satisfying some other 
(epistemic) property besides knowledge, or that it has value in and of itself. And, moreover, 
both these views can be found in the literature. Let me give a couple of examples. On the one 
hand, Declan Smithies (2015) supports the first kind of view and argues that justification has 
instrumental value insofar as it is means to having beliefs that are stable under rational 
reflection, and that being able to have beliefs that are stable under rational reflection is the 
sine qua non of being a person, which is of intrinsic value. On the other hand, Madison 
(2017) supports the second kind of view and argues, using Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen’s 
(1983) New Evil Demon scenario, that we have good reason to believe that justification is 
valuable in and of itself, for its own sake. So, in other words, there is no reason—at least not 
any that Wright provides us with—why the internalist should endorse the view that 
justification only has instrumental value and that this value is exhausted as a means to 
knowledge. 
Second, another problem with the objection from lack of epistemic value is that it 
assumes that the internalist, by denying that justification is warrant, somehow “detaches” 
justification from knowledge (in a way that devalues it). But this, however, need not be the 
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 Questions about the value of being in certain epistemic positions are increasingly being discussed by 
epistemologists. Here, I simply want to point out the kind of view about the value of justification that Wright’s 
objection appears to presuppose. In my response to this objection, I don’t commit myself to any specific position 
on the issue, but rather point to a couple of views held by others. For more detailed discussions of epistemic 
value, see Haddock et al., (2009).  
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case. The proponent of TJ internalism can affirm that justification is connected with 
knowledge because it is a necessary condition of it (Cf. Madison, 2016, 747-748). Indeed, not 
only is this the standard internalist view,
18
 it also doesn’t devalue justification. As we saw in 
the previous paragraph, one can maintain that justification is necessary for knowledge and 
also claim that it either is of instrumental value as a means to satisfying some other 
(epistemic) property besides knowledge, or that it is of intrinsic epistemic value. For these 
two reasons, Wright’s second objection therefore fails to undermine TJ internalism as it relies 
on implausible or unmotivated assumptions.
19
 
 
5. The Objection from Circular Testimony 
The third objection Wright offers does, at least to my mind, pose a much bigger threat to TJ 
internalism. In a different paper, Wright (2016a) argues that there are scenarios involving 
circular testimony where the internalist is committed to saying that circular testimony, 
contrary to intuition, generates justification. And since the intuitions elicited by cases of 
circular testimony (sometimes) speak against TJ internalism, the argument from section 2 fails 
to provide sufficient support for it. 
Testimonial chains can be circular. This happens whenever you have an epistemic 
agent a, who tells something to another agent b, who then tells that same (or a relevantly 
similar) thing to c, who then tells that same (or a relevantly similar) thing to . . . n, who then 
tells that same (or a relevantly similar) thing to a. Let’s call this an instance of circular 
testimony or, more specifically, an n-sized circular testimonial chain. Now, Wright thinks 
there are cases of circular testimony that threaten TJ internalism. Consider the following 
scenario: 
CIRCLE 
                                                          
18
 Some, like Poston (IEP article) and McEvoy (2005), claim that internalists are committed to the view that 
justification, as they understand it, is necessary for knowledge.  Although I cannot think of any internalists who 
would say that you can have knowledge without justification, it doesn’t seem like something they’re committed 
to. For example, an internalist can claim that facts about justification supervene upon one’s internal reasons, but 
that whether or not one’s beliefs are justified doesn’t have any bearing on whether or not they constitute 
knowledge. 
19
 Again, if my reconstruction of Wright's second objection is inaccurate insofar as he doesn't really think that 
justification is Plantinga-warrant (but rather some other externalist condition), I still think that my response goes 
through. The internalist can still claim that justification isn't detached from knowledge since it is a necessary 
condition of it, and that justification either is of instrumental value insofar as it is means to satisfying some other 
(epistemic) property besides knowledge, or that it has value in and of itself. 
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Agatha looks across the street from her house and comes to believe that the building 
opposite, which she recognizes as Jesus College, is on fire. She telephones her friend 
Francesca to tell her the news. Francesca unhesitatingly believes Agatha and then tells 
this to her friend Anna, though since Anna does not know the college, Francesca 
describes the building and its location to Anna who in turn unhesitatingly texts this 
information to Stacy. Stacy is friends with Anna and unhesitatingly believes her. She 
is also friends with Agatha and realizes that the building in question is Jesus College. 
Stacy telephones Agatha and tells her that Jesus College is on fire. (Wright, 2016a, 
2033.) 
CIRCLE presents us with an instance of circular testimony—or a 4-sized circular 
testimonial chain—where Agatha hears from Stacy that Jesus College is on fire. However, 
according to Wright, since Agatha is responsible for both initiating and terminating the circle, 
intuitively, she does not receive any testimonial justification for her belief that the college is 
on fire. Although her belief presumably already is justified by her visual experience, the fact 
that Stacy tells her that the college is on fire does not further add to the justification of 
Agatha’s belief. 
Yet, Wright does not think that all cases of circular testimony fail to generate 
justification. There must, he thinks, be some other condition that together with the fact that 
Agatha both initiates and terminates the circle is sufficient for inhibiting the generation of 
testimonial justification. To indicate what this further condition is, he has us consider the 
following variation on the first scenario: 
CIRCLE* 
Agatha looks across the street from her house and comes to believe that the building 
opposite, which she recognizes as Jesus College, is on fire. She telephones her friend 
Francesca to tell her the news. Francesca reflects carefully on the likelihood of Agatha 
being insincere or mistaken and having done so, come to believe what Agatha says 
and then tells this to her friend Anna, though since Anna does not know the college, 
Francesca describes the building and its location to Anna who in turn considers 
carefully the possibility of Francesca’s testimony being false before texting this 
information to Stacy. Stacy is friends with Anna and carefully considers the 
plausibility of Anna’s claim before deciding to believe her. She is also friends with 
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Agatha and realizes that the house in question is Jesus College. Stacy telephones 
Agatha and tells her that Jesus College is on fire. (Wright, 2016a, 2034.) 
Intuitively, Wright thinks that Agatha does receive justification from Stacy’s 
testimony in CIRCLE*—or at the very least he is open to the possibility. What differentiates 
the two scenarios and makes it the case that only the former kind of circular testimony fails to 
generate justification is that the listeners in CIRCLE unhesitatingly believe what they’re told. 
In CIRCLE*, however, the listeners critically reflect on the plausibility of what they hear, 
which opens for the possibility that their testimonies can add to the justification of Agatha’s 
belief. This is how Wright puts it: 
The important difference between the CIRCLE case and the CIRCLE* case is that, in 
the former, each of the listeners believes what she is told unhesitatingly, whereas in 
the latter case, each listener reflects carefully on the plausibility of what the speaker 
says before coming to believe it. In the latter case, it might well be plausible to think 
that the internalist claim that Agatha’s overall justification can be enhanced at the end 
of the case might well be the correct one. The idea is that, since the statement that 
Jesus College is on fire seems plausible to multiple individuals who are independently 
using their critical faculties, this might make them sensitive to more error possibilities 
and this might make it intuitive that there’s additional justification at the end of the 
chain. Indeed, this may be the case if just one listener responds by using her critical 
faculties. (Wright, 2016a, 2034.) 
According to Wright, all cases of circular testimony where the listeners unhesitatingly 
believe what they are told therefore fail to generate justification. Thus, CIRCLE, but not 
CIRCLE*, is analogous to the following case where a piece of information uncritically is 
passed along to an agent: 
INSTRUMENTS 
Charlie is attempting to monitor the temperature of some liquid in a glass. He is using 
two instruments to do this. One gives a reading on a screen and the other gives a 
reading on a gauge. Both instruments indicate that the temperature of the liquid is 19 
°C. Unbeknownst to Charlie, however, the instruments have been set up in such a way 
that the screen isn’t in connected directly to the liquid in any way, but just corresponds 
to what the gauge says. (Wright, 2016a, 2036.) 
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In both cases a source of information (Stacy’s testimony in Circle and the screen in 
INSTRUMENTS) is dependent on another source (Agatha’s perception in CIRCLE and the 
gauge in INSTRUMENTS), and uncritically passes the information to an epistemic agent. 
However, since any case of circular testimony where the listeners (or receivers of 
information) unhesitatingly (or uncritically) respond to what they are told (or informed about) 
fails to generate justification, neither Stacy’s testimony nor the screen does anything for 
Agatha or Charlie’s belief. 
Now, the reason Wright thinks this is problematic for internalism is that if TJ 
internalism is true, then Agatha’s belief in CIRCLE does receive justification from Stacy’s 
testimony. Since Stacy’s testimony adds to Agatha’s internal reasons for thinking that Jesus 
College is on fire, it should provide testimonial justification to her belief in that proposition. 
However, intuitively, it does not. Since the listeners in CIRCLE unhesitatingly believe what 
they’re told, Agatha cannot receive justification from Stacy’s testimony. 20, 21 
I will respond by denying that the CIRCLE scenario makes it intuitively plausible that 
Agatha doesn’t receive testimonial justification, instead of failing to receive (or increase) 
some other epistemic property. To see how exactly this response goes, consider the CIRCLE 
scenario again. If we evaluate Agatha’s epistemic position at the end of the scenario, it is clear 
that there are several ways in which it is the same or worse than it was at the beginning of the 
scenario. For example, on the one hand, her belief that Jesus College is on fire is no more 
warranted after listening to Stacy’s testimony. If Agatha’s visual experience somehow fails to 
put her in a position to know that the school is on fire, then listening to Stacy’s testimony 
doesn’t all of a sudden put her in a position to know that it is. Moreover, on the other hand, 
her belief that Jesus College is on fire is no more entitled after listening to Stacy’s testimony. 
Quite to the contrary, it might actually make it less entitled; the reason being that beliefs 
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 Formulated in this manner, Wright's objection isn't, strictly speaking, sound. The reason is that even though 
Stacy's testimony adds to Agatha's internal reasons or states, it doesn't follow, according to internalism, that it 
provides testimonial justification to her belief in the proposition that Jesus College is on fire. For all that 
internalism tells us, one's internal reasons provide the supervenience base of justification; it does not tell us 
anything about which internal reasons or states are justification-conferring. So it is open for the internalist to 
adopt the position that Stacy's testimony doesn't provide Agatha with the right kind of internal reason/state that 
would be required if her belief was to become more justified. However, since I do think that Stacy's testimony 
provides Agatha with an internal justification-conferring reason, I won't pursue this line of response any further. 
21
 Wright’s worry can also be raised as an objection to Duplicates. Agatha, as he sees it, doesn’t receive any 
justification from Stacy’s testimony. However, the Agatha in CIRCLE*—let’s call her Agatha*—does (or at the 
very least might) receive justification from Stacy’s testimony even though they are duplicates with respect to 
their internal reasons. As Wright points out, this is because the hearers in CIRCLE* critically reflect on the 
plausibility of what they hear, whereas the hearers in CIRCLE uncritically accept what they hear. Agatha and 
Agatha* are therefore alike with respect to internal reasons, but not alike with respect to testimonial justification. 
Hence, since Duplicates, which follows from TJ internalism, is false, so is TJ internalism.  
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formed on the basis of visual experiences might actually be more reliable than beliefs formed 
on the basis of visual experiences and circular testimony where the listeners unhesitatingly 
believe what they hear.
22
 Indeed, there appears to be several ways in which Agatha’s 
epistemic position either stays the same or worsens in CIRCLE.  
However, there is also a way in which her epistemic position appears to improve. 
After all, Stacy’s testimony (despite its circular character) does provide Agatha with an 
(additional) internal reason for believing that Jesus College is on fire. And since there is 
nothing in the CIRCLE scenario that tells us otherwise, we can account for the presence of 
this reason by claiming that it adds to Agatha’s justification. The proponent of TJ internalism 
is therefore free to say that the circular testimony in CIRCLE does provide Agatha’s belief 
with testimonial justification, but that it fails to confer any warrant or entitlement upon it. 
Moreover, the same reply is also available in the INSTRUMENTS scenario. Clearly, the 
presence of the screen doesn’t confer any warrant or entitlement upon Charlie’s belief, even 
though it does contribute to its justification. 
Wright, however, recognizes this response, but thinks that it fails because the 
intuitions that CIRCLE elicits primarily are about Agatha’s epistemic position in general, and 
not just about justification. This is what he says: 
The trouble with this response is that the intuitive support for (1) [that there is no 
increase in Agatha’s overall justification] is stronger than the internalist response 
allows. It might be correct that there’s no specific intuition about justification that 
supports the claim that Agatha’s overall justificatory status isn’t enhanced and the end 
of the CIRCLE case. But the lack of such a specific intuition is of no help to internalist 
theories. When we are more precise about the intuition that CIRCLE brings about, we 
see that it is the following: 
(1*) Intuitively, there’s no overall improvement in Agatha’s epistemic standing in the 
CIRCLE case. . . 
                                                          
22
 In order for this to be the case the frequency with which beliefs based on visual experiences and circular 
testimony where the listeners unhesitatingly believe what they're told turn out to be true must be lower than the 
frequency with which beliefs based on visual experiences turn out to be true. We can easily provide an example 
where this is the case by imagining a world in which cases of circular testimony where the listeners 
unhesitatingly believe what they're told usually result in false beliefs (regardless of whether or not those beliefs 
also are based on visual experiences), whereas beliefs (only) based on visual experiences usually result in true 
beliefs. 
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The idea is that the intuition in (1*) creates trouble for internalist theories because it 
implies the truth of (1). The idea is that (1*) is a more general thesis than (1). (Wright, 
2016a, 2039.) 
Of course, Wright is correct when he claims that we do have certain intuitions about 
Agatha’s epistemic position. But (1*) is not one of them. Let me elaborate.  
First of all, most philosophers agree that Agatha's epistemic position changes when 
Stacy tells her that Jesus College is on fire; her testimony gives Agatha another internal 
reason for holding her belief. Wright can of course claim that Stacy's testimony doesn't 
change Agatha's epistemic position at all. However, Agatha plausibly comes to believe that a 
friend whom she considers trustworthy thinks that Jesus College is on fire when Stacy tells 
her that it is. Moreover, denying that this somehow changes Agatha's epistemic position 
would seem to involve a commitment to the view that Agatha's new belief cannot, in any 
sense, provide her with another reason to believe that the school is on fire. But this clearly 
seems to be false. Even though it might not provide her with an external or objective reason to 
hold that belief, it does provide her with an internal or subjective reason.
23
 So the question is 
whether or not this internal reason somehow improves her epistemic position. According to 
Wright, it doesn’t. Moreover, this is just an intuition with which everyone should agree, or so 
he claims. The problem, however, is that, uncontroversially, there are certain internalist 
conditions that supervene upon one's internal reasons and that do improve one's epistemic 
position. For example, internalists and externalists generally agree that epistemic 
blamelessness (or excusability) is an internalist epistemic property.
24, 25
 If, say, you are in a 
skeptical scenario where most or all of your beliefs about the external world are false, it can 
still be the case that those beliefs are blameless. If your internal reasons indicate that the 
world is different from how it really is, then you have an excuse which guarantees that beliefs 
properly based on those reasons are blameless—even though they might be radically 
unreliable. What's more, all else being equal, having blameless beliefs does constitute an 
                                                          
23
 For more on the distinction between objective and subjective reasons for belief, see Sepielli (forthcoming). 
24
 But every rule has its exceptions—at least in the philosophical dialectic. For example, Greco (2005) and 
Srinivasan (2015) claim that there are no interesting internalist properties or norms. However, they face several 
serious (and, I suspect, insurmountable) objections, the most obvious of which is that it clearly seems, intuitively 
speaking, that victims of paradigmatic skeptical scenarios do have something epistemically positive going for 
them. Other, more complex objections have also been developed. See, e.g., Schoenfield (2015). 
25
 Some internalists think that no sharp distinction can be drawn between justification and blamelessness. See, 
e.g., Ginet (1975); Chisholm (1989); and Bonjour (1985).  
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epistemic improvement over having blameworthy beliefs.
26
 Indeed, a common strategy used 
by epistemic externalists to argue that intuitions about Lehrer and Cohen's (1983) New Evil 
Demon Scenario fail to support internalism is to explain our dispositions to positively 
evaluate the victim's beliefs by saying that they are blameless but unjustified.
27
 So, in other 
words, there are internalist epistemic properties that do improve one's epistemic position, 
blamelessness being a case in point. And given that Stacy's testimony provides Agatha with 
another internal reason for believing that the school is on fire, Agatha's belief does become 
blameless to an even greater degree, thereby improving her epistemic position. Hence, (1*) is 
false and the motivation for (1) undermined. 
In sum, my response to the objection from circular testimony is that cases like 
CIRCLE and INSTRUMENTS don't reveal anything special about testimonial justification, 
rather than some other epistemic property. The internalist, in other words, is free to 
characterize Agatha as receiving testimonial justification, while failing to receive any 
entitlement or warrant. Moreover, as we've seen, Wright's counterargument that  
1. Agatha's epistemic position doesn't improve in the CIRCLE scenario. 
2. If Agatha's epistemic position doesn't improve in the CIRCLE scenario, then she 
doesn't receive any testimonial justification. 
3. Therefore, Agatha's doesn't receive any testimonial justification. 
fails since the first premise is false. Intuitively, there are internalist epistemic conditions, like 
blamelessness, that do improve Agatha's epistemic position. And given that Wright’s third 
objection against the argument from section 2 doesn’t succeed, TJ internalism remains well-
motivated. 
 
                                                          
26
 Once again, this claim can of course be contested, but only by failing to recognize or somehow contesting the 
epistemic force of internal or subjective reasons for belief. 
27
 See, e.g., Williamson (2007); Littlejohn (2009); and Pritchard (2012). A problem with this objection, however, 
is that it fails to recognize the way in which our intuitions about justification are sensitive to a distinction 
between beliefs that are false due to perceptual failings and beliefs that are false due to cognitive failings. For 
example, the victim of the New Evil Demon scenario has beliefs that are false due to perceptual failings (in the 
sense that his beliefs fail to adequately represent the environment he is situated in), but they still seem justified. 
On the other hand, if we imagine a similar victim but who also is subject to cognitive failings, like brainwashing 
or some reason-distorting drug he's been given, that makes him unable to form his beliefs by properly basing 
them on his perceptual evidence, then they don't seem justified. However, the beliefs of the second victim are 
clearly just as blameless as those of the first; both of them (let's stipulate) try their best to respect their evidence. 
Indeed, the difference between their epistemic positions seems to be a difference of justification. But this is not 
something the proponent of the objection above can acknowledge. As he would have it, both victims have beliefs 
that are blamelessly unjustified. For more on this problem, see Pryor (2001); Egeland (forthcoming); and 
Smithies (forthcoming). 
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6. Wright’s “Halfway Externalism” 
Having offered his objection from circular testimony against TJ internalism, Wright ends his 
(2016a) paper by trying to differentiate his views from the wholesale externalism of Jennifer 
Lackey. Lackey (2008) argues against TJ internalism
28
 by presenting a scenario purporting to 
elicit intuitions to the effect that reliable or truth-conducive testimony is a necessary condition 
for testimonial justification.
29
 Now, if her argument is sound, then it follows that a listener’s 
internal reasons alone never are sufficient for justifying belief in a speaker’s testimony; there 
is, as she points out, an additional “speaker-condition” on testimonial justification (Lackey, 
2008, 150).
30
 This, however, is highly problematic according to Wright. If Lackey is correct, 
then the internalist story is simply false: having internal reasons are never sufficient for 
having testimonial justification. But this, he thinks, amounts to radical skepticism when it 
comes to the epistemic importance of internal reasons. Instead, Wright claims that TJ 
internalism tells a true story about testimonial justification when it comes to certain cases, but 
that it isn’t the full story: 
                                                          
28
 More specifically, she argues against reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. However, since it is 
somewhat controversial how we should draw the reductionism/anti-reductionism distinction, and since 
internalism clearly also is one of the reductionist views her objection targets, I’ll simply, for the purpose of 
convenience, frame it as an objection against TJ internalism. 
29
 The scenario she presents, entitled NESTED SPEAKER, is as follows: 
Fred has known Helen for five years and, during this time, he has acquired excellent epistemic reasons 
for believing her to be a highly reliable source of information on a wide range of topics. For instance, 
each time she has made a personal or professional recommendation to Fred, her assessment has proven 
to be accurate; each time she has reported an incident to Fred, her version of the story has been 
independently confirmed; each time she has recounted historical information, all of the major historical 
texts and figures have fully supported her account, and so on. Yesterday, Helen told Fred that Pauline, a 
close friend of hers, is a highly trustworthy person, especially when it comes to information regarding 
wild birds. Because of this, Fred unhesitatingly believed Pauline earlier today when she told him that 
albatrosses, not condors (as is wildly believed), have the largest wingspan among wild birds. It turns out 
that while Helen is an epistemically excellent source of information, she was incorrect on this particular 
occasion: Pauline is, in fact, a highly incompetent and insincere speaker, especially on the topic of wild 
birds. Moreover, though Pauline is correct in her report about albatrosses, she came to hold this belief 
merely on the basis of wishful thinking (in order to make her reading of The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner more compelling). (Lackey, 2008, 149.) 
Moreover, as she makes clear, the fact that Pauline’s testimony is unreliable prevents Fred from receiving any 
justification from it: “For, even though Helen’s testimony provides Fred with excellent positive reasons for 
accepting the report in question, Pauline is not only a generally unreliable speaker, but she is also reporting a 
belief which, though true, fails to be reliably produced or appropriately truth-conducive. Because of this, the 
testimony that Pauline offers to Fred also fails to be reliably produced or appropriately truth-conducive, thereby 
preventing it from leading to justified or warranted belief for Fred.” (Lackey, 2008, 149-150.) 
30
 ”What NESTED SPEAKER reveals is that the possession of good positive reasons by a hearer is not sufficient 
for accepting a speaker’s testimony with justification or warrant. Why? Because the possession of positive 
reasons on behalf of a speaker’s report, even when objectively excellent ones, does not necessarily put one in 
contact with testimony that is reliable. There is, then, a further necessary condition for testimonial justification or 
warrant, one that requires that a speaker’s testimony be reliable or otherwise truth-conducive.” (Lackey, 2008, 
150.) Note how, when it comes to testimonial justification, this shifts the focus away from the hearer and over to 
the speaker. 
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It [Lackey’s externalism] seems to amount to an endorsement of a wholesale 
scepticism about a listener’s reasons in the epistemology of testimony. In the same 
way that it’s one thing to think that inductive evidence in epistemology generally 
might sometimes fail to justify one’s belief, but another thing to think that they never 
justify one’s belief, in the epistemology of testimony it is one thing to think that a 
listener’s reasons might sometimes fail to justify her belief, or that there must be more 
to the supervenience base of justification from testimony than these reasons, but quite 
another thing to think that they never justify a listener’s belief.  
Lackey’s argument . . . yields the conclusion that internalist evidence never justifies 
beliefs based on testimony. The argument based on CIRCLE doesn’t yield this 
conclusion. . . This is why the argument here is an argument against the idea that the 
supervenience claim . . . gives a complete account of justification from testimony. 
(Wright, 2016a, 2045.) 
So, in other words, Wright thinks (i) that Lackey’s wholesale externalism commits her to 
skepticism about the epistemic importance of internal reasons, and (ii) that we therefore 
should adopt some sort of “halfway externalism”, according to which a hearer’s internal 
reasons sometimes, but not always, are sufficient for testimonial justification. 
However, there are a couple of reasons why these views are problematic. First, 
Lackey’s claim that internal reasons aren’t sufficient for testimonial justification doesn’t 
commit her to skepticism about the epistemic importance of such reasons since it can still be 
the case that they are necessary for testimonial justification or some other epistemic property. 
For example, she can argue that internal reasons are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for having testimonially justified beliefs. In that case, internal reasons play a key role in 
avoiding skepticism. In addition, just because one thinks that a certain set of states (like one’s 
internal reasons) is insufficient for producing certain effects (like a change in one’s 
testimonial justification), it doesn’t follow that that set of states is insufficient for producing 
any relevant effect (like a change in blamelessness). Thus, Wright’s criticism of Lackey and 
her externalist views undermines nothing other than a strawman.  
Second, claiming that TJ internalism is correct insofar as internal reasons sometimes 
are sufficient for testimonial justification doesn’t only undermine Lackey’s view, but also 
appears to undermine Wright’s own “halfway externalism.” To see why this is so, consider 
the following passage from the end of his paper: 
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Unless we claim, however, that [a hearer’s internal] reasons cannot justify beliefs tout 
court, it is hard to see how we can maintain Lackey’s claim that they do not justify the 
listener’s belief in the NESTED SPEAKER case, or in any other testimony case. . . No 
such sceptical consequences follow from the argument that I have given here. (Wright, 
2016a, 2045.) 
What Wright here says is that unless we claim that wholesale externalism (which 
really just is regular externalism) is true, then it is hard to see why the listener’s belief in 
Lackey’s scenario, or any other (relevantly similar) scenario, should fail to receive 
testimonial justification from his internal reasons.
31
 Or, in other words, if we either adopt TJ 
internalism or Wright’s own “halfway externalism”, then none of the scenarios we can come 
up with will appear to undermine the view that the listener’s internal reasons in that scenario 
are sufficient for testimonial justification. However, if there are no such cases—i.e., no 
counterexamples—then not only does that undermine Wright’s own objections against the 
internalist, it also seems to constitute an argument in favor of TJ internalism. Let me be more 
precise. 
First, if there are no counterexamples to TJ internalism, then neither his scenario in the 
(2016b) paper nor the CIRCLE scenario can provide the intuitive basis for an argument 
against it. And, as we’ve seen above, neither of those scenarios appears to provide such a 
basis (or so I have argued). Second, if TJ internalism tells a true story about the determinants 
of testimonial justification, and there aren’t any counterexamples, then we have good reason 
to believe that it also is the whole story. The different (internalist or externalist) theories of 
justification on the market all rely, for their support, on intuitions elicited by various 
scenarios. Moreover, if only one of these theories—namely, TJ internalism—plausibly is able 
to account for all of these intuitions, then, unless there are other theoretical considerations that 
weigh heavier than the intuitions and that count against it, that theory remains well-motivated. 
                                                          
31
 When it comes to the NESTED SPEAKER scenario, the internalist might, as usual, stress the fact that from 
Fred’s perspective there is much that speaks in favor of the trustworthiness of Pauline’s testimony and virtually 
nothing that speaks against it. Even if we were to imagine Fred as an ideally rational agent that always responds 
in the most epistemically reasonable manner to the reasons he has, we are still disposed to say that Fred should 
believe what Pauline says. Lackey, moreover, appears to offer two responses—one quite modest and the other 
rather bold. According to the modest objection, the internalist is right to claim that Fred's belief is testimonially 
justified, but that it fails to satisfy other (externalist) epistemic properties like warrant and knowledge (Lackey, 
150, footnote 11). This objection simply concedes that the internalist is victorious. The bold objection, on the 
other hand, says that both internalists and externalists are committed to the view that justification is reliable or 
truth-conducive, and that Fred's belief therefore will be unjustified on both kinds of view (Lackey, 151-152). 
This objection, however, clearly misrepresents the internalist position (which need not impose a reliability 
condition on justification), and thus ultimately fails to engage with the internalist response to NESTED 
SPEAKER. 
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For these reasons, I conclude that Wright’s “halfway externalism” doesn’t constitute a 
theoretically viable position, but rather must collapse into wholesale externalism or 
internalism about testimonial justification.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Internalists about the epistemology of testimony claim that a hearer’s testimonial justification 
supervenes upon his internal reasons for believing that what the speaker says is true. This 
claim, which I’ve called TJ internalism, is not without its critics. In this paper, I have argued 
in favor of TJ internalism and responded to three recent objections raised by Wright. The 
upshot of my discussion is that TJ internalism remains as plausible as ever: testimonial 
justification does appear to supervene upon one’s internal reasons. However, the externalist is 
right to claim that not all epistemic properties are internal. As we have seen, epistemic agents 
who are duplicates with respect to their internal reasons often do differ with respect to 
properties like warrant or entitlement. Yet, although this difference often is of great epistemic 
importance, it does not undermine internalism in the epistemology of testimony. 
Moreover, I’ve also suggested that one shouldn’t try to balance between internalism 
and externalism about testimonial justification: the ground in-between the positions is simply 
too narrow (or perhaps not there at all). For simplicity’s sake, we should expect the set of 
internal reasons to either be a sufficient supervenience base for testimonial justification or not, 
rather than believing its character to be multiform and changing on a case by case basis. 
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Against Overconfidence: Arguing for the 
Accessibility of Memorial Justification 
 
 
 
1. Memorial Justification 
Many, if not most, of our beliefs are justified by memory. Consider your belief (whether 
occurrent or dispositional) that Mercury is the smallest planet in our solar system, that 
Fermat's Last Theorem has been proved to be true, or that Napoleon lost the battle of 
Waterloo. Such beliefs appear to be justified, but not by your perceptual experience. Rather, 
they are justified by your memories.
1
 So instead of saying that they are perceptually justified, 
we should say that they are memorially justified, or that we have memorial justification for 
them. 
Memory is a source of valuable epistemic properties, like justification. But what 
conditions must be satisfied in order for your memory to confer justification upon your 
doxastic attitudes? In this paper, I am going to develop a novel argument, inspired by 
Laurence BonJour’s (1980; 1985) clairvoyance scenario, for the claim that there is an 
internalist accessibility condition on memorial justification. This I will do by presenting a 
scenario involving an epistemic agent who exhibits a special sort of overconfidence with 
respect to the memory beliefs he has. Despite the agent's memory beliefs being reliably 
produced by a properly functioning cognitive faculty (as the scenario stipulates), they 
nevertheless appear to be unjustified. And, I argue, the best explanation for why that is so is 
that there is an internalist accessibility condition on memorial justification which the agent 
fails to satisfy. Moreover, after having presented the argument, I will consider and respond to 
the threat which preservationism—i.e., the position that memory preserves the (positive) 
justificatory status of the beliefs that enter it—poses to my view. 
                                                          
1
 More specifically, they are justified by your memories of receiving testimony which supports them. Moreover, 
a memory is a non-factive mental state, whereas remembering that something is the case is a factive state. This 
means that, in contrast to states of remembering, memories include things like belief that fails to qualify as 
knowledge and so-called memory seemings.  
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I present BonJour’s clairvoyance 
scenario and discuss the way in which it provides the resources for formulating an argument 
for access internalism. In section 3, I present the overconfidence scenario and argue that there 
is an indistinguishability problem for anyone who denies the veracity of the intuition it elicits. 
In section 4, I argue, based on the aforementioned intuition, that there is an internalist 
accessibility condition on memorial justification and spell out some of the details about how 
that condition should be understood. In section 5, I argue that access internalism should 
replace preservationism as the standard view in the epistemology of memory. In section 6, I 
conclude and discuss the relevance of the paper and its argument for the larger literature on 
the epistemology of memory and the internalism-externalism distinction. 
 
2. BonJour on Clairvoyance and Justification 
According to simple process reliabilism, most famously endorsed by Alvin Goldman (1979), 
a belief is justified just in case it is formed on the basis of a reliable doxastic disposition (and 
there are no undefeated defeaters). However, the view is vulnerable to a number of 
counterexamples, most of which either target the claim that reliability is necessary for 
justification or the claim that reliability is sufficient for justification.
2
 One of the most 
influential counterexamples to the sufficiency claim is offered by Bonjour, and it goes as 
follows: 
Clairvoyance 
Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence 
or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power 
or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that 
the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this 
belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power under 
circumstances in which it is completely reliable. (Bonjour, 1985, 41; Cf. 1980.) 
Now, as simple process reliabilism would have it, Norman’s belief that the President is in 
New York City is justified because it is produced by a reliable belief-forming process (and 
there are no undefeated defeaters). However, the reliabilist verdict clearly seems to be wrong. 
                                                          
2
 The most influential counterexample to the necessity claim is provided by Lehrer & Cohen (1983). 
205 
 
Intuitively, Norman’s belief is no more justified than a random guess or hunch. Hence, 
provided that the intuition is correct, simple process reliabilism must be false since reliability 
isn’t sufficient for justification.  
But where exactly does simple process reliabilism go wrong? BonJour helps us to a 
diagnosis of the issue. Moreover, his diagnosis also provides us with resources for 
formulating an argument for access internalism based on our intuitive judgments about the 
Clairvoyance scenario. In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, BonJour has the following 
to say about the reliabilist response to the Clairvoyance scenario: 
One reason why externalism may seem initially plausible is that if the external relation 
in question genuinely obtains [i.e., the reliable relation between one's belief and the 
truth], then Norman will in fact not go wrong in accepting the belief, and it is, in a 
sense, not an accident that this is so: it would not be an accident from the standpoint of 
our hypothetical observer who knows all the relevant facts and laws. But how is this 
supposed to justify Norman's belief? From his subjective perspective it is an accident 
that the belief is true. And the suggestion here is that the rationality or justifiability of 
Norman's belief should be judged from Norman's own perspective rather than from 
one which is unavailable to him. (BonJour, 1985, 43-44.) 
Similarly, in his co-authored book with Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification, he writes: 
[Norman is] being epistemically irrational and irresponsible in accepting beliefs whose 
provenance can only be a total mystery to [him], whose status is as far as [he] can tell 
no different from that of a stray hunch or arbitrary conviction. Here again, externalism 
seems to sunder the concept of epistemic justification entirely from the concept of 
epistemic rationality or responsibility, leaving the former concept with no clear 
intuitive content. (BonJour & Sosa, 2003, 32.) 
Here, BonJour tells us that simple process reliabilism and similar externalist positions 
are forced to give the wrong verdict about the clairvoyance scenario because they fail to 
recognize that a subject cannot have a justified belief B without B being rational or reasonable 
from the subject's first person perspective. Even though Norman's belief about the President's 
whereabouts is both true and reliably produced, he doesn't have any supporting evidence or 
reason that is accessible from his first person perspective; as far as he is in a position to tell, 
there is no reason to think that his belief in any way accurately represents where the President 
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happens to be located. Moreover, BonJour's diagnosis doesn't only provide a plausible 
explanation of where the reliabilist goes wrong, but also explains why the access internalist 
appears to be correct. His original diagnosis relies on the thesis that if you don't have 
privileged access to the justificatory status of a belief B, then B cannot be justified. And by 
contraposition we get the (equivalent) thesis that if the belief B is justified, then you must 
have privileged access to the justificatory status of B; which simply is what access internalism 
states. Thus, BonJour's diagnosis provides the resources for formulating an abductive 
argument for access internalism. As he sees it, access internalism offers the best explanation 
for our intuitive judgments about the clairvoyance scenario.
3, 4
 
BonJour's diagnosis and argument have met with a lot of criticism from externalists. 
Recently, I have responded to several of the externalist's objections.
5
 In this paper, however, I 
will simply offer a reconstruction of the argument and present my own, structurally 
analogous, argument about memorial justification. 
 
3. Overconfidence and the Indistinguishability Problem 
Allow me to follow BonJour by introducing the overconfidence scenario as a counterexample 
to Goldman's (1979) simple process reliabilism, before I present the argument for access 
internalism about memorial justification in the next section. Applied to memorial justification 
in particular, rather than justification in general, simple process reliabilism tells us that a 
belief B is memorially justified just in case B is the result of a reliable memory-based doxastic 
                                                          
3
 Lehrer (1990, 163-164) presents a similar counterexample to reliabilism's sufficiency claim and, just like 
BonJour, argues that access internalism provides the best explanation for our intuitive judgments about the 
example. 
4
 Following Goldman (1999, 288ff.), the externalist might offer an alternative explanation saying that one needs 
to have access to the justificatory status of one’s beliefs, but that it need not be privileged since the relevant facts 
about justification can be knowable by other means than introspection or reflection. However, if the facts about 
justification always are accessible, but we don’t need privileged/internal access to them, then it must either be 
the case that we always have this more “externalist-friendly” access to them, or that we only sometimes have 
external access to them but without also having privileged access to them (on pain of redundancy). But, on the 
one hand, the first of these claims is clearly false. Facts about justification are grounded in facts about one's 
evidence and evidential support, and assuming that one always is in an externalist position to know these facts is 
assuming too much: taken together, the sense modalities simply do not put us in a position to know them in all 
cases. On the other hand, the second claim seems like an implausible and overly complex picture of our access to 
the facts about justification. What reason do we have to believe that we often have privileged access to the 
relevant facts about one's evidence and evidential support, but that there are times when don’t have it and that it 
just so happens at these times that we are lucky enough to have externalist access to them? I see no convincing 
reason to hold such a view. 
5
 Elsewhere, I defend BonJour and Lehrer's arguments and clarify what commitments the access internalist 
should make. Doing so, I also point out prominent but implausible versions of the view in the literature and 
where they fall short. 
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disposition (and there are no undefeated defeaters). Thus, the view is committed to both a 
necessity claim—according to which having a reliable memory-based doxastic disposition is 
necessary for memorial justification—and a sufficiency claim—according to which having a 
reliable (undefeated) memory-based doxastic disposition is sufficient for memorial 
justification. However, as we will see, the sufficiency claim is particularly vulnerable. 
Consider the following scenario: 
Overconfidence 
Robert is, for the most part, a normal epistemic agent. His ability to reason is more or 
less like that of other people, his perceptual faculties function normally, and he usually 
acquires knowledge and justified beliefs by relying on his perception and reasoning. 
However, Robert's memory functions in somewhat unusual ways. Whereas his 
memory is exceptionally reliable—his memory-based doxastic dispositions almost 
always produce true beliefs with the same or relevantly similar content to the beliefs 
that entered his memory—he never has any reason to think that his memory beliefs 
indeed are products of his memory, rather than some other process or source.
6 
Moreover, Robert doesn't have any reason or evidence for or against the reliability of 
his memory.
7
 Nevertheless, he always trusts himself with respect to whatever his 
memory “suggests” to be the case.  
One day, Robert is asked by his friend which year Goethe died. Although his interest 
in literature is miniscule and he doesn't in any way seem
8
 to remember anything about 
                                                          
6
 This naturally suggests that Robert's memory processing doesn't have any associated phenomenology and the 
beliefs it produces don't have any distinct phenomenology that is indicative of their source. Moreover, this kind 
of phenomenology which Robert clearly lacks resembles what sometimes is discussed in the literature under the 
name “memory markers”; i.e., intrinsic features of memory experiences which indicate that they provide 
veridical information about the past. For a critique of the idea that memory experiences necessarily have memory 
markers, see Bernecker (2008, ch. 6). 
Although I am undecided when it comes to whether the phenomenal or experiential properties that tend 
to be occasioned by memory are intrinsic to it, even if that turns out to be true and that the scenario I present 
therefore is metaphysically impossible, I still think that it can teach us important things about (e.g.) memorial 
justification. Just because a certain scenario is metaphysically impossible, it doesn't follow that we cannot learn 
anything from it. For example, even though Putnam's (1975) Twin Earth thought experiment most likely is 
metaphysically impossible—how can Twin Oscar be both identical to Oscar, whose molecules are partly 
constituted by water (H2O), and be on a planet where there is no water (H2O)?—it can still teach us important 
things about (e.g.) the content of our beliefs. 
7
 This means that Robert, in the scenario under consideration, doesn’t learn from experience that his memory 
actually is reliable. To see how that can be so, we can for example imagine that Robert only has memory beliefs 
about things that he isn’t in a position to empirically confirm/disconfirm, or that he simply never bothers 
checking whether his memory beliefs turn out to be true. 
8
 Here, I understand seemings as propositional attitudes which involve an experiential or phenomenal aspect that 
in normal circumstances dispose the subject to believe that their content is true, and not simply as dispositions to 
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when Goethe (or any other author for that matter) might have died, his memory 
prompts him to answer that “Goethe died on the 22nd of March 1832”, and he believes 
it. Intrigued by Robert's quick and confident answer, the friend asks him how he can 
be so sure. Robert thinks for a while, but, since he can't come up with any reason for 
thinking that his answer is true, he simply tells his friend that he doesn't know why he 
is so confident in his answer, he just is. Puzzled by the response, the friend asks him 
whether he is trying to pull a trick on him. Robert, taken aback by the accusation, 
thinks for himself a bit more, before he reassuredly says that he isn't trying to pull a 
trick but that he is absolutely confident that his answer is true. “Indeed, too confident”, 
the friend thinks to himself. 
Just like with the clairvoyance scenario, according to simple process reliabilism, 
Robert's belief that Goethe died on the 22
nd
 of March 1832 is memorially justified because it 
is the result of a reliable memory-based doxastic disposition (and there are no undefeated 
defeaters). However, yet again, the reliabilist verdict seems to be wrong. Intuitively, Robert is, 
as the friend's concluding thought suggests, overconfident, and his belief isn't justified. 
Indeed, his belief appears to be no more justified than a random guess or hunch. Hence, 
provided that the intuition is correct, simple process reliabilism about memorial justification 
must be false since having a reliable (undefeated) memory-based doxastic disposition isn't 
sufficient for memorial justification. 
In order to support this intuition (i.e., that overconfident subjects, like Robert, don’t 
have memorially justified beliefs), I'm going to point out a problem which is yet to be 
discussed in the literature, and which those who deny its veracity invariably must face. I call it 
the indistinguishability problem, and it is a deductive argument against anyone who denies the 
veracity of the aforementioned intuition. The argument can be summarized as follows: 
1. Overconfident subjects are not in a position to know of their memory beliefs that 
they are products of memory, rather than some non-reliable process or source. 
2. If a subject isn't in a position to know of their memory beliefs that they are 
products of memory, rather than some non-reliable process or source, then the 
subject should not believe of their memory beliefs that they are products of some 
reliable process or source. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
believe. The latter view is endorsed by Armstrong (1961, 84-87), Picher (1971, 91-93), Swinburne (2001, 141-
142), and Conee (2004, 15), but it is criticized by Huemer (2007a, 31). 
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3. If a subject should not believe of their memory beliefs that they are products of 
some reliable process or source, then their memory beliefs cannot be memorially 
justified. 
4. Hence, overconfident subjects cannot have memorially justified memory beliefs.9 
Since the argument's conclusion entails that the intuition elicited by the 
overconfidence scenario is true, those who want to deny the veracity of said intuition must 
reject at least one of the argument's premises. Now, let's examine how one might go about 
doing so. 
Rejecting premise 1 amounts to the claim that overconfident subjects are in a position 
to know of their memory beliefs that they are products memory, rather than some non-reliable 
process or source. Before we evaluate this claim, I need to say a little bit more about what I 
take the notion of being in a position to know to mean. Following Declan Smithies (2012b, 
268), I will define the somewhat abstruse notion of being in a position to know as meaning 
that one satisfies all the epistemic conditions of knowledge—like having unGettiered 
(propositional) justification to believe a true proposition. Knowing a proposition, by contrast, 
also requires that one satisfies the psychological conditions of knowledge—like believing a 
true proposition on the basis of one's unGettiered justification to believe it. Being in a position 
to know is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for knowing.
10
  
Now, with this definition in mind, rejecting premise 1 is to claim that overconfident 
subjects have unGettiered justification to believe of their memory beliefs that they are 
products of memory. But this clearly seems false. If we consider Robert, for example, he 
doesn’t have any reason or evidence which can justify him in believing that his belief about 
Goethe’s date of death indeed is a memory belief. Moreover, not only doesn't he have any 
reason or evidence to justify such a second-order belief, it wouldn't be reliable in the 
circumstances under consideration. If, say, Robert actually were to form the (second-order) 
belief that his (first-order) belief about Goethe is a memory belief, then, given whatever 
                                                          
9
 The way the argument is formulated, it presupposes a deontological conception of justification. However, it is 
only committed to a minimalist or modest version of deontologism, according to which ideals of justification or 
rationality specify what one ought to believe in order to live up to those ideals; it is not committed to the claim 
that we can or ought to be held responsible for failing to believe in accordance with the evidence.  
10
 The notion of being in a position to know was first introduced by Sosa (1974), and later taken up again by 
Williamson, who defines it as follows: “To be in a position to know p, it is neither necessary to know p nor 
sufficient to be physically and psychologically capable of knowing p. No obstacle must block one’s path to 
knowing p. If one is in a position to know p, and one has done what one is in a position to do to decide whether p 
is true, then one does know p. The fact is open to one’s view, unhidden, even if one does not yet see it.” 
(Williamson, 2000, 95.) I think Smithies plausibly unpacks Williamson’s definition. 
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(plausible) rule for belief-formation that he tries to follow, his best attempt to follow that rule 
wouldn't stop him from also believing that other (first-order) beliefs of his which actually 
amount to nothing more than mere guesswork, but without himself being in a position to 
know so, also are products of his memory—and this of course undermines the idea that 
Robert's (second-order) belief that his (first-order) belief about Goethe is a product of 
memory is reliable.
11
 So premise 1 therefore appears to be on solid ground; overconfident 
subjects are not in a position to know of their memory beliefs that they are products or 
memory, rather than some non-reliable process or source. 
Rejecting premise 2 amounts to the claim that subjects who aren’t in a position to 
know of their memory beliefs that they indeed are products of memory, rather than some non-
reliable process or source, are rationally permitted to believe of their memory beliefs that they 
are products of some reliable process or source. But this naturally raises the question: why are 
such subjects permitted to believe of their memory beliefs that they are the result of some 
reliable process or source? Those who want to reject premise 2 thus face a difficult 
explanatory challenge; namely, they have to explain how subjects who aren't in position to 
distinguish their memory beliefs from random guesses or hunches nevertheless somehow still 
have grounds for believing of their memory beliefs that they aren't such guesses or hunches, 
or indeed products of some other unreliable process.  
Given that subjects who aren’t in a position to know of their memory beliefs that they 
are products of memory don't have any reason or evidence supporting second-order beliefs to 
the effect that their first-order memory beliefs actually come from the source that they do, I 
don't see any reason why we should think that it would be rationally permitted or reasonable 
for them to hold second-order beliefs to the effect that their first order memory beliefs are 
reliably produced. However, one might perhaps try to answer the challenge by following 
Crispin Wright (2004) and arguing that there are certain basic beliefs which we are entitled to 
hold by default,
12
 and that second-order beliefs about the reliability of one's first-order 
memory beliefs somehow belong to that category. Although this might be a consistent line of 
response, it would require a lot of work to argue that second-order beliefs about the reliability 
                                                          
11
 Say, for example, that Robert tries to follow the truth rule/norm, according to which you should believe all 
and only true propositions (see, e.g., David, 2001). If, by attempting to follow that rule, he forms the (second-
order) belief that his (first-order) belief about Goethe is a memory belief, then, since that (second-order) belief is, 
from his first person perspective, indistinguishable from mere guesswork, he will be equally disposed to believe 
that other beliefs of his that actually are mere guesswork also are products of his memory.    
12
 In contrast to concepts like "justification", "rationality", and "reasonableness", Wright (2004; 2014) uses the 
concept of "entitlement" to refer to a species of warrant that isn't evidential or indicative of the truth. 
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of one's first-order memory beliefs somehow belong to the category of beliefs that are entitled 
by default (assuming that such a category exists). In his work on entitlement, Wright focuses 
for the most part on presuppositions (2004) and authenticity-conditions (2014), which 
function more or less like Wittgensteinian hinge propositions that we are entitled to believe 
without evidence or argument,
13
 rather than such second-order beliefs about the reliability of 
one's first-order memory beliefs. Moreover, this line of response is also problematic insofar as 
it seems to license as warranted or entitled some sort of bootstrapping argumentation, since 
forming a first-order memory belief (but without being in a position to know its source) is 
sufficient for generating entitlement to believe in the reliability of that first-order memory 
belief.
14
 
That being said, it seems that premise 2 should be accepted and that subjects who 
aren’t in a position to know of their memory beliefs that they indeed are products of memory 
shouldn't believe of their memory beliefs that they are products of some reliable process or 
source. 
Rejecting premise 3 amounts to the claim that the memory beliefs of subjects who 
shouldn't believe of their memory beliefs that they are products of some reliable process or 
source nevertheless can be memorially justified. But this would be an odd claim to argue for. 
To see why that so, consider which doxastic attitude such a subject should have toward the 
proposition that their memory beliefs are products of some reliable process or source. 
Presumably, for any proposition that you have the concepts to understand, you should either 
believe it, withhold judgment about it, or disbelieve it, and you should never have more than 
one of these attitudes toward it at the same time.
15
 So if the subject shouldn't believe in the 
proposition under consideration, then he should withhold judgment about it or disbelieve it 
(but not both). But then he would end up being in an absurd quasi-akratic position where he 
withholds/disbelieves of his memory beliefs that they are reliably produced even though they 
(supposedly) are memorially justified.
16
 If, on the one hand, he disbelieves of his memory 
beliefs that they are reliably produced, then (equivalently) he believes of his memory beliefs 
that they are unreliably produced. But if he believes of his memory beliefs that they are 
unreliably produced, then that defeats any memorial justification he might have for his 
                                                          
13
 See, e.g., Wittgenstein (1969, §341-343). For more about Wittgensteinian hinge propositions and their 
epistemological consequences, see Pritchard (forthcoming). 
14
 For more about such circular reasoning, see Alston (1986). 
15
 This is known as the Uniqueness Thesis, and it is defended by Feldman (2007). 
16
 Smithies (2019) similarly argues from the irrationality of akrasia for accessibilism about justification in 
general. 
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memory beliefs—in which case they cannot be memorially justified. If, on the other hand, he 
withholds judgment about the proposition that his memory beliefs are reliably produced, then 
he is committed to being agnostic or neutral with respect to its truth-value. But if he is 
committed to being neutral with respect to the reliability of his memory beliefs, then it doesn't 
seem that they can be memorially justified. After all, if the subject is equally confident that 
his memory beliefs are reliably/unreliably produced, why should he hold them? 
Following Smithies (2012a), in order to further pump the intuition that a subject 
cannot justifiably withhold/disbelieve of his memory beliefs that they are reliably produced at 
the same time that they are memorially justified, let me just briefly point out how such a 
subject would find himself in a position where it would be completely natural for him to 
assert Moorean conjunctions. Consider the following conjunctions: 
(1) p and I do not know that p. 
(2) p and it is an open question whether I know that p. 
Some philosophers think that asserting either (1) or (2) above is absurd.
17
 Why? Plausibly 
because one cannot rationally believe both conjuncts of such Moorean conjunctions at the 
same time.
18
 If one rationally believes the conjunct (i) that p, then one cannot rationally 
believe the conjunct (ii) that one doesn’t know that p, or the conjunct (iii) that it is an open 
question whether one knows that p. In other words, according to some philosophers, one 
cannot rationally hold a certain belief and at the same time fail to take that belief as 
amounting to knowledge.
19
 
Similarly, consider the following conjunctions about justification: 
(3) p and I do not have justification to believe that p. 
(4) p and it is an open question whether I have justification to believe that p. 
                                                          
17
 Asserting conjunctions like (1) and (2) seems self-defeating, or, as one author has put it, “Mooronic” (Koethe, 
1978). However, in contrast to contradictions, which also are self-defeating, Moorean conjunctions can be true. 
So how can it be that there are Moorean conjunctions which may or may not be true, but that cannot be asserted 
without absurdity? This is known as Moore’s paradox.    
18
 Indeed, according to one influential approach, the paradoxicality of Moorean conjunctions doesn’t  have 
anything to do with the fact that they are linguistically expressed when asserted. Rather, a better strategy is to 
account for the paradoxicality by explaining why they cannot rationally be believed and therefore cannot 
coherently be asserted. For more about how and why Moore’s paradox really is a paradox about the norms 
governing (rational) belief, see Hintikka (1962) and Shoemaker (1995). 
19
 As Huemer (2007b, 145) puts it: “If one believes that p, one is thereby rationally committed to taking one’s 
belief to be knowledge.” 
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Just like with conjunctions (1) and (2) above, asserting either (3) or (4) is absurd because one 
cannot rationally believe both of their conjuncts at the same time. If one rationally believes 
the conjunct (i) that p, then one cannot rationally believe the conjunct (ii) that one doesn’t 
have justification to believe that p, or the conjunct (iii) that it is an open question whether one 
has justification to believe that p. 
However, despite the absurdity of asserting either (3) or (4), a subject who justifiably 
withholds/disbelieves of his memory beliefs that they are reliably produced at the same time 
that they are memorially justified will be in a position where asserting those conjunctions is 
entirely natural. For example, he might testify to some proposition p that he has a (justified) 
memory belief in, while simultaneously (justifiably) disbelieving/withholding judgment that 
his belief that p has been reliably produced and thereby also asserting that he doesn’t, or 
might not have, justification to believe that p. So having this sort of lower-level belief, while 
at the same time failing to also have some higher-level belief to the effect that the lower-level 
belief is reliably produced, simply seems absurd. 
One can of course always try to avoid this dilemma by denying that one always has 
justification for adopting either of the doxastic attitudes toward any proposition that one has 
the concepts to understand. Although I remain doubtful about that kind of position, even if it 
turns out to be true, I don't think that the kind of proposition that we're currently considering 
will be one of those that we shouldn't always hold either of the doxastic attitudes toward. For 
example, whereas your evidence might not determine that you should hold any particular 
doxastic attitude toward the proposition that the Pope currently is lying in his bed, it does 
seem that it always will determine such an attitude when it comes to the reliability of your 
memory beliefs. If your evidence on balance neither tells in favor of the truth nor the falsity of 
such a proposition, then you should withhold judgment in it. And if it does tell in favor of the 
truth/falsity of the proposition, then you should believe/disbelieve it. Evaluating which 
doxastic attitude your evidence on balance supports when it comes to the proposition that 
your memory beliefs aren't unreliably produced may of course be very difficult, but that 
doesn't mean that it is impossible or that your evidence on balance doesn't tell in favor of 
either attitude.  
I therefore think that premise 3 should be accepted and that the memory beliefs of 
subjects who shouldn't believe of their memory beliefs that they are products of some reliable 
process or source cannot be memorially justified. The indistinguishability problem thus 
214 
 
presents a deductive argument against anyone who denies the intuition elicited by the 
overconfidence scenario. And it does so by highlighting the fact that overconfident subjects 
aren't in a position to distinguish bona fide memory beliefs from mere guesswork, and that 
failing to be in such a position is incompatible with having memorially justified beliefs. 
In this section, I have presented a scenario that is analogous to those offered by 
BonJour and others, but which focuses on memorial justification in particular, rather than 
justification in general. Moreover, in order to move beyond the discussions by earlier 
internalists, I have presented a novel argument which supports the intuition elicited by the 
overconfidence scenario, and which thus bolsters the case for access internalism about 
memorial justification. With that said, I now turn to the issues of why and how memorial 
justification is internally accessible. 
 
4. The Accessibility of Memorial Justification 
Why exactly does Robert's belief fail to be justified? I think the best explanation for this 
intuitive datum is that there is an internalist accessibility condition on memorial justification 
that he fails to satisfy. A belief can be memorially justified only if the subject has privileged 
access to the justificatory status of that belief. If the subject cannot even in principle tell what 
a certain belief B rationally has going for it, then B cannot be memorially justified—even if it 
is produced by the subject's reliable, properly functioning faculty of memory. Indeed, if the 
belief B is wholly indistinguishable from, say, mere guesswork, then B cannot be memorially 
justified.  
The access internalist about memorial justification thus thinks that a belief can be 
memorially justified only if the subject has privileged access to the justificatory status of that 
belief. But this naturally raises the question: what kind of memorial justification does the 
internalist condition attach to? It is common to distinguish between two different kinds of 
justification, which we may call propositional justification and doxastic justification, 
following Roderick Firth (1978). On the one hand, you can have justification to believe a 
certain proposition, regardless of whether you actually believe it. For example, you can have 
justification to believe that Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo, but without having to believe 
it. This is what we call propositional justification. On the other hand, you can also have 
justifiably held beliefs. For example, if you believe the proposition above—that Napoleon lost 
the battle of Waterloo—in a way that is properly based on that which gives you 
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(propositional) justification to believe it, then your belief is justifiably held. This is what we 
call doxastic justification. So which of these two kinds of memorial justification does the 
internalist condition attach to? 
I claim that we should be access internalists about memorial justification in the 
propositional sense, but not the doxastic sense. Why? Because doxastic justification, as 
presented above, simply is propositional justification plus proper basing, which means that 
both those conditions must be internally accessible if facts about doxastic justification are to 
be internally accessible. So access internalism about doxastic justification is indeed a stronger 
position, and, as a result, it is more implausible. To see why that is so, consider how the facts 
about whether the beliefs you have are properly based on their justificatory basis are 
psychological (and not epistemic) in nature; that is, they have to do with the psychological 
processes and mechanisms that have led you to form and maintain your beliefs. But such 
psychological processes don't seem to be internally accessible. Not only did many of them 
occur in the past, thus making our access to them dependent on our fallible memorial 
capacities, but many of them also occur entirely below the level of conscious experience, thus 
making them completely inaccessible to our faculties of reflection and introspection.  
So, I claim, we should be access internalists about memorial justification in the 
propositional sense.
20
 But another question we also need to ask is how facts about memorial 
justification are internally accessible. Here I want to make two suggestions. One, they are 
internally accessible insofar as we are in an a priori position to know them; two, we are in an 
a priori position to know them insofar as the memorial justifiers and the justifying relations 
are similarly accessible. Let me begin by elaborating on the first point. 
Drawing on Smithies' definition from the previous section, we always have 
unGettiered a priori justification to believe the facts about what we have memorial 
justification to believe.
21
 Moreover, it should be noted that I'm using a priori in the traditional 
sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn't depend on any of the sense modalities. 
This means that what we have a priori justification to believe shouldn't only be taken to 
include what we have reflective or reasoning-based justification to believe, but also, for 
example, what we have introspective justification to believe—even though introspection 
                                                          
20
 Henceforth, I'll just write “memorial justification” as short for “memorial justification in the propositional 
sense”. 
21
 This a priori justification is immune to Gettier-cases, since in any close case in which one has a priori 
justification to believe that one has memorial justification to believe that p, one actually does have memorial 
justification to believe that p. 
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clearly involves an experiential aspect.
22
 Thus, according to the position I advocate, anyone 
who takes advantage of their epistemic position by also satisfying the psychological 
conditions of knowledge will know in an a priori manner what they have memorial 
justification to believe.  
When it comes to the second point, we are in an a priori position to know the facts 
about what we have memorial justification to believe by being in an a priori position to know 
the memorial justifiers we have and how they justify the beliefs they do.
23
 And we are in a 
position to have the latter knowledge (i) by having unGettiered introspective justification to 
believe what our memorial justifiers or reasons for belief are, and (ii) by having unGettiered 
reflective justification to believe that those reasons justify the beliefs they do (and to the 
degree that they do).
24, 25
 
So in a case where you have some memorial justification 
M
J for the belief that p 
(written 
M
J : p), you will also, in virtue of your faculties of introspection and reflection, have: 
1. A priori justification APJ to believe that you have memorial justification MJ for 
believing that p: 
M
J : p  APJ : (MJ : p). 
(where the a priori justification isn't vulnerable to Gettier cases.) 
And by having this a priori justification, it will be sufficient for: 
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 For more on the distinction between narrow and broad notions of the a priori, see Casullo (2003, ch. 2). 
23
 Some epistemologists, like Bergmann (2006, 9) for example, have formulated the access internalist position in 
such a way that it only places an accessibility condition on your justifiers/reasons. However, this fails to qualify 
as an internalist position since it opens up for the possibility that subjects can be justified in holding certain 
beliefs which they aren't in a position to tell what have going for them. 
24
 This is arguably the most controversial aspect of the internalist theory I advocate. Insofar as you have 
reflective justification to believe that your reasons justify the beliefs they do (and to the degree that they do), 
justification cannot be truth-conducive. This is because truth-conduciveness is a contingent empirical relation, 
and therefore not something that can be known through reflection alone. Moreover, many externalists take it as 
obvious or extremely plausible that justification is truth-conducive (see, e.g., Alston (1989); and Glüer & 
Wikforss (2018)). However, in response, internalists will often point out that our intuitions about Lehrer and 
Cohen’s (1983) New Evil Demon scenario indicate that forming justified beliefs need not be conducive to 
forming true beliefs.  
25
 An alternative suggestion when it comes to how access internalists should spell out the idea that one always 
has justification to believe the facts about justificatory support (i.e., the facts about how one's justifiers support 
the beliefs they do) has recently been offered by Brogaard (2018). According to Brogaard, facts about 
justificatory support, which she conceptualizes as facts about evidential probability, are internally accessible in 
the sense that one has memory-seemings to the effect that they are true. Consider the following example which 
she offers: “To be justified in believing that it will rain on the basis of a belief about dark clouds, one must be (1) 
justified in believing that there are dark clouds, and (2) justified in believing that dark clouds makes rain likely. 
According to phenomenal dogmatism of the sort defended here, the belief about current dark clouds is, as we can 
imagine, justified by the visual seeming of dark clouds outside. The belief that dark clouds make rain probable, 
by contrast, is [immediately and fully] justified by the memory seeming that there is a constant conjunction 
between dark clouds and rain.” (Brogaard, 2018, 65.) 
217 
 
2. Being in an a priori position to know APK that you have memorial justification MJ 
for believing that p: 
AP
J : (
M
J : p)  APK : (MJ : p). 
And this gives us the following internalist accessibility condition on memorial justification: 
3. Access internalism about memorial justification: MJ : p  APK : (MJ : p).26 
Although I don't have the space to go into more detail here, this will do as an initial 
characterization of the internalist accessibility condition that attaches to memorial 
justification. According to access internalism about memorial justification, if you have 
memorial justification to believe that p, then you are in an a priori position to know that you 
have memorial justification to believe that p
.
 
27
 
 
5. Preservationism Dethroned 
Access internalism about memorial justification is, however, incompatible with what recently 
has been called “a received view” about memorial justification; namely, preservationism 
(Frise, 2017, 487). This is what the thesis says: 
Preservationism: if a belief B is justified at t1, and B is retained in memory until t2, 
then B is (prima facie) memorially justified at t2.
28
  
So according to preservationism, any memory belief, whether occurrent or dispositional, that 
was justified at an earlier point in time is presently (prima facie) memorially justified.
29
 
Preservationism is in conflict with access internalism since a subject can satisfy the 
antecedent of the conditional, and thereby have a memorially justified belief at t2, but without 
satisfying the internal accessibility condition argued for in the previous section at t2. In other 
                                                          
26
 Since the notion of being in a position to know is factive, the claim could also be formulated using the 
equivalence operator without a change in meaning. 
27
 A similar suggestion when it comes to justification in general is defended and developed in much greater detail 
by Smithies (2019). My position is very much inspired by the arguments in that book. 
28
 Proponents of preservationism include Annis (1980); Pappas (1980); Harman (1986); Burge (1997); Huemer 
(1999); Owens (1999); McGrath (2007); Bernecker (2008); Goldman (2009); Senor (2010); and Naylor (2012). 
29
 A similar view that sometimes is confused with preservationism (see. e.g., Lackey (2007); Michaelian (2011); 
and Senor (2019, ch. 6)) is anti-generativism about memorial justification, which says that memory cannot 
generate justification for belief. However, anti-generativism differs from preservationism insofar as either of the 
views can be true without the other having to be true as well. For more about anti-generativism and how it differs 
from preservationism, see Frise (IEP article on Epistemology of Memory.) 
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words, on the preservationist picture, you can have a memorially justified belief, but without 
being in a position to know what that belief rationally has going for it.
30
   
Moreover, preservationism is motivated by its ability to solve a couple of notorious 
problems in the epistemology of memory. The first is the problem of stored belief, which 
challenges us to explain how the stored beliefs we have that intuitively seem to be justified 
indeed are justified.
31
 Preservationism solves the problem by claiming that a belief (whether 
stored or consciously entertained) will retain its justification as long as it is preserved in 
memory. And since stored beliefs by definition are preserved in memory, they do retain their 
justification. The second problem is the problem of forgotten evidence, which challenges us to 
explain how our justified (memory) beliefs whose original supporting evidence we have 
forgotten indeed are justified.
32
 You might, for example, have a justified belief that your best 
friend's phone number used to be such-and-such, but without remembering what the evidence 
was that you first formed your belief on the basis of. Preservationism again solves the 
problem by claiming that a belief will retain its justification (whether forgotten or not) as long 
as it is preserved in memory.  
Given that preservationism thus is motivated by its ability to avoid the problems 
above, and that it is in conflict with access internalism, does this provide the dialectical upper 
hand to preservationism? I am going to argue that it doesn't. My strategy for doing so will be 
two-pronged: first, I will argue that access internalism about memorial justification has the 
resources to provide plausible solutions to the problem of stored belief and the problem of 
forgotten evidence; second, I will argue that preservationism faces a couple of problems 
which access internalism avoids, and therefore that internalism actually has the dialectical 
upper hand. Let me begin with the first point. 
Access internalism about memorial justification can provide plausible answers to the 
explanatory challenges which the problem of stored belief and the problem of forgotten 
evidence pose. Consider first the problem of stored belief, which challenges us to explain how 
the stored beliefs we have that intuitively seem to be justified indeed are justified. According 
                                                          
30
 Although there is a natural conflict between preservationism and access internalism, the positions aren't 
inconsistent. However, if one were to endorse both positions, one would have to claim for all beliefs that are 
justified when they first enter one's memory, that insofar as they are retained until a later moment in time, the 
subject will have internally accessible grounds which support them, and that this is the case regardless of how 
long it has been since the beliefs in question first entered one's memory—and that, I think, is very implausible. 
31
 Pappas (1980) introduced the problem, whereas Senor (1993), Goldman (1999), and Williamson (2007) 
present it as a problem for internalism about memorial justification. 
32
 Pappas (1980) and Harman (1986) introduced the problem, whereas Goldman (1999) and Bernecker (2008) 
present it as a problem for internalism about memorial justification. 
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to access internalism, stored beliefs are typically justified because we are in an a priori 
position to know that we have certain justifying reasons and that those reasons support them. 
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (2001; cf. Feldman, 2004) and Kevin McCain (2016) have 
suggested that what justifies such stored beliefs are “stored justifications”, which, just like the 
beliefs they justify, also are memorial in nature. Moreover, this suggestion can be plausibly 
expanded along the lines suggested in the previous section by claiming that what justifies 
stored beliefs usually are other stored beliefs which we have introspective justification to 
believe that we have and reflective justification to believe support the stored beliefs that they 
indeed do justify. So, for example, my stored belief that Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo 
is plausibly justified by another stored belief to the effect that a trustworthy source—e.g., my 
middle school teacher—told me so some time ago. 
However, an anonymous referee raised the following objection: there will probably be 
cases where one isn't able, from one's subjective point of view, to distinguish genuine memory 
beliefs from confabulated beliefs, and this raises the worry that one cannot rationally rely on 
one's genuine memory beliefs. Consider, for example, the belief that Napoleon lost the battle 
of Waterloo. Although I might have another stored belief to the effect that a trustworthy 
source told me so some time ago, it might nevertheless be the case that I am not able to tell 
whether or not the second belief is a genuine memory belief.
33
 In response, I think we can 
appreciate the seriousness of this objection, while at the same time demonstrating that it does 
not undermine access internalism about memorial justification. More specifically, I think we 
can do so by acknowledging that what the objection says is true, but that it fails to contradict 
access internalism about memorial justification. According to the access internalist position 
laid out in the previous section, if one has memorial justification to believe p, then one is in an 
a priori position to know that this is the case. However, this version of access internalism 
does not claim that one must be able to take advantage of one's epistemic position and know 
that one has memorial justification to believe p. Neither does it claim that one must be able to 
take advantage of one's propositional justification by forming doxastically justified beliefs on 
their proper justificatory basis. So what this means is that even though the subjective 
indistinguishability of genuine and confabulated memory beliefs might prevent one from 
taking advantage of the memorial justification one has, it is still true that one is in an a priori 
position to know about one's memorial justification. To put the point in more general terms, 
the access internalist position endorsed in this paper only makes a claim about what one is in 
                                                          
33
 Thanks to the referee who helpfully pressed me on this point. 
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an epistemic position to do, in the sense that it might be done by an ideally rational agent, 
while remaining neutral about people's actual psychological capacity for reasoning and 
rationality. 
Consider next the problem of forgotten evidence, which challenges us to explain how 
our justified (memory) beliefs whose original supporting evidence we have forgotten indeed 
are justified. According to access internalism, justified memory beliefs whose original 
supporting evidence we have forgotten are justified by other internally accessible evidence or 
reasons that we haven’t forgotten. In the literature on the epistemology of memory, we find 
two different kinds of explanation that have been suggested along these lines.
34
 First, Brent 
Madison (2014) has argued that just like the perceptual seemings we have justify certain 
corresponding beliefs, we also have memory-seemings which justify certain corresponding 
beliefs.
35
 So whenever you have a justified memory belief whose original evidence you have 
forgotten, you will typically have some memory-seeming (which differs from the belief) 
supporting it. Second, Robert Schroer (2008), following Robert Audi (1995), has argued that 
memory beliefs themselves have certain distinctive phenomenal properties (indicative of their 
source) and that those properties provide defeasible reasons for belief. According to the view, 
simply having a memory belief that p necessarily involves a certain feel or phenomenal aspect 
that justifies believing that p (if I understand the view correctly).
36 
I think the best way for the access internalist to answer the explanatory challenges 
posed by the problem of stored belief and the problem of forgotten evidence is to combine the 
idea that memory beliefs can function as "stored justifications" with Madison's idea that we 
typically have memory-seemings that confer justification upon certain beliefs. By combining 
these ideas, the result is a sophisticated internalist view of memorial justification that has the 
power to deal with the challenges raised above. Our memorially justified beliefs are supported 
                                                          
34
 Another internalist response is offered by McCain (2015), who argues that we haven’t been provided with any 
case which intuitively involves a justified belief whose evidence is forgotten.  
35
 “The basic proposal is a simple one: just as seeming to see that P justifies the belief that P (in the absence of 
defeaters), an internalist might hold that seeming to remember that P justifies the belief that P (in the absence of 
defeaters). . . One’s state of seeming to remember something . . . or a memory-seeming, as I shall call the state, is 
a kind of experience one can undergo, one with content and a distinctive phenomenology, but one without any 
associated phenomenology.” (Madison, 2014, 42-43.) Cf. Pollock (1986), who endorses a somewhat similar 
view where it is our beliefs about our memory-seemings, rather than the memory-seemings themselves, that 
ultimately do the justifying. 
36
 “When I speak of ‘seeming to remember that P’, you should assume that I am referring to an apparent memory 
belief and not an apparent memory image or combination or belief and image. . . 
The kind of memory foundationalism that I am interested in treats the feel of apparent memory beliefs 
as being prima facie justification for believing a proposition. Hence, in asserting that: seeming to remember that 
P is prima facie justification for believing that P, what I am really asserting is that a certain kind of feel—the feel 
of seeming to remember that P—is a defeasible reason for believing that P.” (Schroer, 2008, 75.) 
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by other such beliefs or by memory-seemings. In the case of justified stored beliefs, they are 
justified by other stored beliefs, as is illustrated by the example about Napoleon above. And in 
the case of beliefs whose original supporting evidence we have forgotten, they will either be 
supported by memory-seemings or other stored beliefs (or both, of course), insofar as they are 
justified. 
Now, it should be mentioned that whether or not we actually have enough stored 
beliefs and memory-seemings to justify all the beliefs that we intuitively think of as 
memorially justified is an empirical question. This means the internalist, insofar as he relies 
on the view that I here endorse, runs the risk of committing himself to some form of 
skepticism, if the empirical evidence were to show that we don't have a sufficient stock of 
such memory beliefs and memory-seemings. Moreover, I should note that this is a bullet that I 
am willing to bite; although I strongly suspect, on the basis of my own introspection, that we 
do have enough memory-seemings and beliefs in order to justify all the beliefs that intuitively 
seem to be memorially justified (cf. footnote 39).  
Access internalism about memorial justification is thus just as suited to answer the 
explanatory challenges posed by the problem of stored belief and the problem of forgotten 
evidence as preservationism. Next, I want to argue that the philosopher’s scales should be 
tipped in favor of access internalism, since preservationism is vulnerable to a couple of 
objections which access internalism avoids.  
The first objection is that there are counterexamples to the preservationist analysis of 
memorial justification. For example, Matthew Frise (2017) has recently provided several such 
examples formulated as dilemmas for the preservationist. In this paper, however, I will focus 
on the overconfidence scenario from section 3. The scenario presented a subject named 
Robert who satisfies the antecedent of the preservationist conditional. By relying on his 
reasoning and perception, Robert acquires justified beliefs which his faculty of memory 
reliably retains. According to preservationism, Robert’s memory beliefs should therefore be 
memorially justified when he consciously entertains them at a later time. However, 
intuitively, they clearly fail to be justified. Since he doesn’t have any reason or evidence 
supporting them, Robert’s memory beliefs aren’t memorially justified. Indeed, even though 
his memory belief that Goethe died on the 22
nd
 of March 1832 is true, reliably produced by a 
properly functioning cognitive faculty, and may have been justified in the past, it doesn’t 
seem to be (memorially) justified at the present. Moreover, as we have seen, access 
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internalism offers the correct verdict about the scenario and it appears to receive the most 
support from the evidence which our intuitions provide. According to access internalism, the 
reason Robert’s memory belief isn’t memorially justified is that he isn’t in a position to know 
what that belief rationally has going for it. So whereas preservationism gives the wrong 
verdict about the scenario, access internalism plausibly accounts for our intuitive judgments 
about it. 
The second objection suggests that preservationism, in light of recent work in 
cognitive psychology, is vulnerable to skepticism about memorial justification. The reason is 
simply that preservationism assumes that something like the traditional “storehouse view” of 
memory is true, when in fact it probably isn’t. According to this traditional view, memory is 
like a storehouse insofar as the items we retrieve (be they beliefs or episodic events
37
) are the 
same ones that we deposited at an earlier time. The idea is simply that memory preserves 
(propositionally encoded) information and our doxastic attitude toward it. However, as 
Kourken Michaelian (2011) in his discussion and interpretation of recent work in cognitive 
psychology has demonstrated, the standard scientific view is that memory processing is 
generative or constructive, not preservative. The information that enters memory drastically 
changes at various stages of its processing; indeed, so much so that the information we 
retrieve most plausibly should be considered a construction of our memory processing, rather 
than simply a preserved informational unit—like a bottle of wine retrieved from a wine 
cellar.
38
 According to Michaelian (2016, 82), "the basic lesson of constructive memory 
research is that remembering does in fact routinely involve modifications that introduce 
information not even implicitly contained in the earlier representation." 
So how does the fact that memory processing is constructive rather than preservative 
threaten preservationism about memorial justification? The problem is as follows. Given that 
recent work in cognitive psychology indicates that memory is generally constructive, why, on 
the preservationist view, should our memory beliefs be (memorially) justified? If our 
(justified) beliefs tend to change content while they're processed in memory, why should we 
think that the beliefs we retrieve from memory are justified? After all, the belief we retrieve 
might very well be different from the one that entered memory in the first place, in which case 
the preservationist doesn't provide us with any reason to think that that belief actually is 
                                                          
37
 Using the taxonomy first developed by Squire (2009), episodic memory differs from propositional memory 
insofar as the former has experiences or events as its content, whereas the latter has propositions as its content. 
38
 By drawing on the same literature, Frise (2018) argues that the problem of stored belief is a pseudo-problem 
since there aren’t any stored beliefs.  
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justified. And without any such reason, skepticism follows. Preservationism, at least in its 
current form, is therefore unable to explain why our memory beliefs whose content differs 
from those that originally were encoded in our memory are justified. 
The access internalist, on the other hand, avoids the problem. Since memory beliefs 
usually will be produced by a process with some associated phenomenology, or have some 
phenomenal property of themselves which is indicative of their source, the subject will 
usually be in a position to know what their memory beliefs rationally have going for them—
which plausibly explains why they are (memorially) justified.
39
 And if, for whatever reason, a 
subject has memory beliefs but without any of the relevant phenomenology, access 
internalism again plausibly explains why those beliefs intuitively won’t be memorially 
justified (assuming that the subject doesn’t have any other internally accessible ground for the 
beliefs). So access internalism isn’t only just as suited as preservationism when it comes to 
answering the explanatory challenges posed by the problem of stored belief and the problem 
of forgotten evidence, it also avoids important problems which preservationism is vulnerable 
to. For these reasons, I therefore claim that access internalism should replace preservationism 
as the standard view in the epistemology of memory. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Let me conclude by taking stock. In section 2, I presented BonJour's clairvoyance scenario 
and his argument for access internalism. In section 3, I presented the overconfidence scenario 
and argued that anyone who denies that the memory belief of the subject in that scenario fails 
to be memorially justified is vulnerable to an indistinguishability problem. In section 4, I used 
the intuition elicited by the overconfidence scenario as the basis for an abductive argument for 
access internalism about memorial justification. In section 5, I argued that access internalism 
should replace preservationism as the standard view in the epistemology of memory, since (i) 
it is just as able to answer the explanatory challenges posed by the problem of stored belief 
                                                          
39
 It has long been argued that episodic memory is characterized by one or more special phenomenological 
properties (see, e.g., Hume (1739/2011); Russell (1921); Tulving (2002); Dokic (2014); and Michaelian (2019). 
Moreover, based on my own experience of personal introspection, I find it reasonable to infer that the same 
holds true of semantic/propositional memory. That being said, there clearly seems to be a difference in the 
phenomenal properties that are associated with the different kinds of memory. Whereas episodic memory often 
is characterized by what Tulving (1985) calls autonoetic consciousness—i.e., the feeling of mentally travelling 
through time and experiencing an event anew—propositional memory seems to be characterized by a distinct 
feeling of accessing and retrieving old information. Indeed, that is plausibly why the "storehouse view" of 
memory is so compelling when one only considers it from an intuitive point of view.  
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and the problem of forgotten evidence, and (ii) it avoids a couple of problems which 
preservationism is vulnerable to.  
Access internalism is an intuitively compelling thesis about the nature of memorial 
justification. By reflecting on the justificatory status of overconfident subjects who aren't 
(even in principle) in a position to tell what their memory beliefs rationally have going for 
them, we can infer that there is an internal accessibility condition on memorial justification. 
However, this kind of view is naturally threatened by preservationism, which has become the 
dominant position in the epistemology of memory. Preservationists argue that memory 
preserves the justificatory status of the beliefs that enter it, and that this explains why most of 
our stored beliefs and the beliefs whose original evidence we have forgotten are justified. The 
purpose of this paper has been to challenge the orthodoxy by presenting a new scenario which 
provides the intuitive basis for argumentation which, on the one hand, supports access 
internalism, and, on the other hand, undermines preservationism. Moreover, the paper has also 
argued that preservationism, in contrast to access internalism, is vulnerable to skepticism 
about memorial justification, insofar as it relies on an outdated folk-theoretic conception of 
memory processing. The upshot of the paper is thus that a reorientation of the epistemology of 
memory is in order: the discipline should readjust itself by building its theoretical framework 
in coherence with the scientific work done on memory processing—and, as I have argued, 
access internalism provides a plausible framework for doing so.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
 
7. References 
Alston, W. P. (1986). Epistemic Circularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47 
(1), 1-30. 
Alston, W. P. (1989). Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Cornell 
University Press.  
Annis, D. (1980). Memory and Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 40, 
324-333. 
Armstrong, D. M. (1961). Perception and the Physical World. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Audi, R. (1995). Memorial Justification. Philosophical Topics, 23 (1), 31-45. 
Bergmann, M. (2006). Justification without Awareness. Oxford University Press. 
Bernecker, S. (2008). The Metaphysics of Memory. Dordrecht: Springer. 
BonJour, L. (1980). Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge. Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, 5 (1), 53-73. 
BonJour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
BonJour, L. & Sosa, E. (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, 
Foundations vs. Virtues. Blackwell Publishing. 
Brogaard, B. (2018). Phenomenal Dogmatism, Seeming Evidentialism and Inferential 
Justification. In: K. McCain (Ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. (53-
70.) Springer Verlag. 
Burge, T. (1997). Interlocution, Perception, and Memory. Philosophical Studies, 86, 21-47. 
Casullo, P. (2003). A Priori Justification. New York. Oxford University Press. 
Conee, E. (2004). First Things First. In: E. Conee & R. Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in 
Epistemology. (11-36.) New York: Oxford University Press. 
Conee, E. & Feldman, R. (2001). Internalism Defended. American Philosophical Quarterly, 
38 (1), 1-18. 
226 
 
David, M. (2001). Truth as the Epistemic Goal. In: M. Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, Truth and 
Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility and Virtue. (151-169.) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Dokic, J. (2014). Feeling the Past: A Two-Tiered Account of Episodic Memory. Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology, 5 (3), 413-426. 
Feldman, R. (2004). Having Evidence. In: D. Austin (Ed.), Philosophical Analysis: A Defense 
by Example. (83.104.) Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Feldman, R. (2007). Reasonable Religious Disagreements. In: L. Anthony (Ed.), Philosophers 
without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular. (194-214.) Oxford University 
Press. 
Firth, R. (1978). Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts? In: A. Goldman, & 
J. Kim (Eds.), Values and Moral. (215-229.) Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Frise, M. (2017). Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory. The Philosophical 
Quarterly, 67 (268), 486-507. 
Frise, M. (2018). Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs. American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 55 (1), 63-71. 
Frise, M. Epistemology of Memory. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [downloaded: 
14.03.2019.] Available from: https://www.iep.utm.edu/epis-mem/.  
Glüer, K. & Wikforss, Å. (2018). Reasons for Belief and Normativity. In: D. Star (Ed.), 
Oxford Handbook on Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press. 
Goldman, A. I. (1979). What is Justified Belief. In: G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and 
Knowledge. (1-25.) Boston: D. Reidel. 
Goldman, A. I. (1999). Internalism Exposed. Journal of Philosophy, 96 (6), 271-293. 
Goldman, A. I. (2009). Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification. 
Journal of Philosophy, 106, 309-338. 
Harman, G. (1986). Change in View. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
227 
 
Hume, D. (1739/2011). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Huemer, M. (1999). The Problem of Memory Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 
80, 346-357. 
Huemer, M. (2007a). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 74, 30-55. 
Huemer, M. (2007b). Moore’s Paradox and the Norm of Belief. In: S. Nuccetelli & G. Seay 
(Eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford 
University Press. 
Koethe, J. (1978). A Note on Moore’s Paradox. Philosophical Studies, 34 (3), 303-310. 
Lackey, J. (2007). Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor. 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74 (1), 209-219. 
Lehrer, K. (1990). Theory of Knowledge. Routledge. 
Lehrer, K. & Cohen, S. (1983). Justification, Truth, and Coherence. Synthese, 55 (2), 191-
207. 
Madison, B. J. C. (2014). Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory. Logos and 
Episteme, 5 (1), 33-62. 
McCain, K. (2015). Is Forgotten Evidence a Problem for Evidentialism? The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, 53 (4), 471-480. 
McCain, K. (2016). Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification. Routledge. 
McGrath, M. (2007). Memory and Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese, 157, 1-24. 
Michaelian, K. (2011). Generative Memory. Philosophical Psychology, 24 (3), 323-342. 
Michaelian, K. (2016). Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the 
Personal Past. The MIT Press. 
Naylor, A. (2012). Belief from the Past. European Journal of Philosophy, 20, 598-620. 
Owens, D. (1999). The Authority of Memory. European Journal of Philosophy, 7, 312-329. 
Pappas, G. S. (1980). Lost Justification. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 127-134. 
228 
 
Picher, G. (1971). A Theory of Perception. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Pollock, J. (1986). Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Pritchard, D. (forthcoming). Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement. 
Topoi, 1-9. 
Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of 'Meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, 7, 131-193. 
Russell, B. (1921). The Analysis of Mind. London: G. Allen & Unwin. 
Schroer, R. (2008). Memory Foundationalism and the Problem of Unforgotten Carelessness. 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89 (1), 74-85. 
Senor, T. D. (1993). Internalistic Foundationalism and the Justification of Memory Belief. 
Synthese, 94 (3), 453-476. 
Senor, T. D. (2010). Memory. In: J. Dancy, E. Sosa & M. Steup (Eds.), A Companion to 
Epistemology. (520-524.) Malden: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Senor, T. D. (2019). A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Memory. Bloomsbury 
Academic. 
Shoemaker, S. (1995). Moore’s Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 77 (2/3), 
211-228. 
Smithies, D. (2012a). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 85 (2), 273-300. 
Smithies, D. (2012b). The Normative Role of Knowledge. Noûs, 46 (2), 265-288. 
Smithies, D. (2019). The Epistemic Role of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 
Sosa, E. (1974). How Do You Know? American Philosophical Quarterly, 11 (2), 113-122. 
Squire, L. R. (2009). Memory and Brain Systems: 1969-2009. Journal of Neuroscience, 29 
(41), 12711-12716. 
Swinburne, R. (2001). Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
229 
 
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and Consciousness. Canadian Psychologogy/Psychologie 
Canadienne, 26 (1), 1-12. 
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic Memory: From Mind to Brain. Annual Review of Psychology, 53 
(1), 1-25. 
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, T. (2007). On Being Justified in One's Head. In: Mark Timmons, John Greco, 
and  Alfred Mele (Eds.), Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and 
Epistemology of Robert Audi. (106-122.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty, Ed. G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Tr. D. 
Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Wright, C. (2004). Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume, 78 (1), 167-212. 
Wright, C. (2014). On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology. In: D. Dodd & 
E. Zardini (Eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. (213-247.) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
